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 Summary                                                        
                     
                                                               
This thesis is a reassessment of British foreign policies from the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 until 
the Treaties of Locarno in 1925. It initially argues that much of the historiography of this period is 
unbalanced in its judgement of the different governments because it views them from a teleological 
perspective that fails to differentiate this period from the inter-war years as a whole. The problem 
with this approach is that the rise of Hitler and the causes of the Second World War became so 
dominant in such analyses that most issues within these years have only been judged within that 
wider context.  
 
The thesis argues that an assessment of the foreign policies between 1919 and 1925 must take 
greater account of all the diplomatic, military and economic difficulties in the years after the Great 
War, and also recognise the degree of stability achieved by the end of 1925.  The difficulties 
included the expansion of the British Empire as a result of Versailles, ongoing financial and 
economic problems including wartime debts, the complexities of the Irish negotiations, and the 
major European issues that had not been resolved at Versailles. 
 
Britain was still a great power and its foreign policies are analysed both as an imperial power, 
including the newly acquired territories in the Middle East, and as a major European power. After 
an analysis of primary and secondary sources, it is argued that despite all the difficulties, and the 
seeds of long-term decline in imperial matters, British foreign policies contributed to greater 
stability in international affairs by the end of 1925. This is especially true of the achievements at 
Locarno in respect of Germany’s western borders and in establishing Germany as an equal 
diplomatic partner. There were also no obvious new diplomatic hostages to fortune. Whether 
Britain and other powers could build on this greater stability after 1925 is a different issue, but that 
should not detract from recognition of the achievements during these six years.   
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Introduction, Methodology and Historiography 
 
 
 
‘This country has a double status. In the first place it is an integral part of Europe just as 
much as is France or Germany; secondly it is the centre and nucleus of a world-wide 
confederation, the other members of which are the Dominions.’1   
 
 
 
 
        Scope of the Thesis 
  
This thesis is an attempt to reassess the conduct and success of British foreign policy between 
1919 and 1925. It is an exercise that raises three preliminary tasks. The first is to justify why 
this period has been chosen; the second concerns the definition of success as the criterion 
against which to assess the conduct of policy, and the third is the methodological discussion 
about the ability of individuals, in this case, of politicians, diplomats or civil servants to affect 
the policy decisions. In this Introduction these three issues will be addressed in turn, followed 
by a discussion of the sources for this thesis, both primary and secondary. This will involve 
a review of the relevant literature and an assessment of the strengths, weaknesses and 
suitability of these sources in relation to the objectives of the thesis. The Introduction 
concludes with an outline of the structure of the succeeding chapters of the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1From the writings of James Headlam-Morley, academic historian and classicist, and a temporary member of 
the Foreign Office, including the Paris Conference.  FO 371/11064/W1252/9/98, cited by Erik Goldstein in 
Michael L. Dockerill and Brian J. C. McKercher (eds.), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British 
Foreign Policy 1890-1950 (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p.121.   
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          The Significance of the Years 1919 to 1925:  
                                                                
Historical research projects may be periodised in a variety of ways. The critical factor in 
determining periodisation is how it relates to the objectives of the research. To take one 
relevant example, the ‘inter-war years’ is a commonly used period in twentieth century 
historiography; it is typically defined in British history as the years from 1918 or 1919 to 
1939 or 1940, and it has become a standard period for diplomatic, military, political and 
economic history. The problem with this definition is that histories of this period have taken 
as their primary objective an explanation of the causes and events which led to the rise of 
Hitler and the devastation of the Second World War. This objective has been so dominant in 
the historiography that the major events of the two decades tend to be analysed only insofar 
as they contribute to answering that research question, with the consequence that the 
understanding of this period has been approached in teleological fashion. This has led some 
aspects of these years to be overemphasised and others to be disregarded. Consequently, even 
though the inter-war years periodisation is suitable for the dominant research question, it has 
distorted the historiography of specific periods within the inter-war years. This becomes clear 
if we focus on 1919 to 1925 because doing so will generate alternative interpretations, such 
as that argued for in this thesis.  
 
This thesis argues that the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 is an 
appropriate starting date for a reassessment of foreign policies in the 1920s. The Paris Peace 
Conference, and the resulting treaty signed at Versailles,2 have been extensively researched 
and reassessed in the last twenty years, initially by a group of mainly American academics 
who published their results in 1998,3 and then by MacMillan in her comprehensive account 
published in 2001.4 The argument for  taking Versailles as a starting point, is partly that  it 
                                                 
2 ‘Paris’, ‘Versailles’ and ‘Locarno’ are used as abbreviations where appropriate. 
3 Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elizabeth Glaser (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A 
Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
4 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London: 
John Murray, 2001). 
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was such a significant event which set the diplomatic agenda for the following years and 
partly because it has been so thoroughly and recently researched. 
 
In making the argument for the reassessment to end in 1925, there is no doubt that the 
Locarno Conference in October 1925 were seen as a diplomatic watershed at the time.5 The 
editorials in The Times immediately after the Locarno negotiations were headed ‘Peace at 
Last’6 and ‘Peace with Honour’7 with the former stating that ‘it is a genuine treaty of 
peace…the destructive rivalries that for years had found expression in an appalling war, 
followed by an uncertain peace, are in process of being transformed into forces of intelligent 
co-operation in a common task. The war is over at last.’ A writer to The Times letter column 
went further and asked, ‘ought we not to have flags flying and bells ringing on December 1, 
when the Locarno Pact is signed? It seems to me as important that there should be a day of 
rejoicing, as that Armistice Day should be a day of memory.’8  
 
There was a strong sentiment in parliament, but also in the press, that although there was 
further work to be done, it was Locarno rather than Versailles that marked the real end of the 
Great War.9  Young people attending one of the popular ‘Locarno Ballrooms’ later in the 
twentieth century, would be quite unaware that the name of their local dance hall linked back 
to the positive view of the 1925 Locarno Treaties. For example, one of the ballrooms was 
opened in 1926 in Glasgow, and according to the Glasgow city archives, it was clearly named 
after the town of Locarno in recognition of the achievements in ‘making the frontiers of 
Western Europe permanent.’10 
 
The contemporary positive reception given to Locarno, adds credence to the argument that 
the six years from Versailles to Locarno should be seen as a discrete period, one in which 
many of the consequences of the war and the peace treaties became more settled and the 
                                                 
5 The terms ‘Britain’ and ‘British’ are used rather than the ‘United Kingdom’ as was the custom at the time. 
6 The Times, 17 October 1925. 
7 The Times, 21 October 1925. 
8 The Times, 20 November 1925, p.15, letter from Geoffrey Glyn.   
9 The terms ‘Great War’ or just ‘the war’ are usually used, as they would have been by the politicians of the 
time, unless the term ‘First World War’ is quoted, or seems more appropriate in a longer-term context.  
10 Glasgow city archives, D-CA 8/2930 
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ground was established for a new order that was quite distinct from the one that preceded it. 
However, more important than the contemporary views, this thesis will make the case based 
on historical analysis and will argue that by the end of 1925 the diplomats had made 
significant progress in resolving issues that were either not resolved by Versailles or were 
created by it, and had achieved a greater degree of stability, especially in Western Europe.    
 
It is important to stress that the historiography of the inter-war years does not ignore British 
policy achievements in this period. Instead the argument here is that assessments of them 
have been judged for their contribution to the lead up to the Second World War, rather than 
being considered as significant in their own right. This applies, for example, to military 
history written by Roskill, Bond, Hyde, Kennedy, Barnett, Clayton, Howard, Gibbs and or 
McIntyre,11 to diplomatic or imperial history by Doerr and Holland,12 and to economic 
history by Drummond and Garside.13 Whilst these works offer insights into the period from 
1919 to 1925, many of their arguments are related to the longer period, and they do not offer 
conclusions on the achievements as at 1925. 
 
Conversely, some studies take periods more limited than the one employed in this thesis. 
Two studies covering the years 1918 to 1922 show some of the effects of choosing a different 
date. Jeffery examined the military issues in the empire including Ireland, India and the 
Middle East; his work is of specific interest in bringing out both the predominance of 
problems for the army after 1918, as opposed to the pre-war priority of naval matters, and 
for the comparison with the expenditure in the years immediately before 1914, but he chose 
                                                 
11 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars (London: Collins, 1968); Brian Bond, British Military 
Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: OUP, 1980); H.M. Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars 
1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery 
(London: Allen Lane, 1976); Correlli Barnett, Britain and her Army 1509-1970 (London: Allen Lane, 1970); 
Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower 1919-1939 (London: University of Georgia Press, 
1986); Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of 
the Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972); Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy, Volume I, Rearmament 
Policy (London: HMSO, 1976) and ‘British Strategic Doctrine 1918-1939’ in The Theory and Practice of 
War, Michael Howard (ed.) (London: Cassell, 1965); W. David McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore 
Naval Base 1919-1942 (London: Macmillan, 1979).  
12 Paul W. Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (Manchester: University Press, 1998); Robert Holland, 
Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1981). 
13 Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1919-1939 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1972); 
W. R. Garside British Unemployment 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
5 
 
to end his study in 1922.14 Morgan’s work covers the years of the Lloyd George peacetime 
government; from a foreign policy point of view he therefore covers all the difficulties from 
1919 to 1922. By ending with the fall of the Lloyd George Government in October 1922 he 
emphasised the frustrations of the various earlier European conferences and the near disaster 
at Chanak, factors that appear less significant from the perspective of the wider timespan.  15 
Other historians of Europe have chosen alternative periods, such as the recent book by 
Gerwarth on the years 1919 to 1923. He has studied a quite different periodisation regarding 
the continuing fighting and violence, mainly in central and eastern Europe, in the five years 
after the armistice in November 1918, where his choice of those years is fully justified. 16 
 
There is modern research that analyses the period from Versailles to Locarno or close to it. 
The most substantial example is Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the sub-title of whose book is France, 
Britain and the Enforcement of the Versailles Peace 1919-1925.17 Although the book offers 
valuable insights, it does not take stock at the end of 1925, as the title implies. Further, 
although it covers the totality of European issues, it does not consider the imperial aspects of 
British foreign policy that are equally important in the assessment of the achievements of the 
period. A much older book by Orde appears to cover the same years, although the 1926 in 
her title expands to 1927 in two of the final chapters; like Kleine-Ahlbrandt she did not draw 
conclusions at the end of 1925, although her work is valuable for her contention that during 
this period foreign policies were generally not constrained by military capability.18 
Goldstein’s The First World War Peace Settlements does cover the specific years of 1919 to 
1925, but this book is more of a textbook and also looked at Locarno from an international, 
rather than a British, point of view.19 The sub-title of Ferris’s book,  The Evolution of British 
                                                 
14 Keith Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918-1922 (Manchester: University Press, 1984). 
15 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979). 
16 Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished : Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923 (London : Allen 
Lane, 2016). 
17 William Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Burden of Victory: France, Britain and the Enforcement of the 
Versailles Pace, 1919-1925 (London: University Press of America, 1995). 
18 Anne Orde, Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978).  
19 Erik Goldstein, The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925 (London: Pearson Longman, 2002).  
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Strategic Foreign Policy, 1919-1926 makes it appear relevant but this book is more 
concerned with financial and military policies rather than strategic foreign policies. 20     
 
A number of recent secondary sources have recognised the problem with the inter-war 
periodisation. Grayson wrote that ‘often, scholars look at the 1920s to ascertain the causes of 
the problems of the next decade, thus failing either to understand the outlook of policy-
makers at the time, or credit their achievements.’21  Gaynor Johnson argued: 
 
         Almost all of the work that has been published on the diplomacy of the inter-war 
period is tinged with a fatalistic quality and is concerned directly or indirectly 
with explaining the outbreak of the Second World War. The actions of Hitler 
continue to dominate the historiographical landscape of the inter-war period, 
with the diplomacy of the 1920s commanding much less attention from 
historians.22   
 
 
In summary, in the justification of the choice of the years of 1919 to 1925 for this thesis, 
there are many examples of the issues being subsumed within the overall consideration of 
the inter-war years. The example of Orde and the more recent example of Kleine-Ahlbrandt 
both demonstrate that even where historians have accepted the need to look at the period 
from 1919 to 1925 there is still a gap in the historiography in assessing the significance of 
these years, and this thesis attempts to fill that gap, by looking specifically at the 
achievements by the end of 1925. The next question that must be answered is how to measure 
the success or achievements of the governments.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 John Robert Ferris, Men, Money, and Diplomacy: The Evolution of British Strategic Foreign Policy, 1919-
1926 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
21 Richard S. Grayson Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe : British Foreign Policy, 1924-29 
(London : Frank Cass, 1997) p.ix. There is a general dilemma as to whether to use the present or past tense in 
citing secondary sources, especially as a source can date from 1920 or 2016; I have followed advice and 
normally used the past tense. 
22 Gaynor Johnson (ed.), Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy 1920-1929 (Oxford: Routledge, 2004), p.1. 
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How to measure the Success of the Governments: 
 
In assessing the ‘success’ or ‘achievements’ of the governments23 of this period, it is 
necessary to consider what criteria should be used for this purpose. It is possible to employ 
criteria for the success of foreign policies that are not related to the conduct of diplomacy; it 
can, for example, be assessed in relation to economic history, to social history, or to cultural 
history. As Burke put it succinctly, ‘a cultural history of parliament would differ from a 
political history of the same institution.’24 A thesis could examine the extent to which foreign 
policies contributed to increased trade and economic prosperity, or whether policies 
contributed to domestic harmony or social progress. It would also be possible, within the 
analysis of imperial policy, to assess the benefits, quantitative or qualitative, brought to the 
colonial countries.  
 
While all these perspectives are valid, this thesis attempts to measure the achievements of 
foreign policies in relation to whether they dealt effectively with the foreign policy problems 
that the governments faced as a result of the Great War, the complicated peace negotiations 
in Paris, and the treaties that were then imposed on the defeated countries.  Therefore, 
successful foreign policies are defined in terms of making progress in at least some of the 
problems created by, or left unsolved by Versailles, in particular in enhancing stability in 
Western Europe, in resolving or containing problems in the Britain’s broad imperial 
responsibilities, and in not leaving obvious ‘hostages to fortune’25 for the governments to try 
to resolve after 1925. As the existing established global imperial power, Britain would be 
more concerned with stability than an expanding United States, or a country like Russia 
                                                 
23 The six-and-a-half years from Versailles to Locarno are almost equally split between the Lloyd George 
peacetime government which lasted until October 1922, and the four governments in the next three years, 
under Bonar Law, Baldwin, MacDonald and the first year of the second Baldwin administration. 
24 Peter Burke What is Cultural History? (Cambridge : Polity, 2004) p.3. 
25 The term ‘hostages to fortune’ may not be ideal, but it is intended to define an important concept, especially 
when arguing for a specific periodisation in history, of very difficult issues which are created by current 
governments, but then left for future governments to live with, or attempt to solve. 
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which had just been through revolution, or a country like Egypt seeking independence, but 
there was still a majority interest in stability amongst the major powers. 
 
There are inevitable linkages between foreign and domestic policies. Foreign policies have 
domestic causes and consequences which can affect not only the political establishment, but 
also all sections of domestic life. This is perhaps most evident in times such as the Great War. 
Domestic issues also provide major constraints on foreign policies. This thesis explores three 
areas of possible domestic constraints on foreign policies during this period, namely the 
differences in policies between the main political parties, the economic constraints, and the 
military constraints which may themselves be direct consequence of the economic 
constraints.  
 
The diplomatic problems of these years provided problems, challenges and opportunities 
for all or many of the countries involved, but the size and complexities of Britain’s issues 
were especially significant because Britain was a major power before, during and after the 
Great War, in both imperial and European terms. The demise of the Russian, German, 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires left only France as a comparable traditional 
empire, with the growing power of the United States as a new global power.   
 
The extent of the diplomatic problems, can be seen in that there were more than twenty 
European conferences in these years about German reparations and related matters, including 
meetings of experts and meetings to prepare for those conferences, and most were 
unsuccessful or inconclusive until the London Conference in August 1924, which 
incorporated the terms of the Dawes Plan. The subsequent negotiations in September 1924, 
within the League of Nations26 on the terms of the Geneva Protocol, proposed committing 
the countries both to a disarmament conference, and to a binding system of arbitration to 
settle disputes. MacDonald’s commitment to the Protocol was not ratified by the incoming 
                                                 
26 The ‘League of Nations’ is often referred to just as the ‘League’, and the ‘Geneva Protocol’ the ‘Protocol’. 
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Baldwin government, and Austen Chamberlain as the new foreign secretary was responsible 
for the British efforts that led to the Locarno Agreements in October 1925.27  
 
It will be argued that, after all the problems discussed at Versailles, and the issues left 
unresolved, it was a considerable achievement six years later that Germany accepted detailed 
agreements on reparations and on its western borders, that France agreed to Germany being 
treated as an equal in the League, and that a very different long-term settlement had been 
agreed regarding Turkey and Greece, all at the same time that Britain was dealing with the 
centuries-old problem in Ireland, and many other difficult issues in her global empire. 
 
Like any governments, the post-war governments had to deal with unpredictable one-off 
events such as the Amritsar massacre, and the subsequent parliamentary debate, but the most 
continuing non-domestic pressures were those Franco-German problems throughout these 
years, and the Irish problems up to the end of 1922. It is arguable whether the Irish problems 
should be designated as falling under a domestic or imperial heading. The Irish issues came 
back firmly on the cabinet agenda immediately after the war, and involved a large 
commitment of time and effort from different cabinet ministers, but especially from Lloyd 
George, and they were also related to other imperial developments, with Southern Ireland 
becoming a Dominion in 1922. There were therefore a wide range of continuing and other 
problems to test the governments’ resolve and diplomatic skills. 
 
In assessing the success or achievements of the governments’ policies it is necessary to 
understand the background to these years, the problems left unresolved at Versailles, and 
then the progress made with and by the Treaty of Locarno which was finally signed in London 
in December 1925. The expression which captures the key issue better than the word 
‘success’ or even ‘achievements’ is the degree to which the policies had led to a greater 
degree of ‘stability’ on key foreign policy issues by the end of 1925. For a nation such as 
Britain, as a fully stretched imperial power at this time, greater stability is a reasonable test 
of any re-assessment of achievements in foreign policies, and whether at least some of the 
                                                 
27 Austen Chamberlain will normally be referred to as Chamberlain; any references to his father Joseph 
Chamberlain, or his half-brother Neville Chamberlain, will include their first names. 
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problems left unresolved at Versailles, had now been resolved, such as Germany’s 
acceptance of its western borders. Stability may not, as stated above, be the priority for all 
nations in the same way, but it was vital for a long-established imperial power such as Britain. 
 
It must also be established, especially after choosing the specific date of the signing of the 
Treaty of Locarno, that there were no hostages to fortune established during these years, and 
outstanding at the end of 1925. The term ‘hostages to fortune’ was apparently first used by 
Francis Bacon in 1612, with no relevance to history at all. However, it is a helpful concept 
for historians, and has been used very recently about the Iraq War and the Middle-East, with 
a definition along the lines of taking an action or making a statement that is risky because it 
could cause trouble later; it is particularly appropriate for a study such as this thesis which 
emphasises the importance of a specific timeline. 
 
If the five governments of these years had established greater stability by the end of 1925, 
but had created hostages to fortune that undermined that stability in the medium or longer 
term, it would undermine the arguments in this thesis. There were such examples from the 
Great War, with long term effects, such as the ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement’ or the ‘Balfour 
Declaration’ or from Versailles such as the ‘Polish Corridor’ or perhaps the ignoring of the 
Kurdish claims for self-determination or independence.  However, it will be argued that in 
relation to the years from 1925 to 1929, that there are no such obvious examples arising from 
the post-war years up to 1925. There were, for example, no insoluble hostages to fortune 
arising from the Washington Naval Agreement, from promises made or not made about self-
determination or independence for Dominions or colonies, or from the Locarno treaties 
themselves regarding Western Europe.  
 
The success, or achievements, of British foreign policy can be reasonably assessed against 
the progress made between the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the Treaty of Locarno in 
1925, both in respect of the greater stability achieved and the absence of hostages to fortune 
being left for the following years. While other countries might have different interests in 
stability, however defined, Britain as a long-established global imperial power, had a great 
interest in stability and the resolution of existing problems. 
11 
 
 
 
 
The Role of the Individual in Foreign Policy 
 
This thesis is therefore concerned with the success of the British foreign policies, and makes 
clear the role of individuals in making or influencing those policies. It is therefore important 
to consider at the outset the status of the individual in the making of history. Debate on the 
importance of the individual, as opposed to the impact of social structure, in determining the 
course of events is perennial within the social sciences. The critical concept in this context is 
that of agency, more precisely the extent of the agency of individuals in the conduct of human 
affairs. If major events in history were determined by structural factors in the international 
sphere, then a focus on individuals would have little explanatory force.  
 
In an attempt to create an analytically useful distinction, sociologists Barker and Jane, 
echoing Marx’s classic and more eloquently phrased formulation, 28 defined agency as the 
‘socially determined capability to act and make a difference’ and structure as the ‘recurrent 
organisation and patterned arrangements of human relationships.’ 29  This distinction will be 
applied to the realm of foreign policy decisions in this thesis, which will therefore analyse 
the extent to which the capacity of the key politicians, statesmen, diplomats and civil servants 
to make choices,  was constrained by ‘recurrent patterned arrangements.’  
 
Among contemporary theorists, the work of Anthony Giddens, the British sociologist, is 
widely considered to be most relevant on this subject. He uses his concept of structuration to 
argue that the way social systems reproduce themselves is rooted in both structure and 
agency, with primacy being given to neither. Giddens sees human beings as having the power 
to intervene, or to refrain from intervention, in different situations, and says that agency does 
                                                 
28 Karl Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1926) p.23.  ‘Men 
make their own history, but not just as they please. They do not choose the circumstances for themselves, but 
have to work upon circumstances as they find them, have to fashion the material handed down by the past. 
The legacy of the dead generations weighs like an alp upon the brains of the living.’  
29 Chris Barker and Emma Jane, Cultural Studies : Theory and Practice (London : Sage, 2016) p.632. 
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not refer to ‘the intention people have in doing things, but to their capability of doing those 
things in the first place.’ He develops his argument by stating that agency has to be related 
to power rather than to intentions, and that to be able to ‘act otherwise’ means ‘being able to 
intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a 
specific process or state of affairs.’ 30  It was the politicians and statesmen, and to a lesser 
degree the senior civil servants and diplomats, whose positions in the social structure gave 
them power, rather than just the intentions, to introduce or modify or influence foreign 
policies.  It was not the impressive personalities or intellects that were of key importance, but 
that the politicians occupied positions of power that enabled them to use those skills or 
attributes to make or modify foreign policies.   
 
In practice, the analytical concepts are not applied literally to historical analysis, and a clear 
distinction between structure and agency is rarely argued.   It is more usual to follow Giddens 
and refer to the inevitability of a mixture, with the focus, as here, being on exploring the 
pattern of interaction between these two forces. In the context of international history, as 
eminent a theorist as Bourdieu sought to transcend traditional arguments by stating that  ‘his 
particular target is the commonly held assumption that it is necessary to take sides on the 
question of agency and structure.’31  In relation to the field of diplomatic history, Otte 
expresses the sense that the writing of history has moved beyond concern with the role of the 
state and the actors within it, and that this approach has been seen as ‘old-fashioned and 
lacking in the glamour associated with theory-driven deconstructions and reconstructions of 
identities and views of the ‘other’ in terms of ethnicity, gender or sexuality.’ However, he 
later came to a pragmatic conclusion on diplomatic history when he wrote that ‘Human 
agency holds the key to history,’ but stressed that ‘the lock, however, will turn only if the 
actions of individuals are placed against the realities behind diplomacy.’32   Specific to the 
years under discussion, in his study of foreign secretaries, 33 Hughes concluded after 
                                                 
30 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society : Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge : Polity 
Press, 1984), pp.9 and 14. 
31 Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu, the cultural turn, and the practice of international history’ in Review of 
International Studies Volume 34/1 January 2008. p. 163. 
32 T.G. Otte, ‘Diplomacy and Decision Making’ in Patrick Finney (ed.)  Palgrave Advances in International 
History (London : Macmillan, 2005) pp.37 and 51. 
33 The use of capital or lower case is a problem for those writing diplomatic and political history, with the 
plethora of examples. As there are no absolute rules, this thesis follows the majority of historians, in putting 
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considering the balance of agency and structure, that his analysis ‘rest on the assumption that 
the foreign secretaries at least had the potential to be pivotal in influencing British foreign 
policy between the wars.’34  
 
In summary, while the problem of agency versus structure has been widely debated, the 
dominant response is to refuse to give primacy to either. In the field of diplomatic history, 
the primary justification for focusing on individuals, while not denying the role of social 
structure, is that these individuals occupy positions of power within the state.  The policy 
choices they make take place within the ‘recurrent patterned arrangements’ of this six-year 
period, but these choices do make a material difference to the success or otherwise of British 
foreign policy. To illustrate this argument, it is appropriate at this point to highlight some 
themes in the thesis which demonstrate the interplay of structure and agency. The details of 
all the themes are described in the later chapters on imperial and European matters. 
 
Concepts of the British Empire, and commitment to maintaining it, were a major theme of 
this period and there were clear common assumptions in the British political establishment, 
about the appropriateness, wisdom and virtues of the British Empire. 35  This was reinforced 
by the collapse of the Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in 1917 or 
1918, and only challenged in the British political establishment by an occasional political 
maverick like Edwin Montagu. So, whether talking about the British Empire in relation to 
the Dominions, India or the colonies, the existence of recurrent patterned arrangements is 
clear. However, the empire evolved significantly in this period. The additional territories 
obtained within Versailles, particularly in the Middle-East, and the development and 
clarification of the status of the ‘White Dominions’ created new questions on which policy 
                                                 
job designations in lower case (unless referring to individual such as President Wilson) and departments of 
state and political parties with capitals. Usages that feel odd include the ‘viceroy of India,’ the ‘empress of 
India,’ ‘imperial and European policies’ and ‘Dominions and colonies’, but the main objective is to try to be 
consistent within the thesis.  
34 Michael Hughes British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World 1919-1939 (London : Routledge, 2005) 
p.6. 
35 A striking example of British imperialist attitudes a few years later was when the Conservative cabinet on 
22 January 1929 had a lengthy discussion as to if it would be appropriate to operate a British ‘Monroe 
Doctrine’ in the Middle East and/or Persia. The fact that the cabinet could spend such time discussing this is 
the important point, not that no conclusion was reached.  
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choices had to be made. It is in these choices that the effect of individual statesmen or 
politicians on events becomes apparent. 
  
In Western Europe, the clearest example of recurrent patterned arrangements in the decades 
after 1870, and in this period, was the rivalry, hostility and hatred between France and 
Germany, following the establishment of the new German State under Prussia and Bismarck. 
This hostility was at its height during the wars of 1870-1871 and 1914-1918, but not 
surprisingly continued in the years after each war, including continuing into the Paris 
Conference, the Treaty of Versailles and the six-year period under discussion. However, in 
this context the recurrent pattern was challenged and this enmity had to evolve in light of the 
upheavals produced by the Great War. The consequences of the war extended beyond the 
Franco-German rivalry and other parties had a vital interest in shaping the new context, in 
the interests of their own societies. Britain had a particular interest, not only because events 
on the continent had a large effect on British society, but also because its imperial great power 
status meant its interests were at stake anywhere in the world where the aftermath of the war 
created change. The situation was therefore one that required exceptional creativeness and 
involved choices for British statesmen on a wide and significant set of issues. This then is a 
case in which the weight of past generation did indeed weigh heavily on statesmen, 36 but 
they had to create a new pattern that could become a new recurrent arrangement, through the 
conference in Paris, through the events surrounding the Dawes Plan, and in the London 
Conference and the Locarno Conference. The role of the individuals in all these events and 
the significance of the decisions they reached is evident.37 
 
In looking at the theoretical analyses of foreign policy issues, a good description that is 
consistent with this thesis, was made by Brighi and Hill when they concluded that ‘foreign 
policy decisions should be seen primarily as heightened moments of commitment in a 
perpetual process of action, reaction, and further action at many different levels and involving 
a range of different actors, inside and outside the state, all of which need to be taken into 
                                                 
36 Marx, op cit. 
37 While it is arguable whether the Irish Problem was a domestic or an imperial problem, there is no doubt 
there had been recurrent patterned arrangements, but these were broken by the changes orchestrated by Lloyd 
George and the Sinn Fein leaders, which resulted in a pragmatic negotiated peace at the end of 1921.  
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account.’38  Using this perspective, this thesis argues that key individual players in British 
foreign policy during these years affected recurrent patterned arrangements. Key individuals 
whose contributions will become clear in the central chapters included Lloyd George, 
Chamberlain, Churchill, Balfour and Crowe. 
 
Lloyd George was the key British player during the three years after the armistice. While his 
individual contribution in Paris has been emphasised by many historians, most recently by 
MacMillan,39 assessments of his contributions as prime minister after Paris are more mixed. 
One of his key contributions was to the negotiations about Irish independence with Sinn Fein. 
Other examples show that individual contributions do not have to be direct and/or successful, 
in order to be significant. Lloyd George clearly affected the Greco-Turkish events in a 
negative way, and in regard to the Washington Conference his influence was important, but 
as a passive supporter in London of Balfour’s role in Washington, rather than as a participant.  
 
Austen Chamberlain’s contribution was in the twelve months he was foreign secretary 
leading up to the Locarno Conference. It was in the period that he, Briand and Stresemann 
accomplished the settlement in October 1925, which was the culmination of nine months of 
diplomatic negotiations since Stresemann’s initiative in January. This was a more traditional 
diplomatic success with the full use of British ambassadors during the process, unlike the 
different diplomatic approaches employed in Paris, and in Washington which will be 
described in subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
 
Churchill appears at various points during these six years as secretary of state for war, as 
colonial secretary, and then as chancellor of the exchequer in the second Baldwin 
Government. His contributions were perhaps more pragmatic than his traditional image or 
reputation would suggest, but he certainly influenced policy as an individual in respect of 
attitudes to Russia, to imperial policy in the Middle-East, to the settlement in Ireland and 
                                                 
38 Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill Implementation and Behaviour in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and 
Tim Dunne (eds.) Foreign Policy : Theories / Actors / Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) p.166. 
39 MacMillan Peacemakers. 
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then as chancellor of the exchequer, regarding both financial policies which were his 
responsibility, and foreign policies, which were not. 
 
Balfour’s significance lies in the fact that years after being prime minister, and having been 
foreign secretary for nearly three years from December 1916, he reappeared as an elder 
statesman to play major roles at the Washington Naval Conference, and then at the Imperial 
Conference in 1926, where he made a significant contribution to the definition of 
independence for the Dominions. Balfour’s impact was arguably more significant than 
Curzon, who was foreign secretary for most of this period, although, this should not ignore 
Curzon’s success at the protracted negotiations in Lausanne, where he finally achieved a 
lasting settlement between Turkey and Greece in June 1923. 
 
The most influential civil servant during these years was Sir Eyre Crowe, who despite his 
German ancestry, first established his reputation in the Foreign Office in 1907, with a clear 
warning of the danger of Germany to the balance of power in Europe. After the war, Crowe 
was permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office from 1920 until his death in 1925. 
Chamberlain’s appreciation of Crowe, in a private letter to his own sister is revealing when 
he said ‘He was a great public servant, devoted to duty, delightful to work with, of immense 
knowledge & experience & proved judgement.’40 Goldstein wondered what might have been 
achieved after 1925, if Crowe had not died prematurely in April 1925,41 and Neilson and Otte 
concluded in their study of permanent under-secretaries that at Versailles he ‘provided the 
energetic impulse and the organisational efficiency in the British efforts at the conference.’42  
 
The example of such an influential civil servant like Crowe, raises the further question of 
recurrent patterned arrangements within the Foreign Office, or the wider civil service. Whilst 
thinking could be more constrained within in these areas than with politicians, there was still 
                                                 
40 Austen Chamberlain, The Austen Chamberlain Diary and Letters 1916-1937 Robert C. Self (ed.) 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.275. This citation is probably more objective that quoting 
from his daughter’s biography Sybil Eyre Crowe, Our Ablest Public Servant : Sir Eyre Crowe 1864-1925 
(London : Merlin, 1993). 
41 Erik Goldstein, The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact 1924-1925 in Dockrill 
and McKercher (eds), Diplomacy and World Power. p.135. 
42 Keith Neilson and T.G.Otte The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs 1854-1946 (London : 
Routledge, 2008). pp.170 and 175. 
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room for individual leadership and special support for the politicians. This again reinforces 
that the discussion of agency and structure is a necessary background analysis to this thesis, 
but the arguments are now progressed, in line with the majority of historians, on the basis 
that they should reflect the important contribution of statesmen and politicians in exercising 
their power in the making and influencing important foreign policy decisions.  
 
 
 
The Use of Primary Source Material 
 
This thesis does not bring forward previously unstudied primary sources. The primary, and 
also the secondary sources, referred to are mostly well-known, and the arguments made in 
this thesis are not based on newly discovered papers, but rather on an alternative 
interpretation of a wide range of existing sources relevant to these years. Of the primary 
sources, the most important are formal government documentation, especially the 
comprehensive Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919 to 1939, a series that is central to 
research on this period. 43  The strength of the Documents is that historians of this period have 
themselves researched all the Foreign Office files and selected the key documents. While 
every document cited must be tested for its relevance to the issues discussed, it is reasonable 
to assume the professionalism of the choices of documents after the research that led to the 
twenty-seven volumes of the documents to cover these six years.  
 
The commitment to the work on the Documents was announced in 1944 by Anthony Eden, 
the foreign secretary, and it was initially assumed that it would be produced concurrently for 
the two separate decades of the nineteen-twenties and the nineteen-thirties.44  In the event, 
the starting point was defined as the signing of the Versailles Treaty, and then both decades 
                                                 
43 Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (London HMSO): 
       First Series       27 volumes from 1919 to October 1925, published from 1947 to 1986. 
       Series 1A          7 volumes from October 1925 to 1929, published from 1966 to 1975. 
       Second Series   21 volumes from 1930 to early 1938, published from 1946 to 1984. 
       Third Series      9 volumes from early 1938 to Sept 1939, published from 1949 to 1955. 
All quotations from Documents are from First Series, unless specific reference is made to another series. 
44 Hansard, Volume 398, 29 March 1944, column 1408. 
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were split, the 1920s in 1925 and the 1930s in 1938. The dates chosen are consistent with 
and reinforces both the starting and concluding dates of this research. The editor of the 
Documents, and presumably the researchers working through the detailed documents, 
subsequently justified the split in 1925 by emphasising the watershed of Locarno, and 
concluding that the best dividing point was the initialling of the Locarno Agreements on 16 
October 1925. 45 
 
The workings of the Cabinet are a second important source. Meetings did not have formal 
minutes before 1916. The War Cabinet Minutes, initiated by Lloyd George and Hankey in 
October 1916, and continued as the Cabinet Minutes from October 1919, provided formal 
accounts of cabinet decisions during these years.46 The limitation of this source is that the 
minutes concentrated on the decisions made at the meetings, and normally did not list 
arguments made by individual cabinet members. However, the minutes of the cabinet sub-
committees, such as the Committee on Imperial Defence, or the Eastern Committee, are more 
illuminating as they usually listed the arguments made by individual cabinet members.47 
Other government minutes such as those for the British Empire delegation in Paris or those 
of the various Imperial Conferences also recorded the detailed discussions, and the views of 
the different Dominions.48  
 
The proceedings of parliament were central to the domestic political process, and therefore 
the third major source is Hansard, which provides the full account of the proceedings of both 
the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Although it is important to analyse the 
nuances of formal ministerial statements, Hansard is particularly useful because it goes 
beyond those ministerial statements, and records the views of backbenchers which are more 
diverse and offer greater insight into the various currents of opinion that were extant in the 
                                                 
45 M. E. Lambert in the preface to the First Series of Documents, volume 1. 
46 National Archives NA/CAB 23. 
47 The CID, sometimes referred to as the Standard Defence Sub-Committee, in files NA/CAB 2/3; the Eastern 
Committee in NA/CAB 27/24. 
48 The British Empire Delegation in NA/CAB 29/28; the Imperial Conferences in NA/CAB 32.  
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period. This is much more likely to capture the mood of the times, and the variety of popular 
opinion, than the sometimes bland character of government statements.49 
 
Newspapers and periodicals provide contemporary, even if often anonymous comment, of 
the events of the period. Although there were a wide range of newspapers, The Times and 
The Economist are especially important for this thesis because they had correspondents based 
in key foreign cities who had greater understanding of the views of that country and its 
government. The views of The Economist’s Paris correspondent both during the war and in 
the subsequent years provide important balance in the analysis of Anglo-French relations.  
 
While sources such as Documents, Hansard and The Times are regularly cited regarding 
these years, the major use in this thesis of The Round Table, available in London University, 
is more unusual. Within the wider political establishment, The Round Table and The New 
Europe were two academic-political interest groups, that had significant influence on 
thinking about international relations before, during and immediately after the war. The 
nature of the two groups was well described by Goldstein, who wrote that: ‘The Round Table 
was primarily Unionist and Empire-centric, The New Europe liberal and Euro-centric. World 
War I brought about a convergence of the work of the two groups’ and that ‘each of these 
groups was by no means monolithic but rather a broad church, its members sharing some 
views and differing on others.’50 A permanent achievement of these groups was the founding 
of Chatham House in 1920, which was to be granted a royal charter as the ‘Royal Institution 
of International Affairs’ in 1926. 
 
Although coming from an imperial background, the quarterly publication of The Round Table 
is a good source of wider political and diplomatic thinking during these years and it was not 
afraid of being controversial. For example, in March 1918, in analysing a possible peace 
settlement, it was concerned for the large German speaking population in Alsace-Lorraine 
and argued that peace did ‘not necessarily imply the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine as an 
                                                 
49 The ‘House of Commons’ and ‘House of Lords’ may be abbreviated to ‘Commons’ and ‘Lords.’ All 
quotations from Hansard are from the Commons, unless the Lords are specified. 
50 Erik Goldstein, ‘The Round Table and New Europe,’ The Round Table, Number 346, April 1998, p.177. 
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entity to France.’ 51 This was not an easy, or popular, argument to make at any time, but 
especially when the war was far from over. 
 
In addition to official and public sources already described, focus on individual politicians at 
various points in the arguments needs more specific primary sources related to individual 
politicians. These include the archived papers of Lloyd George in the Parliamentary 
Archives, of Austen Chamberlain at Birmingham University and Churchill’s at Churchill 
College, Cambridge; many of the most relevant of Churchill’s papers were collected together 
by Gilbert in the companion to his biography of Churchill.52  Less well known are the papers 
of Sir John Stavridi, at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford. There are also contemporary diaries 
or letters of participants such as Amery, D’Abernon, Nicolson, Riddell and Scott.53 
 
Finally, there are the autobiographies written by figures such as Amery, Cecil, Churchill and 
Lloyd George; these must be treated with caution, as they were often written some years after 
the events, when the authors priority was to justify their earlier political decisions, rather than 
to give the most impartial account of the events.54 An example of the unreliability or 
inconsistency of political memoirs, can be seen in the two separate books by Cecil. In 1941 
he wrote in a brief reference to Locarno, that ‘in all the Treaties, the position of the League 
was fully safeguarded. Indeed, they were not to come into force till Germany entered the 
League.’55  However, in 1949 he wrote on the same subject that ‘indeed, the worst part of 
Locarno was that it diminished the authority and availability of the League’ although he 
added that ‘I did not think that at the time.’56 
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 The Round Table, Number 30, March 1918, p.244.  
52 Martin Gilbert, Winston S Churchill Companion Papers Volume IV 1917-1922 and Volume V 1922-1939 
(London: Heinemann, 1977 and 1979). 
53 L. S. Amery, The Leo Amery Diaries 1896-1929 (London: Hutchinson, 1980); Lord D’Abernon, 
Ambassador of Peace: Pages from the Diary of Viscount D’Abernon (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929); 
Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1933); George Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace 
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54 L. S. Amery, My Political Life (London: Hutchinson, 1953); Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The 
Aftermath (London: Macmillan, 1929); and David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (London : Odhams, 1936) 
and The Truth about the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938). 
55 Lord Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment (London : Jonathan Cape, 1941). p.167. 
56 Lord Robert Cecil, All the Way (London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1949).  p.187. 
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Although many of the primary documents and quotations will be well known, and be 
consistent with the interpretations in other secondary sources, it is not assumed that they have 
                   always been correctly quoted or interpreted.  For example, Curzon’s much quoted Foreign 
Office document of 1921,57 and the quotation from Chamberlain’s speech to the Commons 
in 1924,58 will be scrutinised in the analysis of relationships with France, to understand better 
the British attitudes to its major ally from the Great War. The Chamberlain speech is 
particularly important; Dutton, in emphasising Chamberlain’s friendship with France, quoted 
him in the Commons in July 1924 saying that: ‘we would make the maintenance of the 
Entente with France the cardinal object of our policy.’59 However, a closer look at Hansard 
shows that Chamberlain, speaking from the opposition front bench regarding the meeting 
between the prime ministers of Britain and France actually spoke of three, rather than one, 
underlying principles for a future Conservative government: upholding the Treaty of 
Versailles, maintaining the entente with France and also if Germany accepted its obligations, 
to respect the integrity of Germany and to welcome her back into the international community 
of nations. 60 This demonstrates the importance of studying the full citation in the primary 
source. 
 
Contemporary comments from politicians, and near contemporary memoirs, may lack 
objectivity, but may still be used with those reservations in mind. Moreover, the relevance of 
such sources is not just whether the arguments are correct; for example, there are a number 
of quotations in this thesis from the diaries of Lord D’Abernon.61 This does not assume that 
D’Abernon, the British Ambassador to Germany, was as influential as he suggests, or as 
some historians may have implied. Johnson’s The Berlin Embassy of Lord D’Abernon is no 
doubt correct as to the limitations of D’Abernon’s contribution to the diplomatic processes, 
and to his generally ‘idiosyncratic’ behaviour.62 Citations are however still appropriate 
because his contemporary comments and the introductions written in 1929 are relevant on 
                                                 
57 Documents, Volume XVI, No.768, 28 December 1921, p.860. 
58 Hansard, Volume 176, 14 July 1924, column 109. 
59 David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain : Gentleman in Politics (London : Ross Anderson, 1985). p.238.  
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Locarno Diplomacy Germany and the West (Princeton : University Press, 1972), p.16. 
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the basis of how a perceptive diarist saw the issues, rather than on his contribution to the 
current problems. 
 
This thesis therefore makes most use of formal government documents, but with careful 
analysis of correct citations. The overall breadth of primary sources available is helpful, and 
the Round Table provides a particularly distinctive source of contemporary political 
comments on both imperial and European issues. 
 
 
 
 
The Use of Secondary Sources 
 
Many of the secondary sources for the period from 1919 to 1925, especially in the diplomatic 
and military fields, were written during the 1970s, after the large number of primary sources 
cabinet and foreign office files from the 1920s reached the end of what was then a fifty-year 
restriction of access.63  Although some of these works will still be quoted, the majority of the 
arguments from such research will have been subsumed within more recent books, especially 
that of MacMillan in 2001 regarding Versailles,64 of Johnson and her colleagues in 2004 
regarding the Locarno years,65 of Steiner in 2005 regarding the broader European issues but 
including Locarno,66 and of Darwin in 2009 on the British Empire.67  
 
These four books all make major contributions to an understanding of this period, but they 
do not provide a particular basis for the historiography of this thesis. MacMillan’s 
comprehensive account illustrated the complexities of the problems that were solved, or not 
solved, in Paris, but essentially ends with the treaty signing at Versailles; Johnson and her 
                                                 
63 The closed period was changed in principle from 50 years to 30 years in legislation in 1967, and was 
introduced gradually over some years.  
64 MacMillan, Peacemakers. 
65 Johnson, Locarno Revisited.  
66 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
67 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830-1970 (Cambridge: 
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colleagues, and like Jacobson before them, looked well beyond 1925 at the years after 
Locarno; Steiner in her magisterial work is unlikely to be bettered on her detailed analysis, 
but her work did not consider British responsibilities outside Europe, or within the British 
Isles in Ireland, and she in fact placed Locarno in the middle of a chapter rather than pausing 
for reflection at that date. Darwin did look at important links and context between imperial 
and European issues, but he had an imperial theme, and did not place an emphasis on 1925 
or Locarno.    
 
There is then no clear school of thought representing the arguments of this thesis, nor one 
making the contrary arguments. The failure of historians to look separately and objectively 
at the years from 1919 to 1925, has already been analysed above. The remaining relevant 
secondary sources will be reviewed here under three headings; the experience of historians 
in looking at the conflicting pressures of the British Empire and Europe; the many 
assessments over the years of the Locarno process and the Locarno Agreements; and, most 
importantly, the wider failure of many historians to appreciate both the relative stability that 
had been achieved by the end of 1925 and the difficulties that were faced by the different 
British governments, 
 
 
(a) Empire and Europe 
 
There was, and is, no doubt that Britain was still a Great Power immediately after the Great 
War, as exemplified by Lloyd George’s role in Paris, and Britain’s role in the various 
conferences in the 1920s. What is less clear is the balance between Britain’s imperial 
responsibilities and how it saw its European responsibilities. Headlam-Morley’s 
contemporary statement regarding Britain’s ‘double status’ is quoted at the beginning of this 
thesis. Rothwell wrote about Britain’s war aims that, ‘with no ambitions on the continent of 
Europe save the overall one of preventing any one power from becoming dominant there, 
Britain has traditionally been able to pose as the honest broker, striving for such equitable 
political arrangements as would reduce the risk of disputes, involvement in which might 
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tempt one of the Great Powers to aim at European supremacy.’68  In his appropriately titled 
‘Reluctant Engagement’ - Salmon wrote that ‘the huge costs of the war, the political 
turbulence of central and eastern Europe and the threat of Bolshevism all served to strengthen 
an internal revulsion from European affairs,’ and that after the war ‘if British involvement in 
Europe was reluctant, this was because British interests were worldwide and not simply 
European, Britain was ambivalent towards continental Europe because real interests were at 
stake.69 
 
Within the secondary sources, there is a significant question regarding the lack of evidence 
on the diplomatic priorities or conflicts between the British imperial and European policies. 
Many contemporary imperial historians, such as Hancock70 or Mansergh,71 were more 
concerned with the constitutional developments between the British governments and the 
Dominions, which led to the Balfour Report at the Imperial Conference in 1926 and the 
Statute of Westminster in 1931.72 The date of 1925 and the Treaty of Locarno will, however, 
also be seen as a significant date in British imperial history, in that the events of 1926 and 
1931 regarding the independence of the Dominions, essentially formalised a number of 
earlier developments, which culminated in the Dominions being excluded from the process 
leading to Locarno. Hancock emphasised that the Imperial Conference of 1926 recognised 
the principle of separate national responsibility,73 and Mansergh wrote significantly about 
the link to Locarno: 
 
Dominion inaction at Locarno later came to be regarded, and rightly regarded, as 
an historic landmark in the evolution of their external policies. The precedent 
established in 1925, was followed with remarkable consistency up to the 
                                                 
68 H.V. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 
1971) p.285. 
69 Patrick Salmon, ‘Reluctant Engagement : Britain and Continental Europe 1890-1939’ Diplomacy and 
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Oxford University Press, 1952).  
72 The term ‘Dominion’ had been used for the ‘Dominion of Canada’ from 1867, and was adopted on a wider 
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outbreak of the Second World War. In 1939 none of the Dominions had any 
major treaty obligations in Europe or in Asia.74  
 
Of the more recent imperial historians, Darwin’s The Empire Project, and especially the 
chapter on Making Imperial Peace 1919-1926, was a clear exposition of the history of the 
empire, and especially on the internal developments of the Dominions, but it also made the 
clearest linkages between the empire and Britain’s responsibilities in Europe.75 He did not 
put a particular emphasis on 1925, and kept 1926 as the end year for his relevant chapter 
which ties in with his imperial themes. He argued that ‘1914 was the watershed between the 
two ages of Empire. In the long nineteenth century after 1815, the British world-system had 
developed as if there were no danger of a general war in Europe or across the world,’ and 
that after the extreme difficulties of the war and the immediate post-war years, wrote that 
after 1925, a ‘new economic order took shape in Europe, underwritten by the flow of 
American investment. Franco-German reconciliation lifted the threat of a new European 
struggle.’76 Although Darwin’s work does not provide an overall imperial/European thesis, 
to support or criticise, it is nevertheless much closer than many other secondary sources to 
the thinking behind this research.   
 
During the last ten years, there have been various one-volume histories of the British Empire, 
including Levine,77 Porter,78 Stockwell79 as editor, and Thompson.80 They are general 
accounts of the empire, which by their nature look at the longer-term imperial developments, 
and place no particular emphasis on the years up to 1925 or 1926, or the links to Europe.  
They contain references to the increase in the size of the empire in 1919, to the Amritsar 
massacre, to the growing nationalism in different parts of the empire, and to the developments 
in relationship with the Dominions. However, there are no references in these books to the 
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Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918-1922 (London: Macmillan, 1981) is a key secondary source in 
the section below on imperial responsibilities in the Middle East and India.   
76 Darwin, The Empire Project, pp.305 and 418. 
77 Philippa Levine, The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset (London: Pearson Longman, 2007). 
78 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1970 (London: Pearson 
Longman, 2004). 
79 Sarah Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire:  Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). 
80 Andrew S. Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? (London: Pearson Longman, 2005). 
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significance of the non-involvement of the Dominions in the Locarno process or to the 
Locarno agreements themselves. Despite the absence of links between imperial and European 
policies in such works, they retain some value as sources, because there are significant 
aspects of imperial policy which must be assessed as part of a broader analysis of foreign 
policy during these years.81  
 
Gallagher and Robinson’s analysis of the ‘informal empire’ is of special interest, in a study 
of how the political establishment perceived the empire during these years.82 Of the major 
multi-volume studies of imperial history, the Cambridge History of the British Empire is of 
some interest in expressing near-contemporary views on early twentieth century events, 
rather than in helping with the analysis of events, especially as most of its chapters end in 
1919 or 1921.83  The more recent Oxford History of the British Empire does not have a 
chapter directly on empire and Europe, with the nearest relevant chapter being Clayton’s on 
Deceptive Might: Imperial Defence and Security 1900-1968; the separate volume on 
Historiography is also of limited value because it reflects the chapters of the main volumes.84 
Beloff’s two volumes on the British Empire made the break between the volumes in 1921, 
rather than 1919 or 1926, with the deliberations of the Imperial Conference in the summer, 
and the settlement in Ireland at the end of that year, as central to his decision, but with no 
particular link to Europe. 85 
 
                                                 
81 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918-1968 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) are major works of imperial history, but not as relevant to this thesis. In view of the importance 
of the Middle East, it was hoped that Edward W. Said’s Orientalism (London: Routledge, 1978), which 
argued that western writers failed to understand the ‘otherness’ of Eastern, and particularly Middle Eastern, 
culture, customs and beliefs, would have been particularly relevant. However, although Said started from an 
analysis of a speech made by Balfour in June 1910, and has quotes from Curzon in the Lords in 1909, he 
made no reference to post-war politicians such as Lloyd George, Baldwin, MacDonald or Churchill. See also 
David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire 1850-1970 (London: Allen Lane, 2001). 
82 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review, Volume 
6/1, 1953, pp1-15. 
83 J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton and E. A. Benians (eds.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, various volumes from 1929). 
84 Judith M. Brown and Louis Wm. Roger (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume IV 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) and Robin W. Winks (ed.), Volume V 
Historiography. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
85 Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset (London: Macmillan, 1969 and 1989). 
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Although not many secondary sources look at both imperial and European issues, particularly 
for the years from 1919 to 1925, there are a wide range of secondary sources available within 
the separate areas of imperial and European history, that will be referred to in this thesis. 
  
 
(b) Locarno 
 
The Treaties of Locarno are so central to the re-assessment of the governments’ foreign 
policies, that it is relevant to refer to the outline of the treaties in this chapter. The treaties, 
covered the following subjects: 
 
• A treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German and the Belgian-German   
frontiers, with Britain and Italy as guarantors; 
• German-Belgian and German-French arbitration treaties;  
• German-Czechoslovak and German-Polish arbitration treaties; 
• Treaties of mutual assistance, in the event of German aggression, between France    
and Poland, and between France and Czechoslovakia. 
 
Analysis of the historiography of Locarno overlaps with that of the overall achievements of 
foreign policy by 1925. It is, however, important to try to look at them separately, because 
although Locarno was integral to the achievements in 1925, the two issues are not 
synonymous, as Britain’s wider responsibilities and achievements include developments near 
to home in Ireland, and those outside Europe throughout the empire. Within the 
historiography of Locarno, there are questions both about the processes involved and about 
the substance of the agreements. On the processes, Steiner wrote about a triumph for ‘old 
diplomacy’ and this emphasis on what may be seen as pre-war diplomacy was put more 
strongly by Cassels when he wrote, in Locarno Revisited, that: 
 
The Treaty of Locarno was intended to be a surrogate for the aborted Geneva 
Protocol. But, as the historiographical consensus now recognizes with the 
benefit of hindsight, what was agreed at a Swiss lakeside resort on 16 October 
1925 was nothing more or less than an old-fashioned compact among the major 
European powers, heirs of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe. 
Substantive guarantees were severely limited by geography to the Rhine 
frontiers. The objectives of the signatories were all, in one way or another, self-
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seeking, and often mutually contradictory. As an exercise in conventional 
power politics, nothing could be further from the universalistic, idealistic 
Geneva Protocol.86 
 
Bell was also critical of the Locarno diplomacy when he wrote: 
 
Most serious of all, the agreements merely disguised a profound difference of 
approach between France and Germany. It was true that Briand and Stresemann 
spoke the language of reconciliation; but each hoped to reconcile the others to 
something different. Briand wanted to reconcile Germany to the acceptance of 
the Versailles settlement; Stresemann wanted to reconcile France to its 
revision.87  
  
It will be argued that these conclusions do not reflect the problems faced by the Locarno 
negotiators, as all diplomatic processes are bound to involve national self-seeking and often 
mutually contradictory views. Any diplomatic negotiations, let alone those dealing with the 
difficulties regarding France and Germany after the Great War, are trying to reconcile 
apparently irreconcilable positions into an agreement that the different parties can accept. In 
such negotiations, any agreement reached does not require the giving up of beliefs, but a 
willingness, albeit very reluctantly, to move towards some common ground, that the parties 
can live with, and sell to their own national constituents.  
 
Doubts about the Locarno Agreements have gone much wider than Cassels’ and Bell’s 
comments on the diplomatic processes. The most critical views of the performance of the 
governments can be seen when Barnett wrote of Locarno that ‘the treaty was, so far as 
England and her guarantee were concerned, no more than a hollow gesture to soothe the 
French; a bogus commitment, a fraudulent IOU, that was given only because the English 
Government never thought for a moment that they would ever have to make it good.’88 Many 
historians while not adopting Barnett’s vivid language or his strange reference to the ‘English 
Government’ still put great emphasis on words such as ‘illusion’ or other negative terms. 89  
 
                                                 
86 Locarno Revisited, p.81, Alan Cassels, chapter four Locarno: Early Test of Fascist Intentions. 
87 P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), p.40. 
88 Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (London: Methuen, 1972), p.332. 
89 The use of the term ‘illusion’ is considered below on page 31. 
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The common criticism of Locarno has been that the agreements only dealt with the issues on 
Germany’s western borders, and did not attempt to solve the much more problematic eastern 
issues.90 Although Poland could be worried after Locarno that her borders were not as 
guaranteed as those of France, it will be argued that this is not a fair criticism; there was 
already a framework for a possible agreement on the western borders, and there was no 
practical possibility that Gustav Stresemann, the German foreign minister, could have got 
parliamentary approval for reinforcing the Versailles decisions in the east, even if he had 
personally wanted to, which he almost certainly did not. The most common analysis in the 
many secondary sources is that both the Versailles and Locarno Treaties fell to pieces with 
the rise of Hitler and the German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and that these events 
led to the Second World War. That analysis is accepted, but it will be argued that does not 
prove that the Locarno conclusions were not a significant achievement in the circumstances 
of 1925.  
 
Of the many historians of Locarno, Doerr emphasised Jacobson’s conclusions regarding the 
different perceptions of the three key signatories to the Treaties: 
 
Stresemann thought that the path had been cleared for the peaceful revision of 
Germany’s borders in the East; Briand considered that French predominance 
over Germany had been assured, and Chamberlain believed that since France 
was mollified and Germany was returned to the international community Britain 
would never have to assume a military role on the continent.91  
 
However, such emphasis on the different perceptions, as also indicated above in a similar 
way by Bell, again emphasises the exceptional difficulties, during these years and specifically 
in 1925 and therefore this reflects on the achievements at Locarno.92  Although Jacobson’s 
                                                 
90 Comparison with other treaties in twentieth century is difficult, but Locarno may have some similarities 
with the Camp David agreements for the Middle-East in 1978. It can be argued that this was a significant 
achievement in 1978, even if it was only an agreement between Israel and Egypt, and not with Jordan and 
Syria, and even if the whole agreement might be in danger of collapsing nearly 40 years later. It could be 
argued that getting agreement on one front (ie France or Egypt) distracted attention from then getting 
agreement on the other ie Poland or Syria); that is however again an argument about the lack of follow-up on 
the original agreement rather than the original agreement itself.    
91 Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. p.90, citing Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy p.44. 
92 Jonathan Wright argued that ‘the Locarno détente represented a temporary modus vivendi in the mid-1920s 
because there was no better power political alternative for either France or Germany in the short term...more 
of a democratic truce than a democratic peace. In both countries the modus vivendi was also unpopular with 
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standard book on Locarno was written as long ago as 1972,93 we now have the advantage 
that Jacobson was also a contributor to the 2004 series of essays entitled Locarno Revisited, 
where there were also contributions or endorsements by Dockrill, Goldstein, Johnson, Cohrs, 
Wright and Dutton.94 Jacobson’s original detailed analysis is still relevant, but like the 2004 
book, it was looking at the wider ‘Locarno Era’ rather than just the events up to the end of 
1925; for example Jacobson devoted nearly twice as many pages to the Hague Conference 
and the other events of 1929, as he does to the events of 1925.95  
 
There are then many secondary sources available about the Locarno processes and the 
Locarno conference, but any conclusions about success and stability in 1925 must also take 
into account a wider analysis of Britain’s total foreign policies, including all the imperial 
responsibilities of the British Empire and the difficulties facing the different British 
governments 
 
 
 
       (c) Overall Performance of Foreign Policies 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that historiography has not given enough recognition 
to the successes of the different British governments during these years. As the majority of 
the historiography does not treat these years as a significant period or draw conclusions that 
are specific to it, the relevant secondary sources have to be employed for their usefulness in 
constructing an interpretation directly relevant to these six years. The governments of the 
period did have advantages in dealing with their foreign policy problems. The Lloyd George 
coalition government had the political advantage of its mandate being reinforced in the 
general election in December 1918. Britain had been one of the victors in the war, and 
although the benefits may not always have seemed clear, the problems arising from the war 
                                                 
significant sections of the electorate’, Jonathan Wright, ‘Locarno: A Democratic Peace’, Review of 
International Studies, Volume 36/2, April 2010, pp.391-411. 
93 Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy.  
94 Johnson, Locarno Revisited. 
95 Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, p.90, refers to Jacobson as the ‘foremost historian of Locarno’. 
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were more manageable as a result. In addition, the pace of political life allowed more time 
for reflection and strategic thinking. Government was subject to a number of negative press 
campaigns, but these pressures were limited, especially in comparison to the round-the-clock 
media a century later.    
 
         Despite these advantages, it is easier to record the difficulties faced by the administrations of 
the period.  These included the fact that the political leaders and the general population were 
physically and mentally exhausted after four years of total war; that the responsibilities of 
empire had increased as a result of Versailles; that the economic costs and the total debts of 
the war hit the peacetime economy; that there were immediate problems in 1919 not only of 
the demobilisation of up to four million from the armed forces, but also in the major 
readjustment for both men and women within civilian employment; that the complexity and 
difficulties of the Irish negotiations, including the interaction with domestic British politics, 
were a burden; and that while a comprehensive peace treaty had been signed in Versailles, 
major foreign policy issues remained unsettled, especially those between France and 
Germany, in Eastern Europe including the civil war in Russia, and in the Middle East. 
 
Adamthwaite argued that ‘Locarno fostered an illusion of détente’ and that ‘by guaranteeing 
the Franco-German frontier Britain implicitly repudiated responsibility for any other 
European frontier. Munich was the logical sequel of this policy.’96 Marks’ book was entitled 
The Illusion of Peace, her specific chapter was headed The Years of Illusion and she wrote 
that ‘however, it was an illusory guarantee; the Locarno guarantees were from the start 
inoperable,’ and that ‘the public façade of the Locarno conference, and the treaties 
themselves, created an illusion of peace, and ordinary men rejoiced.’97 Ross, in his wider 
historical survey, took a similar approach and entitled his chapter A period of false stability 
1924-1929.98 Doerr had a more positive chapter heading, An era of Stability and Promise 
                                                 
96Anthony Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), 
p.33. 
97 Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe 1918-1933 (London: Macmillan, 
1976).  
98 Graham Ross, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914-1945 (London: 
Longman, 1983).  
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1924-1929 but still wrote that ‘post-Locarno optimism now seems hopelessly unjustified.’99 
When the military history of this period was written as part of a much wider view of 
developments over the centuries, the tone of the approach to chapters on the inter-war years 
is exemplified in the chapter headings, with Kennedy on the Royal Navy choosing The Years 
of Decay100 and Barnett on the British Army the equally negative Illusion and Neglect.101 
 
Many historians have been critical of Versailles, but their critique is normally based on 
considering it retrospectively from the standpoint of 1939. Marks’ analysis of international 
relations from 1918 to 1933 is worth detailed examination in this context.  She itemised all 
the difficulties after Versailles, and all the changes to Versailles that took place such as the 
Dawes Report, the abandonment of Austrian and Turkish reparations, the replacement of 
Sèvres with Lausanne, and the Japanese concessions to China at Washington.102 On 
successive pages Marks wrote that ‘as the peace settlement crumbled’ and ‘as the treaty 
crumbled’ and also ‘the will to enforce the treaties was lacking or at best divided.’103 
However, her listing of the problems after Versailles demonstrated the scale of the difficulties  
facing all the major powers, including Britain, during these years. It therefore reinforces the 
achievements at Lausanne, at the London Conference and at Locarno, all of which 
contributed to the significantly greater stability achieved by the end of 1925.  
 
Considering a broader perspective, beyond the inter-war years, another way in which the 
historiography is deficient is that the historians of the whole of the twentieth century paid 
very little attention to this six-year period. For example, Hobsbawm104 made no reference to 
Locarno, and Mazower105 and Vinen106 made only passing references. Looking more closely 
at diplomatic histories of the war and the early inter-war years, accounts start from Marks in 
1976, through a large number of other accounts leading to the comprehensive volume by 
                                                 
99 Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, p.89. 
100 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp.267-298. 
101 Barnett, Britain and her Army, pp.410-423. 
102 Marks, The Illusion of Peace, p.55. 
103 Ibid. p.34. 
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105 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London: Allen Lane, 1998). 
106 Vinen, A History in Fragments.  
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Steiner in 2005.107 Broader histories of Britain during these years such as Lloyd108 or 
Charmley109 are sometimes relevant either because of insights about the members of the 
political establishment, or because of the effects on foreign policies of domestic 
developments. Dangerfield is relevant on the background of the Edwardian years, but despite 
the reputation of his work, he surprisingly did not make any comparison with the issues after 
the war. 110 
  
A very recent book covering these years, from an American perspective, illustrated another 
difficulty of getting appropriate analysis. Summarising the effects of the war and the peace 
on the different countries, Tooze wrote that ‘Britain had won a great victory, but then frittered 
away its credit in a disastrous series of post-war affairs at Amritsar, in Ireland, and in the 
Middle-East.’ 111 While not even qualifying his list by saying that these were examples, he 
used the narrowness of Amritsar, where the tragedy was commissioned well out of sight of 
London, with the breadth of the ‘Middle-East’ without any analysis, and then listed ‘Ireland’ 
which can better be seen as a difficult solution to a longstanding problem. Tooze’s 
conclusions on this point show the problems of an over-simplified analysis of very 
complicated diplomatic, military and imperial situations.  
 
The failure to get any agreement about Germany’s eastern border issues in the years after 
Locarno was a major reason for the events that led to the Second World War, and the 
principles of both the Versailles and the Locarno Agreements did collapse with Hitler’s 
                                                 
107 Marks, The Illusion of Peace and Steiner, The Lights that Failed. Historiography of British foreign policy 
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occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. However, it will be argued in this thesis that Locarno 
achieved what was diplomatically possible in 1925 in two crucial respects: first to confirm 
Germany’s western borders written down at Versailles, but now accepted by Germany, and 
secondly to establish a diplomatic rapport or understanding between Britain, France and 
Germany, as equals, that could be built on, with further efforts. It will be argued therefore 
that, although the causes of the Second World War could be linked back to Locarno and 
Versailles, it is not because Locarno was a failure, but because Locarno was not built upon 
after 1925.  This thesis will provide an analysis of the years from Versailles to Locarno, 
making full use of most relevant primary and secondary sources.  
 
 
The Structure of the Thesis 
  
The analysis of the secondary sources reinforces the appropriateness of looking at the six 
years from Versailles to Locarno, but it does not identify a school of thought either supporting 
or opposing the arguments of this thesis. Empire and Europe are both central to British 
foreign policies. While Locarno is crucial to any argument, it is important to look at the 
widest possible assessment of the policies, and to assess the difficulties faced by the 
governments.  
 
         The structure of the thesis, after the Introduction, starts in chapter one with the background 
to these six years. The key background factor is the Great War, and the chapter concentrates 
on links of the war to the post-war period, including the attitudes of the different political 
parties, the unmeasurable effects on politicians and the wider public of the war, the evolution 
of the relationships between Britain and the Dominions, and the events towards the end of 
the war leading to the armistice and the Paris Peace Conference. Other effects of the war, 
such as Britain’s relationship with France, and the implications of the great build-up of 
international indebtedness during the war, are dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
          
        The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles have their own background section, 
in chapter one, as the successes and more importantly the failures in Paris provided much of 
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the agenda for foreign policies up to Locarno and the succeeding years. The earlier section 
on Edwardian Britain offers a description of the background of the British politicians who 
were central to post-war decisions, and an account of the implications for policy makers of 
how the pre-war period was seen by some as one of relative prosperity and stability. 112 
 
         Chapter two provides the contemporary domestic background to foreign policy. Initially, it 
examines party political differences, and concludes that there was a remarkable degree of 
continuity in most aspects of foreign policy, whether it was the Lloyd George Conservative- 
Liberal Coalition, the Conservative Party or the Labour Party as the different parties in 
government. An overview of economic and financial matters emphasises the importance of 
international indebtedness caused by the war, the wish to return to stability and normality 
after the war and the constraints on government expenditure. Despite these constraints, which 
often concentrated on military expenditure as a major part of the budget, it is argued that 
there were no direct constraints on foreign policies, except perhaps in how the military were 
to operate in newly acquired territories like Mesopotamia, or in the financial pressures that 
led to the successful negotiations on battleships at the Washington Conference. 
                       
         Chapter three, is entitled ‘Global Challenges’ and portrays Britain’s place in the world, with 
an initial analysis of the growth of the United States as a global power. The global challenges 
facing the British Empire, which had recently been enlarged and reinforced at Versailles, are 
examined under the headings of the British Imperial Role, the Suez Canal and India, the new 
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 The leading politicians in the early 1920s were, in descending age order: Balfour (53 in 1901) was leader 
of the Commons in 1901, became prime minister from 1902 to 1906, and was still a leading opposition 
politician in 1914; Bonar Law (43) Canadian born but Scottish bred, became an MP in 1900 and was leader of 
the Conservative Party from 1911; Lord Curzon (42) was already Viceroy of India in 1901, and entered the 
Lords in 1908; Austen Chamberlain (38) was financial secretary to the Treasury in 1901, entered the cabinet 
in 1902 and was a leading opposition politician in 1914; Lloyd George (38) was a prominent Liberal 
backbencher opposing the South African War in 1901, but was to be chancellor of the exchequer in the years 
up to 1914; Lord Robert Cecil (37) was a barrister in 1901 before becoming an MP from 1906; Ramsay 
MacDonald (35) became an MP in 1906 and was chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party in 1914; 
Baldwin (34) was a manager in his family steel-making firm in the Midlands, before succeeding his father as 
MP for Bewdley from 1908; Amery (28) had reported the South African War for The Times, and then wrote 
The Times History of the South African War before becoming an MP in 1911; Churchill (27), already well 
known as an army officer and a war reporter, became an MP in 1900 and was in the cabinet as first lord of the 
admiralty before 1914; Hankey (24) was a Royal Navy officer in 1901 and secretary of the CID from 1912. 
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responsibilities in the Middle East, and the development of Britain’s relationships with the 
Dominions, with particular reference to Canada.  
 
         Against that global background, chapter four is a case study of the Washington Naval 
Conference. The emphasis given to this conference, of all the international conferences held 
during these years,113 is justified by the importance of the United States, as the new global 
power, and Britain as long-standing global power, finding a way to establish a balance that 
reflected the new parity in their status. The conference, which was held outside the League, 
was an important diplomatic achievement for Britain, and it also took into account the 
concerns of Australia and New Zealand in respect of the Royal Navy providing security for 
them in the Far East. 
 
         In chapter five, the thesis returns to Europe and after consideration of Britain’s relations with 
the League of Nations, analyses in some depth Britain’s relations with France and Germany, 
whose bilateral antipathy provided the major European diplomatic challenges during these 
years. Not all countries can be covered, but Poland is analysed in some depth, in view of the 
criticisms that the Locarno Treaties did not address the problems of Germany’s eastern 
borders with Poland, and the Polish Corridor, established in Versailles.  
 
         Chapter six also concentrates on Western Europe, but adopts a chronological approach 
covering the two years leading up to Locarno. It takes 1923 as the turning point, then 
considers the significance of the Dawes Plan and the London Conference, the Geneva 
Conference in 1924, and then developments in the twelve months leading up to the Locarno 
Conference in October 1925. The chronological approach is justified for these two years 
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 The years from 1920 saw a succession of international conferences. In 1920 there was San Remo in April 
regarding the formalization of Class ‘A’ League mandates and discussion on reparations; Spa in July 
regarding reparations; and Sèvres in August with the old Ottoman Empire to conclude the Paris agenda. In 
1921 meetings on reparations in Paris in January and twice in London between February and May; the 
Washington Naval Conference started in November 1921 while there was a further Anglo-French meeting in 
London in December on German reparations. In 1922 there was Cannes in January on reparations; Genoa in 
April and May which was mainly about economic matters, but is more remembered for the German 
delegation moving surprisingly on to the adjacent Rapallo Conference between Russia and Germany; and 
London in August with further Anglo-French failure to on the reparation issues. Lausanne was the location for 
conferences with the new Turkish regime, late in 1922, and finalised in July 1923.  
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because, unlike the years from 1919 to 1923, the successive events from the establishment 
of the Dawes Committee do link together. 
 
         Chapter seven examines some key ‘unfinished business’ issues at the end of 1925 to consider 
whether they reinforce the argument that Locarno is a suitable end date for this reassessment 
of these six years; the areas examined referred to include Anglo-American relations, imperial 
developments, Western Europe, relations with Russia and the League of Nations. Chapter 
eight pulls together the overall conclusions of the thesis, and is followed by the bibliography. 
 
Any choice of structure provides problems in that it may not emphasise the interaction 
between policies, or the pressure of timing on the politicians. While such issues should be 
addressed in the chapters on imperial and European matters, it is appropriate at this stage to 
give an indication of how the different imperial, European and domestic problems sometimes 
occurred at the same time for the cabinets at the time. Therefore, a brief summary of some of 
the main events of these years is given on the next page.  
 
This summary does not aim to provide an exhaustive list of key events, and some feature 
more prominently in the text than others. The point of the chart is to show how those key 
dates from domestic, imperial and European history sometimes coincided in respect of 
pressure on the government, and especially the prime minister, which is not apparent from 
historians covering only domestic, Irish, Imperial or European history. For example, Lloyd 
George did not attend the Washington Conference in November 1921 because of the 
pressures of the negotiations with Sinn Fein, and the new Bonar Law government in January 
1923 was dealing with both the problems of the proposed debt agreement with the United 
States and the occupation of the Ruhr, just a few weeks after taking office, and immediately 
after the establishment of the new Irish Free State in December 1922. 
 
The introduction to this thesis has therefore provided justification for the period chosen, a 
definition of the criteria for success, discussion of the role of the individual in foreign policy, 
an assessment of the relevant primary and secondary sources and a brief summary of the 
structure of the thesis.  
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Domestic 
 
Empire (include Ireland) 
 
Europe (or wider)114 
       
1919 
Aug.  Cabinet ‘10 Year Rule’ 
Oct.   Curzon Foreign Sec.  
 
Sept. Smuts PM of S. Africa 
June  Treaty of Versailles 
Oct. British evacuate Murmansk 
 
       
1920 
 
 
July Communist Party of GB 
Oct.  Miners’ Strike 
Nov. Cenotaph Unveiled 
 
 
May  Revolt in Iraq 
July  Amritsar Parlt. Debate 
Nov. Dublin Bloody Sunday 
Dec. Gov. of Ireland Act 
Jan.  League of Nations 
March USA Senate “No” 
April San Remo Conference 
July  Spa Conference 
Aug. Treaty of Sèvres 
Oct. Poland occupies Vilna 
 
       
1921 
 
 
Feb.  Churchill Colonial Sec 
March Anglo-Russian Trade 
 
Aug. Geddes Committee  
March Cairo Conference 
June Withdrawal from Persia 
June Imperial Conference 
Nov. Washington Conference 
Dec. Agreement Sinn Fein 
Feb. Franco-Polish Alliance 
Mar. Poland-Russia Peace 
Mar. Upper Silesian Plebiscite 
Apr. Reparations Bill to 
Germany 
Aug. US/German Peace Treaty 
 
       
1922 
 
 
 
Oct. Lloyd George Resigns 
Oct. Bonar Law P.M.         
Jan. Churchill Kenya Speech 
Feb. Deaths at Chairi Chaura 
Feb. Egypt Independence 
Feb. Washington Conf. ends 
Oct. Anglo-Iraq Treaty 
Dec. Irish Free State 
Jan. Cannes Conference 
April Genoa/Rapallo Conference 
Sept.  Smyrna / Chanak 
Oct.  Mussolini Italian P.M. 
 
      
1923 
 
 
Jan. Debt Agreement with US  
May Baldwin P.M. 
March  ‘Halibut Treaty’ 
Oct. Imperial Conference 
Oct. S. Rhodesia Self-Gov. 
Jan. Occupation of Ruhr 
Jan. Lithuania occupy Memel 
July Treaty of Lausanne 
Aug.  Corfu Incident 
Sep. Germ Passive resist. ended 
Nov. New German ‘Rentenmark’  
 
       
1924 
 
 
Jan.  MacDonald P.M. 
Feb. Britain recognises USSR 
Oct. ‘Zinoviev Letter’ 
Nov. Baldwin P.M. 
April British Empire Exhib. 
Jan.  Franco-Czech Alliance 
April Dawes Report 
May. Herriot replaces Poincaré 
Aug.  London Conference 
Sept.  Geneva Protocol Drafted  
 
       
1925 
 
 
April Return Gold Standard 
April Death Sir Eyre Crowe 
Dec. Chamberlain Nobel 
Prize 
May Cyprus Crown Colony 
Jan.  German Initiative 
April Hindenberg President 
Aug. French troops leave Ruhr 
Oct.  Locarno Conference 
Dec. Signing Locarno Treaties 
 
                                                 
114 The term ‘Europe (or wider)’ ensures events covered such as the United States’ Senate rejection of 
Versailles.  
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Chapter One: Continuities and Discontinuities : The Background to these Years  
 
 
In order to understand and assess the foreign policy problems and successes during the years 
from 1919 to 1925, it is essential to understand the background of the Great War, of the Paris 
Conference and the Treaty of Versailles. This chapter, however, deliberately starts from the 
background of Edwardian Britain, in order to describe the relative normality of the pre-war 
years, before the extremes of the war years and the complexities of the peace conference. The 
analysis of the Edwardian years is also important because the key political figures of 1919 to 
1925 grew up politically during these years and most of the main political leaders in Britain 
were in power before, during and after the war. 
 
 
Edwardian Britain    
 
The term ‘Edwardian Years’ is usually defined as the years from the death of Victoria and 
the accession of Edward VII in 1901 to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, even though 
Edward himself died in 1910, and was succeeded by his son George V. These years have 
been portrayed in many different ways; in the middle of the twentieth century they were 
looked back on as being relatively peaceful and prosperous, compared with the tragedies of 
two world wars, and the economic depression and unemployment of the inter-war years. 
More recently it has become fashionable to see this these years as being more complicated, 
more troubled and more significant. Hattersley wrote that, ‘the persistent myth depicts the 
Edwardian era as a long and leisurely afternoon’ and argued that it was not an interlude but 
rather the time when a modern nation was born.1   
 
         Gregory emphasised that the British working classes, who were to fight and die in the 
trenches in Flanders, did not come from an easy life in pre-war years. He described the ill-
health, insecurity, grinding poverty and child mortality in working class families and 
                                                 
1 Roy Hattersley, The Edwardians (London: Little Brown, 2004) in his introduction.  
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highlighted the extreme suffering in the welsh mining village of Sengennydd where over four 
hundred men and boys were killed in a pit explosion in the mine in 1913, before many of the 
remaining men fought and died in the war.2 Gregory’s description of the working class in 
these years was of course different again from the life of the British political establishment. 
 
         The politicians who were to be the leading figures in the early 1920s came mostly from the 
upper middle or upper classes. Napoleon is reputed to have said that ‘to understand the man, 
you have to know what was happening in the world when he was twenty.’ It is certainly 
important to understand the British politicians’ progress through the Edwardian years and the 
considerable continuity from those years to the early 1920s. The leading figures in 1901 
included Salisbury, Hicks Beach, Asquith, Rosebery, Campbell-Bannerman, Balfour and 
Joseph Chamberlain. Of these, only Balfour and Asquith were still active in the years nearer 
1914; however, of those prominent just before the war, only Asquith was not in the post-war 
governments, although he was still leader of his section of the Liberal Party  
 
         Apart from the issue about continuity, the main conclusions from looking at the pre-war 
biographies is the deep experience of the British Empire, but not of Europe, for some of the 
key members of the post-war cabinets. Lord Curzon was viceroy and governor general of 
India from 1898 to 1905; Lord Milner after some years spent in Egypt was later appointed 
governor of the Cape Colony and high commissioner to South Africa in 1897, and was to 
remain in South Africa until 1905; Churchill had experience of fighting with the British army 
in the Indian sub-continent and was then a war correspondent and captured by the Boers in 
the South African War, and Amery was the special correspondent of The Times for the same 
war.3 Asquith and Lloyd George had little experience outside domestic politics. 
 
The Edwardian party political scene was divided by the January 1906 election which was 
followed by eight years of Liberal governments, under Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith. 
The general elections in 1900, 1906 and the two in 1910 resulted in seats in the Commons, 
                                                 
2 Adrian Gregory, The Last Great War: British Society and the First World War (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), p.278.  
3
 Others working at the heart of government came from a colonial environment.  Philip Kerr had been an 
active member of the Milner Kindergarten, and was private secretary to Lloyd George from 1916 to 1921.  
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and in actual votes cast, which could be seen at the time as reflecting the gradual rise of the 
Labour Party. 4 What could not have been foreseen were the split in the Liberal Party after 
1916 between the supporters of Asquith and those of Lloyd George, the replacement of 
Redmond’s Irish Party by the much more radical Sinn Fein and the further rise of the Labour 
Party after the war.5 Although it will be argued that there were relatively few important 
differences between the political parties in foreign and imperial policies after the war, the 
changes in the political balance in Westminster were significant.  
 
In looking at the key political and diplomatic events of the Edwardian years, and the extent 
that they may have influenced politicians after the war, it should first be said that it was a 
relatively peaceful time in foreign and imperial matters in those years before the outbreak of 
war in 1914. There was a sensitive follow-up to the situation in South Africa, and there was 
a generally quiet imperial scene unless Ireland is included in that definition. The attempts to 
be more friendly to France were exemplified by the Entente Cordiale which was signed in 
1904, but there was growing concern about the strength and threatening attitudes of Germany 
with the three Moroccan crises and the competitive naval building polices. As Lloyd 
commented: ‘British interest in imperial expansion had been replaced by a feeling of 
uneasiness about German policy.’6 
 
         Dangerfield’s analysis of The Strange Death of Liberal England concentrates just on the 
years from 1910 to 1914, but his comments are of particular interest because his book was 
written shortly after the period covered by this thesis, and published in 1935.7 He analysed 
the four developments that he argued had the effect of destroying the Liberal Party as a party 
of government. These were the Conservative attacks on the Parliament Act, the threat of civil 
war over Ulster, the suffragette movement and lastly the increasing militancy of the trades 
                                                 
4 David Butler and Gareth Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 (London: Macmillan, 
2000). In the general elections of 1900, 1906 and the two in 1910 the Conservatives won 402, 157, 273 and 
272 seats respectively; the Liberals 184, 400, 275 and 272; Labour 2, 30, 40 and 42; and the Irish Party 
between 82 and 84 seats in all the elections. Labour voters, admittedly for a growing number of seats, went 
from 1.8% of total vote in 1900, to 5.9% in 1906, and to 7.6% and 7.1% in 1910. 
5T.O. Lloyd, Empire, Welfare State, Europe: A History of the United Kingdom 1906-2001 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) p.47, does however show that, in eight of fifteen by-election seats lost by the Liberals 
or Labour between 1910 and 1914, the parties together still polled a majority of votes cast. 
6 Ibid. p.11. 
7 George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England. (New York: Smith and Haas, 1935).  
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unions. Although Dangerfield’s arguments lack comparisons with the years immediately 
after the war, they do emphasise the complexities of the domestic policies.8    
 
The Conservative attack on the Parliament Act followed the Lloyd George budget of 1909, 
the subsequent battles about the powers of the Lords, including the two elections of 1910, 
and the Liberal government’s threat to ask King George to create hundreds of new peers to 
ensure a majority in the Lords. Dangerfield was right to emphasise the bitterness of the 
dispute; however, despite the acrimony, it did not remain an issue during or after the war, 
when the Conservatives and the Liberals were in coalition. Any further debate regarding a 
reduction of the two-year delaying power of the Lords did not occur until after 1945.   
 
The Irish problems returned to Westminster after 1910 with growing antagonism between 
the Liberals, and their commitment to Home Rule, and the Conservatives and their opposition 
to this. This antagonism increasingly centred on the demands of Ulster, and the close links 
between members of the Conservative Party and legal and illegal elements within the Ulster 
Unionist movement. After the increasing likelihood of violence in the first half of 1914, the 
main political parties agreed to a political truce at the beginning of the war. The truce in 
Ireland itself was shattered by the Easter Rising in 1916, and the issue became a great 
problem between 1919 and 1922, but again the British political situation was very different 
as the Lloyd George Liberals and the Conservatives were then attempting to solve the Irish 
problem as coalition partners, rather than facing each other in the Commons. 
 
Then there was the question of the suffrage and the campaigning, and sometimes violent 
action, of the suffragettes; although some Liberals were somewhat sympathetic to the 
movement, there was not a great difference of emphasis between the main political parties. 
In the Edwardian elections only about one third of the adult population were entitled to vote, 
with no women having the vote. However, the Representation of the People Act of 1918 
ensured that after the sacrifices of men and women during the war, all adults aged 21 and 
                                                 
8 For example, days lost through strikes were typically plus or minus 10 million days in most of the years 
from 1910 to 1914 and from 1923 to 1925, but with peaks of 40m in 1912, 34m in 1919, 26m in 1920, 85m in 
1921 and 19m in 1922. Butler and Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, p.399.  
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over, with the exception of women under 30, had the vote from the 1918 general election. 
The question of the suffrage was not an issue after the war, and the final equalisation for 
women aged between 21 and 30 was achieved in 1928. 
 
Finally, on economic, social and labour matters, there were the arguments before the war 
about the Taff Vale case and trade union legislation, the Liberal initiatives on social issues 
regarding old age pensions, national insurance and the establishment of labour exchanges, 
and the initiatives on Imperial Preference led by Joseph Chamberlain. In comparison however 
with other decades, it was a period of relatively stable economic and financial matters. The 
key arguments between the parties, and within the parties, were regarding the cost of the 
Liberal social issues, the degree of sympathy for the newly organised working classes, the 
choices of tax options and then the costs of the naval building programme. The debate about 
the number of Dreadnought battleships to be built was particularly tense when the Admiralty 
demanded in 1909 that eight further battleships should be laid down, and the Liberal Cabinet 
eventually compromised on committing to four ships immediately with four more to follow.  
 
Citing Dangerfield regarding the key domestic and Irish issues demonstrates the variety of 
issues during those years when the post-war leaders were either starting their ministerial 
careers or already carrying heavy responsibilities of state, and which must have influenced 
their thinking in post-war years. The analysis also shows the contrast between the issues that 
were to be still important after the war, and those which had been solved or disappeared from 
view. The main continuing issue was that of Ireland; those which were there but not in the 
same way were trade union disputes and arguments about government expenditure, including 
military matters. There was therefore much greater continuity in the politicians involved 
before and after the war, rather than in continuity in the issues. Most of the issues that seemed 
insurmountable, or very difficult, before August 1914, were overtaken by the threat and the 
actuality of war in Europe; as Churchill wrote on 24 July ‘The parishes of Tyrone and 
Fermanagh faded back into the mists and squalls of Ireland, and a strange light began 
immediately, and by perceptible gradations, to fall and glow upon the map of Europe.’9 
 
                                                 
9 Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England, p.364. 
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The Great War    
 
Any study of the years from 1919 to 1925 could not ignore the Great War and its cataclysmic 
events and effects, especially in Europe. However, this section will concentrate on aspects of 
the war that link to the post-war period, such as the attitude of the different political parties, 
the unmeasurable effect on politicians and the public of the casualties of four years of total 
war, the evolution of British-Dominion relationships, and the events at the end of the war 
leading to the Paris Peace Conference. Other aspects including the development of Anglo-
French relationships, and the extent of international indebtedness, will be referred to in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
During the war there was general political unity in Britain behind the war aims, but there 
were some differences between or within the parties. Within Labour there were sharp 
differences between the majority who supported the war, and those such as Ramsay 
MacDonald who consistently opposed the conflict. The Liberals supported the war but split 
in 1916 when Asquith and his supporters left the coalition government and could be very 
critical of the Lloyd George coalition government, even though they continued to support the 
war. Some Conservatives had mixed feelings in joining the coalition governments in 1915 
and 1916, but as Blake pointed out, they were the party more comfortable dealing with 
wartime issues, ‘because on almost every issue that came up, Conservative tradition and 
ideology was better suited than Liberal to meet the needs of the hour; conscription, defence 
of the realm, Ireland, indeed all the necessities of a prolonged war, tended to create doubts 
and divisions in the Liberals.’10  
 
While many of the countries fighting in the war suffered grievously in both military and 
civilian casualties, Britain’s casualties were overwhelmingly military; the total of those who 
were killed, missing in action or died of wounds amounted to 743,000 for Britain, compared 
with 1,384,000 for France, 615,000 for Italy and 48,000 for the United States.11 British 
                                                 
10 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London: Heinemann, 1993), p.196. 
11 Martin Gilbert, The First World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), p.541. 
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casualties were highest among the infantry rank and file and the junior officers leading 
them.12 It is customary to say that the total numbers of British deaths, disabled and wounded 
must have affected every family in the land; Gregory challenges this by a calculation relating 
the number of deaths only to immediate family, but that will underestimate the total number 
of wounded, and the cohesive nature of society in those years, especially in working class 
areas.13 The extent of the casualties is better appreciated by examples such as that 1,157 Old 
Etonians died in the war,14 or that on 1 July 1916, the first day of the Battle of the Somme, 
235 members of the ‘Accrington Pals’ battalion were killed, 17 were to die of wounds, and 
350 were wounded.15    
 
Given the age range of politicians, and the class structure of the British military forces, the 
attrition rate of young officers was bound to affect the sons of the leading politicians. 
Asquith’s personal tragedy is perhaps best known, with his eldest son Raymond being killed 
in 1916, and two of his other sons being wounded and decorated on the western front, but  
Bonar Law also lost two of his four sons,16  Henderson, Redmond and Lord Hardinge, each 
lost a son, and Hankey lost a brother. There would have been many cases like that of Sir 
William Tyrrell, a senior official at the Foreign Office, who early in 1915 suffered a nervous 
breakdown after his son was killed in action.17 Balfour was unmarried, Curzon had three 
daughters and others appear not to have been directly affected either because of the age or 
gender of their families.18 Many future politicians were personally involved; Attlee, Eden19 
and Macmillan20 all had direct experience of fighting in the trenches on the western front.  
                                                 
12 Naval casualties were relatively low because the Battle of Jutland was the only major naval battle.  
13 Gregory, The Last Great War, p.253. 
14 Ibid. p.124. 
15 Ibid. p.127. 
16 Charles Bonar Law, aged 20, died in Gaza in April 1917; his brother James was shot down and killed in 
September 1917 aged 24. See R. J. Q. Adams, Bonar Law (London: John Murray, 1999), various references. 
17 Erik Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace 
Con3ference. 1916-1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.67.  
18 Lloyd George had two sons in the forces: Richard was a major in the Royal Engineers and Gwilym a major 
in the Royal Artillery, although they do not appear to have been involved in the front line. 
19 Eden was informed in France in 1916 of the death of his very close younger brother Nicholas, aged 16, at 
the Battle of Jutland. See Anthony Eden, Another World 1897-1917 (London: Allen Lane, 1976), p.82. 
20 Macmillan had started his studies at Balliol College, Oxford, in 1912; of the 151 undergraduates who 
matriculated at Balliol between 1911 and 1913, and served in the war, 49 were killed. See J. M. Winter, 
‘Balliol’s Lost Generation’, Balliol College Annual Record, 1975, pp.22-26. Winter develops this as wider 
argument in The Great War and the British People (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp.65-99.  
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Any doubts about the commitment of the wider British population to the war have been 
challenged in Gregory’s recent book. He wrote about the consent of the population to the war 
in 1914, the development of what he called ‘an economy of sacrifice’21 during the war, the 
‘painful final two years of war, as ideals of sacrifice and fairness came under increasing 
pressure,’22 and then that ‘the luxury of victory was that it minimized the searching for 
scapegoats, and instead stressed universalism.’23 Vinen made the valuable point that although 
they had very large casualties, both Britain and France, unlike many European countries, had 
‘no revolution, no hyper-inflation, no starvation and no plague.’24 Whether the widespread 
outbreaks of influenza after the war would count as a plague is debatable, but Vinen’s point 
was well made, especially in the case of Britain where no land was occupied by foreign 
troops, and normal government and society continued to exist. 
    
The ebb and flow of fortunes during the war, and the stalemate on the western front, did not 
prevent preparations by the government for the anticipated victory peace conference. The 
Imperial War Cabinet in March 1917 established a ‘Committee on the Terms of Peace’ with 
sub-committees, on territories chaired by Curzon and economics chaired by Milner. 
Initiatives by Hankey as cabinet secretary and Hardinge from the Foreign Office developed 
during 1917, leading to the Foreign Office forming the Political Intelligence Department; 
different aspects of any peace conference were reviewed, often emphasizing that it would be 
the first such peace conference since Vienna in 1815.25   
 
There was, however, no inevitability of victory for the Allies during what turned out to be 
the last twelve months of the war. The cabinet made no assumption of any end to the war; 
Lloyd George was discussing with Colonel House in November 1917 the options for 
American troops in both 1918 and 1919,26 and on the last day of 1917, the cabinet ‘agreed to 
                                                 
21 Gregory, The Last Great War, p.113. 
22 A. Bell, Journal of British Studies, Volume 48, No. 4, October 2009, p.1036, reviewing Gregory’s book. 
23 Gregory, The Last Great War, p.270. 
24 Richard Vinen, A History of Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century (London: Little Brown, 2002) 
p.71. 
25 Foreign Office and other departments prepared a total of 174 historical handbooks, 71 Political Intelligence 
Department memoranda and 35 military intelligence reports for Paris. Goldstein, Winning the Peace, p.281. 
26 Gilbert, The First World War p.378. 
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ask its chief military advisers whether there was in 1918 or 1919 any reasonable chance of a 
victory that would not leave the military domination of Prussia successful and intact.’27 In 
March 1918, the German offensive pushed the allied forces back to within forty miles of 
Paris. Although it is easy for historians to see that this was the last desperate attempt of the 
German forces in the west, after the peace treaty with Russia and while their partners were 
increasingly under pressure on the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman fronts, this was not clear 
at the time. Lloyd George said, theatrically but probably accurately, in the Commons that 
‘the fate of the Empire, the fate of Europe, and the fate of liberty throughout the world, may 
depend on the success with which the very last of these attacks is resisted, and countered.’28  
During the cabinet discussions on ‘Imperial Objectives’ in August 1918, Lloyd George was 
still stating that ‘on the question of peace terms, he considered it essential that Germany 
should first be beaten; that was more important than the actual terms themselves.’29   
 
Whatever the detailed preparations of the politicians for the peace negotiations, the foremost 
influence on Britain’s foreign policies as they entered the actual negotiations was that victory 
had been achieved. This situation was accentuated by the general election in December 1918, 
when Lloyd George and his coalition won a large victory, helped no doubt by popular anti-
German election rhetoric, such as ‘Hang the Kaiser,’ and demands for the maximum 
contribution by Germany to the cost of war.30 The effect of the threefold extension of the 
electorate to include the vast majority of men aged 21 and over, and women aged 30 and 
over, had raised concerns in the political establishment, but no evidence has been produced 
that the wider suffrage led to a different result.  
     
                                                 
27 War cabinet minutes, 31 December 1917, NA/CAB 23/4.  
28
 Hansard, Volume 104, 9 April 1918, column 1337. In June, The Round Table was aware of both the 
seriousness of the situation in that ‘the ordeal of August and September 1914 is being repeated in a sterner 
form,’ and the emphasis put on the British determination to defeat German, and specifically Prussian, 
militarism, stressing that the ‘pledge not to sheathe the sword until the military domination of Prussia was 
wholly and finally destroyed’, The Round Table, Number 31, June 1918, p.427, and in September they were 
still talking not of peace terms but that ‘we have first to defeat, finally and decisively, the German outrage on 
humanity.’ The Round Table, Number 32, September 1918, p.683.   
29 War cabinet minutes, 15 August 1918, NA/CAB 23/7.  
30 The expression ‘in victory…magnanimity’ expressed by Churchill in very different times, would never 
have been used by a British politician in 1918. 
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The eight months from the armistice on 11 November 1918 to the signing of the Treaty of 
Versailles on 28 June 1919 were initially dominated in government circles by that general 
election, but then much more widely and intensively by the peace negotiations. In some ways 
the wartime military conditions ended quickly; for example by the start of the Paris 
Conference the German surface ships were safely secured at Scapa Flow, the majority of 
German submarines were in Harwich, and the German colonies were under Allied control; 
on the other hand the blockade of Germany continued until July 1919 and France kept many 
German prisoners of war interned until 1920.  
 
Full consideration of how the Great War affected the thinking and attitudes of British policy 
makers, would need a separate thesis.  However, some relevant points have already been 
established, including the effects on many of senior politicians of family casualties, the public 
attitudes to the war especially by quoting Gregory, the fact that there was no invasion, no 
revolution and no starvation, and that there could be no assumptions as to when the war 
would end. There was also remarkable political continuity as war changed to peace, unlike 
1945, as the Lloyd George Coalition won a convincing victory in the general election. 
 
The major issue of demobilisation was handled reasonably well, as referred to in chapter two, 
assisted by the economic boom in 1919-1920 which disguised many post-war economic 
problems. Although the discussion in chapter three on imperial policy shows some maverick 
views such as Montagu, the general approach of the Lloyd George peacetime coalition, and 
most of the subsequent government’s thinking shows strong continuity of Britain’s place in 
the world, reinforced by victory in the war and its major role in Paris. The general election 
was held on 14 December, but the votes were not counted until 28 December, after the receipt 
of forces votes. The new cabinet was announced on 10 January 1919, and Lloyd George 
travelled to Paris for the peace conference the next day, and there was no pause in pressures 
on Lloyd George and his colleagues, to allow a re-assessment of Britain’s role as great 
imperial power.  
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Peace Negotiations in Paris 
 
The Paris Conference, and the Treaty of Versailles, are very important background to this 
thesis, because of the problems left unresolved, and the continuing enmity both between 
former enemies and former allies that made it so difficult to resolve the ongoing diplomatic 
problems. The peace negotiations had started with Clemenceau’s visit to meet Lloyd George 
in London in December 1918, but were then played out in detail in Paris from January mainly 
by Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau rather than by the official Group of Ten, which 
represented not just the United States, Britain and France, but also Italy and Japan. The 
proceedings in Paris have been fully recounted and analysed by MacMillan.31 
 
The ongoing issues which are important for this thesis are the dominating and surely 
exhausting effect on Lloyd George and the cabinet of the six months of negotiations in Paris; 
the extent of the antagonism of the French towards the Germans and their determination to 
extract both revenge for the war and security for the future; the relative lack of attention to 
the issues in the Middle East; and finally the extraordinary and ironic combination of 
Wilson’s crucial role at Paris, and the subsequent refusal of the United States Senate to ratify 
Versailles and membership of the League. The range of problems facing the leaders in Paris, 
and the apparently irreconcilable differences between France and Germany, were all 
discussed against the background of the democratic expectations of various majorities and 
minorities, but also the fears of revolution in Europe, particularly after the events in Russia 
in 1917. 32 The unresolved issues from Versailles were essentially the agenda for the 
diplomacy of the years up to 1925. 
 
Although the Versailles Treaty was signed over seven months after the armistice, the detailed 
negotiations in Paris did not necessarily allow a detached review of the totality of British 
                                                 
31 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London: 
John Murray, 2001). 
32
 In The Round Table, Number 35, June 1919, the comments include that ‘the Peace of Versailles will never 
be justly appreciated by those who fail to hold in mind the pressure under which its authors have worked’, 
p.429; that ‘most of the deficiencies in the present settlement will be met only by open-minded conference 
and co-operation, when that becomes possible, between the victors and the various enemies’, and with 
Germany and Russia being allowed into the League, p.431. 
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foreign policy. Much work had been done within the Foreign Office, whether or not it was 
used, but it was an extremely pragmatic approach that Lloyd George brought to the 
discussions in Paris. Lloyd George was no longer a radical Gladstonian Liberal, and the 
principle of the British Empire was now as much a part of his attitudes, as the rest of the 
political establishment. A starting point for looking at British policy objectives before Paris 
is the speech by Lloyd George on ‘War Aims’ given to a trade union audience during the 
parliamentary recess on 5 January 1918, three days before Wilson’s more famous ‘Fourteen 
Points’ speech. Lloyd George included the obvious points about Belgium, Alsace and 
Lorraine and the German colonies, but he did not refer to the freedom of the seas, to free 
trade or to the continuation of the British Empire, all of which were taken for granted. 
Goldstein, writing of British policy for the Paris Conference, referred to:  
 
A set of basic principles which do not mutually contradict one another and which 
run right through British thinking on the post-war order. The three schools can 
be clearly identified: the balance of power, the New Europe, and imperial 
expansion. All three schools recognized that 1919 was the great hinge of British 
foreign and imperial policy, marking the critical point of transition from the era 
of expansion to the era of consolidation.33   
 
The use of the term ‘schools’ could be confusing if it was implying three separate and 
possibly conflicting schools of thought, but Goldstein goes on to make clear that they are not 
contradictory; he argues that the British continued to be concerned that there should be a 
balance of power in Western Europe, with no continental power pre-eminent and no 
requirement for British involvement; ‘New Europe’ referred to Central and Eastern Europe 
which was the prime attention for many academics and Foreign Office specialists before and 
at Paris, but not generally by British politicians between 1919 and 1925.  
 
In the Commons in February 1919 there had been the normal wide ranging debate on the 
King’s Speech, but a month later Bonar Law in answer to a question was still saying ‘I hope 
that my Hon. Friend will realise that it is not possible for the government to answer questions 
as to discussions between the peace delegates, which have always been treated as 
                                                 
33 Goldstein, Winning the Peace, p.229. 
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confidential.’34 Steiner referred to the telegram to Lloyd George in Paris from 233 Unionist 
MPs on 8 April, regarding concerns about any possible compromise on reparation claims, but 
Lloyd George was able to calm any concern in the Commons when he returned to London 
and spoke in the adjournment debate a week later.35 When the conclusions at Paris were 
announced, the increase in both territory and population of the British Empire was taken for 
granted by all the political parties in Britain, and no real discussion took place regarding the 
responsibilities, the costs, or the wishes of the peoples affected, when the treaty was debated 
in the Commons on 21 July 1919.  The terms of Versailles were however criticized initially 
by Keynes over the economic arguments, and subsequently by statesmen and historians 
arguing that the treaty contributed to the causes of the Second World War. 36 
 
Many of the decisions in Paris affected British policies in the following years, though it could 
be argued that many of its terms were the best achievable at the time, and that the overall 
result was perhaps better than the value of the individual contributions of Lloyd George, 
Wilson and Clemenceau. On the specific British objectives in Paris, Riddell reflected the 
wider British view when he recorded in his diary in May that ‘the freedom of the seas has 
been relegated to the background, and we have got the German Colonies, Mesopotamia and 
Palestine. Our protectorate in Egypt has been confirmed. They are the big things.’37  
 
The collapse of other empires during or at the end of the war must have affected thinking in 
Britain, whether the regimes were enemies during the war, or in the case of Russia an ex-ally 
which had had a revolution. The fall of the Romanov Russian Empire in 1917 was followed 
in 1918 and 1919 with the end of the German, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires either 
                                                 
34 Hansard, Volume 113, 17 March 1919, column 1740. 
35 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed; European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p.55. Hansard, Volume 114, 16 April 1919, columns 2936-2956. 
36 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London; Macmillan, 1919). On the issue of 
reparations, Germany had held France responsible for five billion francs in the 1871 peace treaty, and in the 
financial section of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty at the beginning of 1918, Russia was due to pay six billion marks 
as compensation to Germany. Macmillan has calculated, Peacemakers, p.490, that from 1919 to 1932 
Germany probably paid slightly less in reparations than France, with a much smaller economy, had paid 
Germany after 1871; but it was the perception in Germany that mattered. 
37 George Riddell, Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After 1918-1923 (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1933), 4 May 1919, p.66. 
52 
 
directly as a result of war, or at the Paris Conference. 38 Lloyd George was certainly very 
conscious of the ‘complete break up of three ancient Empires – Russia, Turkey and Austria’ 
when reviewing the situation in the Commons in that April debate.39 The only surviving 
empire comparable to Britain’s, was that of France, which was only a third of the size of the 
British Empire.40  
 
There is substantial evidence in primary sources of a full analysis of issues from the British 
point of view, during the last two years of the war, whether or not Lloyd George took notice 
of these analyses.41 MacMillan described the weekend, at the end of March, when Lloyd 
George took his staff to Fontainebleau to review the British policies, and this did include 
some role-playing, by Hankey and Wilson, of the other countries’ positions. 42 A resulting 
memorandum did update the British positions, but it is doubtful whether there was any 
regular and serious analysis of the diplomatic and political problems of the other powers; for 
example did Lloyd George make any real attempt to understand the problems of Woodrow 
Wilson or of Clemenceau? 43 The British Empire was accepted almost without question, and 
was enlarged in Paris, and the need to prevent future wars between France and Germany was 
accepted, if not the means to achieve this. The attitudes of Lloyd George in were essentially 
pragmatic and, for example, the British arguments about the Middle East were about how to 
restrict the influence of France, and were not part of a long-term imperial strategy or about 
the interests of the Arabs.  
 
                                                 
38 The problems of minorities had been relatively easier to deal with in the Ottoman or the Austro-Hungarian 
Empires, as the size of such empires meant a proliferation of minorities which had to be accommodated.  
39
 Hansard, Volume 114, 16 April 1919, column 2939. American academics writing 75 years later about 
British war aims argued that ‘the theme that the War would have profited Britain little, if it had eliminated 
Germany as a threat to its security, only to have it replaced by Russia, France or after April 1917, the United 
States, recurred throughout the War when British policy makers considered their war aims.’ Manfred F. 
Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman and Elizabeth Glaser (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 
Years (Cambridge: CUP, 1998), p.71. 
40
 Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society (Manchester: 
University Press, 2005), p.1, gives figures of 27% of world area for Britain and 9% for France. The other 
remaining empires were much smaller, whether on the Allies’ side during the war, in the case of Portugal and 
Belgium, or neutral, in the case of the Netherlands.  
41 To take just one example, a Foreign Office briefing for Paris was later published as A History of the Eastern 
Question (London: HMSO, 1920).  
42 MacMillan, Peacemakers, p.207. 
43 It is not suggested that Clemenceau or Wilson were any better in analysing the needs of other countries. 
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Reviewing the background to the years from 1919 to 1925, it is clear that the Edwardian 
years are relevant both as providing the normality before the war and being the years in which 
the leading post-war politicians grew up politically; the Great War destroyed regimes and 
countries and brought great human and economic consequences on all the nations and peoples 
involved, and provided specific links to post-war problems. The Paris Conference and the 
Treaty of Versailles involved both examples of great discontinuities, such as with regard to 
the absentees of Germany, Russia, Austro-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire, and 
continuities in most respects with regard to Britain and France, and the United States until it 
rejected Wilson’s policies.  Whether or not Versailles is rated as a success, there is no doubt 
that there were many unsolved, or partly solved, issues for the Lloyd George peacetime 
government, and the other European governments to inherit and attempt to resolve.44  
 
 
 
Ireland  
 
Although it is reasonable for historians to consider British policy towards Ireland as part of 
imperial policy, it was clearly seen as domestic policy by a large majority of contemporary 
politicians. Therefore, Ireland does not form a major part of this thesis, but it is important to 
refer to the subject in view of the continuity of the problems before, during and after the war, 
the amount of time Lloyd George, and other cabinet members, devoted to Irish matters, and 
because the Dominion solution would affect imperial thinking both then and in subsequent 
decades. 
   
                                                 
44 The Versailles Treaty had 440 clauses. The complexities are clear in the subjects recorded in the minutes of 
the Supreme Council in July, after the Treaty signing in June, in Documents, Volume 1. For example, on 8 
July Fiume, the status of Modane, German command in the Baltic provinces, and Austrian prisoners of war; 
on 12 July Teschen, the Blockade of Russia and German action in Asia-Minor; pp.32 and 79.  Austen 
Chamberlain himself writing in 1935 Down the Years (London : Cassell, 1935) p.152 about the  period after 
United States and Britain refused guarantees to France said ‘there followed four years of irritating and 
embittered friction between the Allies and Germany. The Peace Treaties were signed, but peace found no 
place in the minds and hearts of men, or in the policy of states. Some of the conditions imposed by the victors 
on the vanquished were inexcutable and remained unexecuted’ 
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The ‘Irish Problem’ could be said to have existed for several hundred years, but the first sign 
of a possible permanent solution was seen in Gladstone’s Home Rule Bills at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In the short term they were both unsuccessful and had the political effect 
of splitting the Liberal Party, with the Liberal Unionists starting a slow move to merge 
eventually with the Tories. Buckland emphasised the point that ‘perhaps a quarter of 
Conservative MPs after 1906 were either Irish Unionists, Southern Irish gentry sitting for 
mainland constituencies, or married into Southern Unionist families.’45 The traditional Tory 
view of Ireland can be seen when Lord Salisbury had said some years earlier that: 
 
        The highest interests of the Empire, as well as the most sacred obligations of                 
honour, forbid us to solve [the Irish] question by conceding any species of 
Independence to Ireland...It would be an act of political bankruptcy, an avowal 
that we were unable to satisfy even the most sacred obligations, and that all 
claims to protect or govern any one beyond our narrow island were at an end.46 
 
The Liberal governments had made further attempts at progressing towards Home Rule in 
the years between 1906 and 1914, and the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act meant that the 
Lords’ powers would only be able to delay for two years the passage of any Home Rule Bill. 
However, the outbreak of war led to a postponement of the arguments with the Liberals still 
committed to Home Rule and the Tories having concentrated on supporting the Ulster 
Unionists.  Although the British government crushed the Sinn Fein Dublin rising in 1916, it 
lost the moral argument by executing a number of the leaders and so created new martyrs for 
the cause of Irish Republicanism. The intention in 1918 to eventually extend wartime military 
conscription to Ireland, was bound to exacerbate feelings there, and in the December 1918 
general election, Sinn Fein won 73 seats although 36 of those elected were in prison.  Sinn 
Fein refused to take their seats at Westminster, and those MPs who were free to do so, met 
as a self-declared Irish Parliament, or Dail Eireann, in Dublin in January 1919.  Hopes 
amongst Irish republicans that the Paris Conference, and particularly Wilson’s emphasis on 
self-determination, might bring some positive movement for their quest for Home Rule, were 
not met in any way.  
                                                 
45 Patrick Buckland, ‘The Southern Irish Unionists, the Irish Question and British Politics 1906-1914’ in Alan 
O’day (ed.), Reactions to Irish Nationalism 1865-1914 (London: Hambledon, 1987), p.381.  
46 Cited in David Marquand, Britain since 1918: The Strange Career of British Democracy (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2008), p.58. 
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The Irish problem therefore continued to be at the centre of the political stage through the 
Lloyd George peacetime government, with the twenty-six counties moving from being an 
integral part of the United Kingdom in 1919, with seats in the Commons, to full Dominion 
status by the end of 1922. Montagu had been concerned as early as 1917 about the links 
between Ireland and empire; he did see Ireland as different, but he interestingly wrote that 
unless the British recovered the ‘courage and sureness of touch which rendered us famous as 
empire builders, we shall simply make a series of Irelands in different parts of the world.’47 
The key development was the passing of the Government of Ireland Act in December 1920 
which provided for a degree of self-government both for Ulster in the north-east and for the 
remainder of Ireland.48 This legislation could be said to have been trying to solve the pre-war 
conflicts and threats about Ulster, but it did provide a de facto situation which made the 1921 
negotiations possible; partition preceded the treaty rather than being the result of it. 
 
As the military situation in Ireland deteriorated during 1920, the concept of Dominion status 
was increasingly discussed in London political circles, and there were letters on the subject 
to the press from Lord Grey and from Asquith. The chairman of the abortive 1917 Irish 
Convention, Sir Horace Plunkett, had formed the Irish Dominion League in June 1919, and 
Harkness described a growing enthusiasm for an Irish Dominion solution that would keep 
Ireland united within a British Commonwealth, and pointed out that ‘the actual creation of 
an Irish Dominion, in 1922 …was a compromise that represented the relativities of brute 
force at the time, even though, as a solution, it turned out to have more to recommend it than 
was generally realized, more that is for Ireland.’49 As Boyce wrote, ‘Dominion status lacked 
precision, because the self-governing dominions had acquired their powers gradually and 
almost imperceptibly over a period of time… but the idea was an attractive one to many 
                                                 
47 Montagu papers, draft letter from Montagu to Lloyd George 27 June 1917; cited in John Darwin, The 
Empire Project :The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830-1970 (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) p.353. 
48 ‘Ulster’ was defined, as demanded by the Unionists, as the six counties, rather than the full nine counties of 
the traditional province of Ulster. 
49 David Harkness, in The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume V Historiography, Robin W. Winks 
(ed.), p.124. 
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Englishmen, because it had roots in the past, and because it had been applied successfully 
elsewhere.’50 
 
The changes in Lloyd George’s views on Ireland are perhaps best seen in the contemporary 
diaries of Lord Riddell. In April 1921 he quoted Lloyd George as asking ‘whether the British 
people would be willing for us to negotiate with the head of a band of murderers,’ seeing the 
analogy between the Irish situation and the American Civil War and declaring that ‘a republic 
at our doors is unthinkable.’51 However, six months later in November 1921, Lloyd George 
was recorded as saying that ‘I am not going to continue the Irish war if a settlement is 
possible. I shall resign and the King will have to ask for someone else’ and concluded that 
‘Sinn Fein are prepared to accept allegiance to the Crown and to agree that Ireland shall 
remain part of the Empire, subject to Tyrone and Fermanagh being joined to Southern Ireland 
or, at any rate, to a plebiscite.’52 It was between these dates that King George V opened the 
new Northern Ireland Parliament in June 1921, with his speech including the statement that 
‘everything which touches Ireland finds an echo in the remotest parts of the Empire.’53  
  
The treaty settlement was recommended by Churchill to the Commons on 15 December 
1921, when he commented that while Sinn Fein demanded an independent sovereign republic 
for the whole of Ireland, Britain had been absolutely firm on the need for allegiance to the 
Crown, membership of the empire, facilities and security for the Royal Navy, and complete 
options for Ulster. He went on to say that in his view ‘every colonial statesman will feel, if 
this succeeds, his task in his Dominion of bringing people closer and closer into the 
confederation of the British Empire will be eased and facilitated. There is not a Dominion 
Parliament throughout the British Empire where this Treaty will not be accepted and 
endorsed.’54 Lloyd George then appointed Churchill to chair a cabinet committee to manage 
the implementation of the settlement; although the secretary of state for Ireland kept his 
                                                 
50 George Boyce, ‘How to Settle the Irish Question: Lloyd George and Ireland 1916-1921’, in A. J. P. Taylor 
(ed.), Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971), p.153. 
51 George Riddell, Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary  3 April 1921, p.289. 
52 Ibid. 3 November 1921, p.332. 
53 Harold Nicolson, King George V: His Life and Reign (London: Constable, 1952), p.353. 
54 Hansard, Volume 149, 15 December 1921, columns 169-183. 
57 
 
formal responsibilities, an analysis of entries in Hansard shows Churchill’s great 
involvement during the remaining months of the Lloyd George Government.55  
 
Within Britain, the events in Ireland did attract comparisons with the wider empire. 
Birkenhead, in defence of the settlement with Sinn Fein, and in a similar vein to Churchill, 
said that those responsible for the agreement realised ‘the misapprehensions our best friends 
will feel and are entitled to say to you that you must examine our careers and our antecedents 
before giving rein to apprehension that we shall be prepared to surrender anything of the 
greatness of this empire or the fundamental principles on which the whole of this empire 
depends.’56 Carson, as the leading Ulster Unionist, in his maiden speech in the Lords, drew 
very different conclusions, when he said ‘if you tell your Empire in India, in Egypt and all 
over the world that you have not got the men, the money, the pluck, the inclination and the 
backing to restore order in a country within twenty miles of your own shore, you may as well 
begin to abandon the attempt to make British rule prevail throughout the Empire at all.’57 
 
The issue of Irish independence can be seen as different from other countries in the empire 
in at least three respects; British critics of Home Rule could argue that Ireland was too close 
geographically to be entrusted with self-government; it was part of the British Isles and at 
the centre of the empire, not an outlying province.58 Then there was the entanglement with 
British politics; the analysis of Conservative MPs was given above and this was quite unlike 
the position of the English speaking white minorities in Africa, later in the century. Finally, 
because of the millions of Irish immigrants in the United States, there was that dimension to 
consider, especially when American support was essential during the war; the Irish minority 
in the Dominions especially Australia was also significant. The Canadian, Lord Beaverbrook, 
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 During the Commons session from February to November 1921 there were 118 references to Churchill in 
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who was no friend of Lloyd George, wrote to support him in 1921 saying that he was 
‘convinced that Empire unity waited upon reconciliation of Irish elements in Canada and 
Australia, who refused co-operation with Britain until, as they believed, Irish wrongs were 
put right.’59 
 
Although Carson drew that comparison between commitments in Ireland and elsewhere in 
the empire, there is little evidence that other politicians saw that comparison. Pressures for 
independence in India, Egypt or Mesopotamia could be compared with each other and 
concessions seen as precedents, but Ireland was seen as part of the British Isles and quite 
different. The Irish Problem was unique, but it had a substantial effect on British politics, and 
was a continuing problem before, during and after the war. In the short term, the pressures 
on Lloyd George and his government were enormous, but a pragmatic settlement was found, 
which must be to the credit of the British Government. 
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Chapter Two: Domestic Influences on Foreign Policies 
 
While the statesmen were arguing in Paris about the complex problems caused by, or not 
resolved by, the Great War, the British public were trying to recover from the national and 
personal traumas resulting from those years of total war. The war had had some positive 
effects for the working classes in respect of a modest improvement in living standards, better 
food for many of those in the armed forces away from the front lines, limited moves for the 
emancipation of women at work, and the acceptance of a substantial move towards universal 
and female suffrage for the election in 1918. Moreover, apart from being on the winning side 
in the war, Britain also had the advantage of political stability, which had been reinforced in 
that election, which had provided a clear majority for the Lloyd George coalition. 
 
However, these benefits did not counter the personal effects on families across the country 
of the deaths, injuries, and sickness of their husbands, sons and brothers in France, Belgium, 
Turkey or the Middle East. At a national level, the politicians must have been personally and 
collectively exhausted by the war, but then had to face different peacetime problems in both 
domestic and foreign affairs. On top of the casualties of the war, there was then a worldwide 
influenza pandemic, known as the Spanish Flu, which swept across the world between 1918 
and 1920. It affected all major countries, and estimates of deaths in Britain ranged between 
200,000 and 250,000 during the three years.   
 
The governments between 1919 and 1925 faced challenging economic situations, and they 
were threatened during the Lloyd George government by mounting trade union pressures that 
were released after wartime restraints. Politicians, not only on the left of the political 
spectrum, were very conscious of the level of unemployment, with the effects of the trade 
cycle and the policies of governments. Although in retrospect the unemployment figures may 
look low compared with the 1930s, they would then have seemed high compared with the 
figures before the war, and more importantly high compared with the expectations raised by 
the sacrifices of war.  
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Although politicians were becoming more conscious of public opinion during these years, it 
was of course a completely different world from the 24/7 media scrutiny of the late twentieth 
century or the early twenty-first century. The one major public opinion campaign was the 
Anti-Waste campaign led by the Daily Mail in 1921, and the associated Anti-Waste League, 
with support from many MPs and industrialists, which sponsored various candidates in by-
elections, and was reflected in the ‘Geddes Axe’ and the 1922-1923 budget. It was, however, 
a campaign aimed not so much at opposing a government policy, but rather reinforcing it. 
 
These were not the years of the major problems of the League of Nations, and the growth of 
the Peace Pledge Union, in the 1930s, but Howard commented that ‘after 1918 the reader 
becomes conscious of a new sound: the heavy and ominous breathing of a parsimonious and 
pacific electorate, to the variations of which the ears of British statesmen were increasingly 
attuned.’1 The country welcomed Locarno, but  Chamberlain was clearly sensitive about the 
mood of the British people about commitments in Europe. Dutton wrote that Chamberlain 
told Stresemann in 1927 that if he had to bring the Locarno treaties before Parliament again, 
he would not get them accepted.2 However, the full quotation in the Stresemann diaries, was 
‘if we have to bring the Locarno treaties again before the House of Commons, I could not get 
them accepted. The people simply would not stand for it. They are resisting any extension of 
the obligations undertaken by England. We were plunged into the Great War; we are now 
obliged, if a war breaks out between France and Germany on the Rhine, to mobilize again to 
our last man, and it is quite out of the question for us to undertake any further obligations.’3 
 
Within the changing and challenging domestic climate after the war, it is appropriate to 
consider the three key areas of the party political differences, the financial constraints and, 
associated in part with those, the military constraints on foreign policies. 
 
                                                 
1 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two 
World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p.79.  
2 David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (London: Ross Anderson, 1985), p.239. 
3 E. Sutton (ed.), Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters and Papers (London: Macmillan, 1940), Volume III, 
p.230. Moreover, Petrie emphasised that ‘all three governments were in advance of public opinion in their 
respective countries’ Sir Charles Petrie The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain 
(London : Cassell, 1940) p.262. 
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Party Political Differences  
 
Looking back on the years from 1919 to 1925, it is possible to see important long term 
changes in the balance of power between the political parties in the Commons. Most 
obviously the settlement in Ireland in 1922 meant that there were no longer a block of Irish 
MPs. Although this had not been important from 1919, because of Sinn Fein’s policy not to 
take seats in Westminster, Redmond’s 84 Irish Party MPs had been very important to the 
Liberal Government between 1910 and 1914. Within Great Britain the results of the elections 
masked to some extent the rise of the Labour Party and the decline of the Liberal Party. The 
detailed figures recorded by Butler and Butler show these changes; perhaps most significant 
is the comparison between the Liberal and Labour total votes between 1910 and 1924, against 
a near tripling of the electorate from 1918, with the Liberal Party only increasing by 30%, 
but with Labour increasing from 371,000 to 5,489,000 in a vastly increased number of seats:4 
 
 
 Dec 1910 Dec 1918 Nov 1922 Dec 1923 Oct 1924 
 
Cons seats 
 
272 335 345 258 419 
Lib seats 
 
272 113 + 285 62 + 54 159 40 
Lab seats 
 
42 63 + 10 142 191 151 
Lab 
candidates 
 
56 406 411 422 512 
Lab votes 
 
371 k 2,546 k 4,241 k 4,438 k 5,489 k 
Lib votes 
 
2,295 k 2,754 k 4,189 k 4,311 k 2,928 k 
 
 
The battle for the left of British politics might be expected to be reflected in very different 
approaches to foreign and imperial policies compared with traditional Conservative attitudes 
                                                 
4 David Butler and Gareth Butler Twentieth Century British Political Facts 1900-2000 (London : MacMillan, 
2000). 
5 The 28 Liberal MPs and 10 Labour MPs refer to “non-coalition” MPs. 
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and policies. This might appear to be the case; for example, the Labour and Liberal 
amendments to the King’s Speech in February 1923 are interesting enough to be cited in full. 
They were written about halfway through the six- year period on the first occasion of a return 
to normal party politics after the coalition, and after the Labour party’s advances in the 1922 
general election. The Labour amendment read: 
  
            recognising the present grave and dangerous condition of affairs in Europe and 
the Near East to be the certain source of future wars and a serious aggravation 
of unemployment and reduced wages in Great Britain, [we] regret the absence 
of any indication of policy upon these affairs which will check the progressive 
economic ruin of Europe, which contemplates an all-round cancellation of 
international war debts as an essential part of a workable general settlement, 
which will make the League of Nations representative of all peoples and 
employ it both for conciliation and arbitration in pressing and critical matters 
like the occupation of the Ruhr, and also for reconsideration at the earliest 
moment of the clauses, especially the economic ones, of the Peace Treaties 
which while they operate will decide the efforts of all governments for 
economic reconstruction and peace.6 
 
 
And the Liberal amendment:  
 
            that, inasmuch as the future peace of Europe cannot be safeguarded nor the 
recovery of reparations promoted by the operations of the French and Belgian 
Governments in the Ruhr, it is urgently necessary to seek effective securities 
against aggression by international guarantees under the League of Nations, 
and to invite the Council of the League without delay to appoint a Commission 
of experts to report upon the capacity of Germany to pay reparations and upon 
the best method of effecting such payments, and that, in view of the recent 
indication of willingness on the part of the Government of the United States of 
America to participate in a Conference to this end, the British representative 
on the Council of the League should be instructed to urge that an invitation be 
extended to the American Government to appoint experts to serve upon the 
Commission.7  
 
  
                                                 
6 Hansard, Volume 160, 16 February 1923, column 495. 
7 Hansard, Volume 160, 19 February 1923, column 665. 
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On the surface, these motions would indicate very different and distinctive approaches to 
foreign policy issues, but it will be argued that the analysis of what the different parties 
actually did when in government, as opposed to what they said they would do when is 
opposition, showed fewer differences. On imperial issues, the empire appeared to nearly all 
British politicians that it worked to the advantage of all, and there were few people who 
argued that Britain should not have that imperial role. Although the costs were sometimes 
queried, a reasonably mature party system in Britain had few debates within elections or 
between elections about the rights and wrongs of empire. 8 
 
The South African War had initially shown important differences both between the 
Conservative and Liberal Parties, and within the Liberal Party between the three factions of 
the Liberal Imperialists, the so-called ‘Pro-Boers’ including Lloyd George, and a centrist 
group of MPs led by Campbell-Bannerman. These divisions were not carried forward into 
subsequent party politics, as the Liberals were quickly reunited, mainly because of the 
Conservative 1902 Education Act, and their developing thoughts on tariff reform which were 
anathema to the Liberals. Moreover, the war appeared to have been a one-off military event 
which was followed by political progress in South Africa. It would have been expected that 
the loss of the Liberal Unionists after 1886 would have made the Liberal Party more radical 
and less imperialist, but any change does not seem to have been significant. Apart from the 
South African War, the Liberal Party had discovered, as Porter wrote, that: ‘ideologically, 
imperialism could be squared as easily with Liberalism as with Conservatism: if a Liberal 
felt strongly enough about his Liberalism, it was arguable that he should want to bestow it 
on others.’9 Those identified with anti-imperial thinking on the left of the political spectrum, 
whether from the Liberal Party or the Labour movement, for example J. A. Hobson, the left-
wing academic and writer, were clearly in a small minority.10 
 
                                                 
8 This brief analysis of imperial issues is taken back to 1900, because of the continuity of issues; the Great 
War and Versailles provided a completely new situation in Europe.  
9 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1970 (London: Pearson 
Longman, 2004), p.201.  
10 J. A. Hobson, Imperialism (London: Nisbet, 1902). 
64 
 
The large increase in the British Empire agreed at Versailles in both territory and population 
was taken for granted by all the political parties in Britain, and no real discussion took place 
regarding the costs, the responsibilities or the wishes of the peoples. The Treaty of Peace Bill 
was debated in the Commons on 21 July 1919 with the second reading, the committee stage 
and the third reading being completed in just one twenty-two-hour session. The leading 
opposition speakers, Maclean for the Asquithian Liberals and Clynes for Labour, had been 
associated with the wartime government and provided little criticism of the treaty.11 
MacDonald, a consistent opponent of the war, did not speak in the debate, nor was he one of 
the minority of MPs who voted in the division, which the government won by 163 votes to 
just four.   
 
Dutton commented that the central question for British policy makers after the war was  
 
            the extent to which Britain, with her aims and ambitions largely satisfied by 
the outcome of the War, could now divorce herself from the affairs of the 
continent, reassured and safe within her island fortress…To the right stood 
committed isolationists such as Churchill, Amery and Birkenhead, supported 
by the Beaverbrook press. These men thought of Britain as an Imperial rather 
than a European power…To his left were internationalists who, with the 
exception of Cecil, were not well represented in government, but who had 
important extra-parliamentary backing in the League of Nations Union.12 
 
Although it is an interesting argument, it is too simplistic an analysis of the so-called right 
and left of the Lloyd George Coalition, or of the Conservative Party. These two strands of 
thinking could emerge on particular issues, but many politicians including Churchill often 
demonstrated a combination of different attitudes at different times on different issues.13  
 
Many of the key secondary sources on party politics during these years, concentrate on 
analysing the developing domestic policies and the internal party arguments, especially on 
                                                 
11 Hansard, Volume 118, 21 July 1919, column 951 etc. 
12 Dutton, Austen Chamberlain.  p.239. 
13 Williamson had an unusual quote from Baldwin, who spoke fluent French and understood German, in a 
speech at Oxford in June 1923 ‘let us not forget this, that while we are Englishmen, Scotsmen, Welshmen, 
Irishmen, we are at the same time Europeans’ Philip Williamson Stanley Baldwin : Conservative Leadership 
and National Values (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999) p.295. 
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the changing positions of the Liberal and Labour Parties. They do not have many references 
to foreign and imperial policies and to the specifics of Versailles, Locarno, relationships with 
the United States, or even relationships with Russia except with regard to the Labour Party.14                 
With the Liberal-led, but Conservative-dominated, coalition from 1919, and the Conservative 
governments under Bonar Law and Baldwin, it would be expected that any opposition to 
imperial or European policies would  come from the Labour Party, or from the right-wing of 
the Conservative Party. Within the Labour Party, Howe argued that ‘most of the party leaders, 
most of the trade unionists who formed the bulk of Labour’s parliamentary strength, and most 
of the Fabians who so dominated its political thinking, were primarily if not exclusively 
concerned with domestic politics.’15  
 
Thompson was no doubt right to say that ‘there was nothing like the annual debate on the 
Indian estimates to empty the chamber of the Commons,’16 but this was not the case on the 
occasion of the debate on India in 1920 about General Dyer and the infamous massacre at 
Amritsar in April 1919, which raised the most vociferous imperial political argument during 
this period. While the story of this tragic incident has been told many times, it is the 
parliamentary arguments which are directly relevant to this subject. The debate regarding the 
‘Punjab Disturbances and Lord Hunter’s Committee’ took place on 8 July 1920, and 
concentrated not on the victims of the massacre, but on whether General Dyer had himself 
been victimised. 17 Moreover, the vote did not split on party lines and the headline in The 
Times the next day indicated that ‘Ministers Saved by the Opposition’ as 129 coalition MPs, 
mostly Conservative and often ex-military, voted against the government, but the vast 
majority of the 40 Labour and the 26 Asquithian Liberal MPs on the opposition benches 
voted with the government. 18   
                                                 
14 For example, Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Major (London : Faber, 2010). Ross 
Mckibbin, Parties and People : England 1914-1951 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010). Kenneth O. 
Morgan, Age of Reform : Dawns and Downfalls of the British Left (London : I.B. Tauris, 2011). Henry Pelling 
and Alastair J. Reid A Short History of the Labour Party (Basingstoke : MacMillan, 1996). G.R.Searle The 
Liberal Party : Triumph and Disintegration 1886-1929 (Basingstoke : MacMillan, 2001). 
15
 Stephen Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.45.  
MacDonald had considerable knowledge of India, having first visited the subcontinent in 1910: he returned in 
December 1912 as a member of the Royal Commission on the Indian Public Services and then again in 1913.   
16 Andrew S. Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back? (London : Pearson Longman, 2005),  p.127. 
17 Hansard, Volume 131, 8 July 1920, column 1705. 
18 The Times, July 9 1920. 
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The more significant point is that apart from the Dyer debate, the right-wing Diehard faction 
of the Conservative Party did not have any effect on major imperial or European issues.19 
The Diehards had the advantage of friends in Fleet Street including the Morning Post, the 
National Review and The Spectator, but many of the Diehards’ issues were of a domestic 
nature, including the anti-waste campaigns, and Morgan indicates that ‘the right was short of 
numbers. Its strength lay in its connections in Parliament and Fleet Street, and its ability to 
provide a megaphone for fundamental Tory instincts.’20 Thompson suggested that ‘only one-
fifth’ of the anti-coalition votes at the famous Carlton Club meeting in 1922 were Diehard 
MPs, although this could also be stated that ‘as many as one-fifth’ were Diehard MPs.21 
Thompson also said that ‘the wider political context for the defence of Dyer is the build-up 
of Diehard Tory sentiment during 1919 to 1922...they believed Britain to have providentially 
sanctioned imperial obligations, and they insisted that challenges to colonial authority had to 
be resisted, whether in Ireland, Egypt or India.’22   
 
Thompson indicated that Diehard MPs came mainly from the landowning classes and the 
armed forces, and a high percentage of them were Irishmen or had Irish connections.23 There 
was obviously scope for the right-wing on a number of imperial and European issues during 
these six years, including the Versailles Treaty itself, the developments in India and the 
reaction in London to the Amritsar massacre, nationalistic pressures in Egypt, the overall 
situation in Ireland, the agreements at the Washington Conference, the circumstances 
surrounding Chanak, and the events leading up to and including Locarno. However, the 
Diehards were not a significant force, after the settlement in Ireland, until the debates on the 
India Act in the 1930s. 
 
                                                 
19 The government had been defeated by a Diehard-led revolt on the relatively unimportant Aliens Restriction 
Bill in October 1919.  
20 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), p.236. 
21 Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain :The Empire in British Politics c.1880-1932 (London : Pearson 
Longman, 2000), p.165. 
22 Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?  p.135. 
23 Thompson, Imperial Britain, p.163. 
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While Churchill could be seen at times emerging as a powerful right-wing figure on imperial 
matters, and was certainly to be that in the 1930s on India, there was no equivalent on the 
left, and no left-wing pressure group, which had the influence that the Movement for Colonial 
Freedom was to have after 1950. Howe, when writing of the later period, commented that 
‘within the Labour Party and Trade Unions, anti-colonialism was perhaps the only issue on 
which the left seemed to score unequivocal victories during the 1950s and 1960s.’24 It is 
interesting to note that Fenner Brockway, later to be a leader of the Movement for Colonial 
Freedom, entered parliament in 1929, and immediately took on an informal role of ILP 
spokesman for colonial affairs. It had, however, not become an issue in the years up to 1925. 
 
There was all-party agreement about the Washington Naval Conference and its conclusions. 
After the conference, the Conservative government decided to confirm the start of building 
a modern naval base at Singapore and as Thompson said, ‘the Singapore strategy became 
something of an acid test of Britain’s resolve to maintain a truly imperial navy.’25 The 
spending on the base might have developed into a major indicator of imperial commitment 
between left and right, as the Labour government halted construction at Singapore in 1924, 
and the Conservatives resumed the work in 1926.26  
 
The issue of Imperial Preference could be analysed either under party politics or economic 
policy, but in view of its limited effect on practical economic policies, it is dealt with under 
party political differences. The movement appeared to have promised so much, but in practice 
it had little effect on policies in the years under review. Initiated by Joseph Chamberlain in 
1903, when he resigned as colonial secretary, he saw the tariff reform movement according 
to Clarke not just as a policy but more of a ‘crusade to avert British decline through an 
exercise of will.’27 The Tariff Reform League was set up as a pressure group to achieve the 
change, but the orthodoxy of Free Trade of the previous fifty years was deeply entrenched, 
even though the policies had different economic effects in different industries and regions.  
                                                 
24 Howe, Anti-Colonialism in British Politics, p.20. 
25 Thompson, Imperial Britain, p.176. 
26 David W. McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base 1919-1942 (London: Macmillan, 
1979).  
27 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000 (London: Penguin, 2004), p.25. 
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Before the war the Conservatives had no opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to 
tariff reform; Balfour had made a pledge during the December 1910 election to submit the 
issue of food taxes to a referendum, but this was subsequently dropped by Bonar Law. One 
minor effect of the thinking was that duties imposed in 1915 on the importation of luxury 
goods, were lowered in 1919 by one third for imperial goods. The duties were abolished by 
Snowden in 1924 but re-introduced by Churchill in 1925.  Baldwin had been a tariff reformer, 
before he became leader, but more from the basis of domestic protection than from any 
imperial ideology. In 1922 Bonar Law committed himself that there would be no change of 
policy towards tariff reform during that parliament, but at the 1923 party conference Baldwin 
said that that commitment would lapse at the end of that parliament, and his half-hearted 
programme of tariff reform in the December 1923 election only re-invigorated the Liberals. 
Baldwin withdrew that commitment for the 1924 election which the Conservatives won 
conclusively, and he appointed Churchill, a traditional free trader, to the Treasury.       
  
The election in 1918 had been complicated by coalition politics, but the party manifestos for 
the subsequent elections during this period might normally be expected to give an insight 
into the imperial or other priorities of the three parties. A study of the manifestos does not, 
however, indicate any clear choices on imperial matters, except in respect of those tariff 
arguments which went under the positive headings of ‘Fair Trade’ or ‘Free Trade.’ There 
were occasional platitudes such as the Labour government saying that ‘it has maintained, and 
even strengthened, the ties of sentiment within the Dominions upon which…the very 
existence of the British Commonwealth of Nations depends.’28 The single most interesting 
statement is the Conservative manifesto in 1924, which took some notice of those ruled, but 
then had a sharply stated conclusion about authority: 
 
         we favour the progressive grant of constitutional liberties in every part of the 
Empire where the capacity and loyalty of the people will make such measures a 
benefit to themselves and a strength to the Empire; but we are no less determined 
to maintain the authority and the unity of the Empire against factious and 
misguided agitation wherever it assert itself. 
                                                 
28 Labour Party, Election Manifesto, 1924. 
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There were no differences between the parties in 1924, when the British Empire Exhibition 
was opened on 23 April, St George’s Day, by King George V at Wembley Park, and which 
attracted during its two-year lifespan over 27 million visitors, who must have come from all 
classes and political opinions.29 The exhibition had cost £12m; it was believed to be the 
biggest exhibition ever held in the world at that time and it had as its aim ‘to stimulate trade, 
strengthen bonds that bind Mother Country to her Sister States and Daughters; to bring into 
closer contact the one with each other, to enable all who owe allegiance to the British Flag 
to meet on common ground and learn to know each other.’ The apparent great public interest 
in imperial matters at Wembley was clearly not reflected in the manifestos or discussions at 
elections, and Thompson was undecided as to whether the public interest reflected real 
interest in wider imperial policies.30 
 
Some of the imperial issues showing similarities between the parties overlap with European 
issues; for example, the lack of parliamentary criticism of the Versailles Treaty reflected on 
the attitudes of MPs of all parties to most decisions from Versailles. Looking more widely at 
the party philosophies, Gupta wrote that while the traditional ‘aim of British strategy and 
diplomacy was to maintain the security of Britain’s imperial and commercial sea lanes, and 
also to prevent any one power from dominating the Continent,’ Labour’s ideological 
preference was for ‘open diplomacy, strengthening the League of Nations by admitting 
Germany and Russia, reducing armaments as a step towards universal disarmament, and 
general recourse to arbitration in international disputes.’31  
 
In looking at those differences between Conservative/Coalition and Labour policies, there 
were perhaps two main strands of differences, both of them relating predominantly to Europe 
rather than the empire. On Russia there was a natural affinity of the Labour Party, and the 
left wing more generally, with the new Russian Government. This can be seen in reactions 
to the Russian Civil War, when Churchill pursued support for the White Russians, and then 
                                                 
29 Thompson, Imperial Britain, p.181. 
30 Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?  p.87. 
31 P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement 1914-1964 (London: Macmillan, 1975), p.93. 
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in differences about trade agreements and the row about the Zinoviev letter in the 1924 
election. Pelling and Reid argued that the Macdonald Government policy on Russia ‘made a 
start by giving unconditional recognition to the Soviet Government; but it proved much more 
difficult to agree on the terms of financial and commercial agreements.’32 More generally on 
the question of peace Labour felt more comfortable as the proponent of international peace, 
the League of Nations, and for example MacDonald’s support for the Geneva Protocol in 
1924. The dilemma of supporting efforts for international peace, or supporting military 
expenditure which had a direct effect on employment most obviously in the shipyards, had 
not emerged in the political debates in the 1920s.  
 
            However, if the governments of the Liberal-led coalition, the Conservative governments and 
the first Labour government are compared, there was no great discontinuity in the actual 
practice of the different governments in dealing with the problems arising from Versailles, 
particularly with regard to relationships with France and German reparations. Although 
MacDonald’s support for the Geneva Protocol did provide a divergence from the 
Conservative Party, his work up to and including the London Conference in August 1924 had 
been consistent with the previous administrations, and in 1925 he supported Locarno when 
in opposition, even if he would have wanted to go further in the direction of the Protocol.       
 
On imperial matters, it is surprising that issues were not more central to the debates between 
the parties. There were potentially divisive issues such as the after-effects of the Amritsar 
massacre, the prospects of greater self-rule in India, the on-going issue of imperial tariffs, 
and the question of the naval base at Singapore. The Indian issues were to show up bitter 
differences within the Conservative Party, rather than between the parties, and Labour had 
not yet developed an agenda for colonial freedom, which would have opened a divide with 
the whole of the Conservative Party.33 The Liberal and Labour Parties were  less inclined to 
be involved in overseas commitments so when the Conservative Party was ambivalent, the 
                                                 
32 Pelling and Reid A Short History of the Labour Party p.54. 
33
 The Labour Government was unlikely to be radical in these areas given MacDonald’s choices of J. H. 
Thomas as colonial secretary and of Lord Olivier, an experienced colonial administrator, as secretary of state 
for India, rather than Josiah Wedgwood a supporter of Indian independence. 
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overall balance was clear.34 There was much less difference between the parties than might 
have been expected, and in particular the comparison between the parties when actually 
having the responsibilities of government shows considerable continuity. 
 
            Although dating from as long ago as 1961, Johnson’s summary of differences over Europe 
and the Protocol is still interesting:  
 
            The Labour Party was divided by ‘revisionism’ and the need to reassure the 
thirty-two signatory states in Europe by applying the Treaty; they were divided 
between their belief that secret diplomacy and ‘the balance of power’ had 
caused 1914 and MacDonald’s personal enjoyment of the old system whereby 
a few individuals could secretly settle the affairs of the world…the Liberal 
Party was divided between an idealistic attachment to the League and the more 
adventurous policies of Lloyd George…in the Conservative Party, the dangers 
that could come from France, or Germany, or Soviet Russia, were given 
various degrees of prominence. Some Conservatives were in favour of Great 
Britain isolating herself from Europe and concentrating on her Imperial 
connections; some were disturbed that the policy of ‘benevolent neutralism ad 
infinitum’ was reducing British influence; others were insistent upon the 
importance of the League.35 
 
However, the key conclusion in respect of this thesis is that although there may have been 
clear contrasts between attitudes or policies in opposition, there were surprisingly many 
fewer differences between the parties when faced with foreign policies issues in the real 
problems of government. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Charmley wrote of the years 1924 to 1929 that ‘the Conservatives had foreborn the pursuit of a forward 
imperial policy under Salisbury because they did not want to pay for it – this attitude now received 
reinforcement from an electorate which showed more concern with domestic politics than with events in far-
away countries about which they knew little and cared less.’ John A. Charmley, A History of Conservative 
Politics 1900-1996 (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.76. 
35 Douglas Johnson, ‘Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements’ University of Birmingham Historical 
Journal, Volume 8. 1961 p.67. 
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Economic Constraints     
 
 
Foreign policies will always be affected by economic strength; a direct effect will be the link 
between economic success and expenditure on the armed forces; an indirect linkage is the 
time that government ministers spend on economic as opposed to diplomatic and military 
issues. Immediate economic effects of the Great War were the very large increases in 
international indebtedness, which presented problems for all the European Allies. The 
importance of this scale of international debt is not just the economic or financial 
complexities, but also the political implications of the possibilities of repayments, the links 
to the debates on the reparation demands on Germany, the effect on the drawing up of post-
war budgets, and a wider indirect effect on government thinking in view of the size of the 
debts. The large scale of the inter-government debts in November 1918, nearly all arising 
from the war, can be summarized as follows, stated in millions of US dollars: 36 
 
 
Borrower from USA from Britain from France Total 
Britain  3,696 ---- ---- 3,789 
Russia 187 2,471 95537 3,614 
Italy 1,031 1,855 75 2,961 
France 1,970 1,682 ---- 3,652 
Belgium 171 422 534 1,128 
Total 7,077 7,014 2,237 16,42238 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, War Debts and World Prosperity (New York: The Brookings 
Institution, 1932), p.426.  
37 This figure is relatively small because many loans from France, on which the new Russian Bolshevik 
Government defaulted, were private or business loans and investments, rather than inter-governmental loans.  
38 All the totals include smaller figures for, or from, other countries. 
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The first major agreement on the treatment of the debts was the Anglo-American agreement 
of January 1923; this resulted from the recommendation by Baldwin and Montagu Norman 
from the Bank of England, after major negotiations in the United States. The proposed sixty-
one-year agreement, defining an initial interest rate of 3% rising to 3.5% for most of the loan, 
was reluctantly accepted by Bonar Law and the rest of the cabinet, and was followed by the 
much wider international agreement at the London Conference in 1924.  
 
Following the extraordinary wartime conditions, the post-war boom in 1919 may have 
insulated the government from some of the immediate economic priorities in peacetime.  
Looking back ninety years later, Crafts concluded that: 
 
the difficulties that beset the British economy in the 1920s came from the world 
economic environment compared with the pre-war period, from the legacy of 
the war itself, and from the policy choices made in the aftermath of war. The 
implications were a substantial rise in the equilibrium unemployment, a big 
squeeze on real earnings and a need for eye-watering primary budget surpluses 
to preserve fiscal sustainability.’39 
 
After initial problems in January 1919 about the principles of demobilization, the massive 
operation to return up to four million men and women to civilian life and employment went 
remarkably smoothly, with the armed forces reduced to 370,000 by November 1920. The 
post-war boom allowed the absorption of the majority of those men from the forces and from 
wartime munitions and similar work, into peacetime activities. The figures were greatly 
helped by the assumption, and then the reality, that most working women would revert to 
family duties, either personal or in service, rather than compete with men for jobs that had 
been traditional done by men.  
 
The issue of employment, and more importantly unemployment, are often referred to in the 
debates on foreign policy during these years, but Garside was correct in the analysis of 
economic priorities of the different governments when he wrote that: 
 
                                                 
39 Nicolas Crafts Walking Wounded : The British Economy in the Aftermath of World War 1 (Warwick : C.E. 
P. R., 2014) p.1. 
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Driven by an intense desire to restore Britain’s economic, financial and trading 
pre-eminence, governments in the 1920s worked assiduously to forestall 
inflation, sustain sound budgetary practice and protect the value of the 
currency, even if …policies of deflation, retrenchment and minimum 
intervention in the workings of the free-market system afforded little 
opportunity for the adoption of a deliberate anti-unemployment strategy.40   
 
The government added to the post-war boom by increasing the floating debt to meet heavy 
public expenditure, and spending the money raised by the sale of war surplus equipment. 
There was no government action to prevent the rapid increase in prices, which was not 
matched by wages. The collapse of the boom began in April 1920, in the month that the 
government belatedly raised bank rate to 7%. The budget for 1920-1921 showed a surplus, 
and including the effects of the bank rate and the increased excess profits duty, had a 
markedly deflationary effect. The subsequent slump in Britain in 1921 and 1922 might have 
been foreseen in the general cutback in government expenditure and the falling off of 
business from 1921, associated with the traditional remedies of economy and deflation. 
Crafts emphasised the severity of the reduction in real GDP in these years, which has 
traditionally been underestimated compared with the Great Depression which was to follow, 
and argued as recently as 2014, that further research was required.41    
 
Government income and expenditure had increased dramatically during the war, after the 
gradual increases during the Edwardian years when arguments mostly centred on the costs 
of the Royal Navy and on social improvements such as old age pensions.42 The following 
chart shows the post-war government budget figures, balance or imbalance of income and 
expenditure, and the sharp reductions of expenditure, including those for 1922-1923 after the 
Geddes Committee: 43 
 
 
                                                 
40 W. R. Garside British Unemployment 1919-1939 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.380. 
41 Crafts Walking Wounded p.3. 
42 Government revenue increased from £198m in 1913-1914 to £1,340m in 1919-1920; Expenditure increased 
from £197m in 1913-1914 to £2,579m in 1918-1919; and £1,665m in 1919-1920. Sidney Pollard, The 
Development of the British Economy 1914-1990 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992), p.24. 
43 Butler and Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, pp.419 and 422, with total debt charges taken 
from Susan Howson, Domestic Monetary Management in Britain 1919-1938 (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), p.156.   
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 Total 
government 
revenue 
(£m) 44 
 
Defence 
expenditure 
(£m) 
Health, 
labour, 
insurance 
(£m) 
Pensions 
(£m) 
Total debt 
charges 
(£m) 
1919-1920 1,340 692 74 100 270   
1920-1921 1,426 292 73 110 332 
1921-1922 1,125 189 73 96 350 
1922-1923 914 111 61 83 352 
1923-1924 837 105 59 72 324 
1924-1925 799 114 65 71 347 
1925-1926 812 119 65 70 357 
 
 
Modern comparable unemployment figures were not introduced until 1921, but according to 
the Ministry of Labour Gazette the number of persons receiving the ‘out-of-work’ donation, 
both ex-servicemen and civilians, never exceeded 1,100,000, and by October 1919 was below 
half a million.45 The newly unemployment figures became available on a comparable basis 
from December 1921 when the post-war boom was over. Garside identified unemployment 
figures, on the new basis, as being 2,212,000 in 1921, 1,909,000 in 1922, 1,567,000 in 1923, 
1,404,000 in 1924 and 1,559,000 in 1925.46 As stated above, the governments still felt 
confined by the effects of the wartime debts and the post-war constraints on spending, and 
the most worrying figure particularly for MPs was that of unemployment.  
 
All the governments during this period saw the balancing of the national budget as the major 
priority, when in peacetime conditions considerable expenditure was still allocated for the 
                                                 
44 Income tax was 5/- in the pound in 1918, up to 6/- in 1919 before reducing to 5/- in 1923 and 4/6 in 1924. 
45 Garside British Unemployment gave a breakdown that 650,000 civilians and 360,000 ex-servicemen were 
drawing the ‘out-of-work’ donation in May 1919. p.36. 
46 Garside p.5. The 1926 figures were affected by the general strike and other industrial action. 
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armed forces and even more significantly up to forty per-cent was to pay for the post-war 
levels of national debt. The national debt had been £650m in 1914, but after all the wartime 
expenditure this had increased massively to around £7,000m by 1919 and stayed between 
£7,000m and £8,000m in all the years to 1925.  British net wartime borrowings were 
complicated by Britain’s large indebtedness to the United States; although Britain was in 
considerable credit with European wartime allies, they were unlikely to repay the loans at an 
early date.  Although Crafts does not make specific post-war break points in his work on 
Britain’s Relative Economic Performance 1870-1999, the long-term changes between United 
States and Britain continued throughout these years.47  
 
Pressures on government expenditure by anti-waste campaigners, including campaigns in the 
press including Lord Northcliffe, led to the appointment in August 1921 of a committee to 
review the 1922-23 provisional estimates and recommend further economies. This committee 
of business leaders was chaired by Sir Eric Geddes, who had previously been minister of 
transport under Lloyd George.48 The committee’s three reports recommended sharp cuts in 
expenditure, and were referred to in the press as the ‘Geddes Axe’ when they were published 
in February 1922. Although they were published after the key negotiations in Washington on 
battleships, the politicians in London were already clear about the need for further economies. 
 
A major economic pressure for the Lloyd George Government, but not so much for the 
successor governments until 1926, was trade union industrial action; this was partly because 
of the possible or actual effects on the economy, and partly because of the association of left-
wing elements with the new revolutionary Bolshevik regime in Russia, especially during the 
union’s ‘Hands off Russia’ campaign in 1920. Certainly in the years 1919, 1920, 1921 and 
1922 days lost through strikes were at the high levels of 35 million, 26 million, 85 million 
and 20 million respectively; this compares with figures of 10 million or below for the years 
from 1923 to 1925, before the record figure of 162 million in 1926 with the general strike 
                                                 
47 Nicholas Crafts Britain’s Relative Economic Performance 1870-1999 (London : Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 2002) p.72. 
48 Not to be confused with his brother Sir Auckland Geddes, who was British Ambassador to the United 
States from 1920 to 1924. 
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and the national coal strike.49 The years immediately after the war were associated with 
government initiatives in the industrial sector, but also considerable industrial muscle being 
exercised by the trade unions representing miners, railwaymen and transport workers. These 
issues added to the problems in terms of time and pressures for Lloyd George and his 
government, even if they did not greatly affect military and foreign policy thinking.  
 
The governments still felt confined by the effects of the wartime debts and the post-war 
constraints on spending. The term ‘Keynesian Economics’ is associated with calls in the 
1930s from Keynes and his associates for counter-recessional government investment and 
spending, but in the early 1920s Keynes was only known for his book criticising the   severity 
of Versailles. There appears to have been no pressure, for example from Labour MPs, for 
such counter-cyclical government spending, to try to bring down unemployment. This is 
relevant to this study because of the employment that would have been created by the 
building of capital ships, in traditional shipbuilding areas in the north of England and 
Scotland. All governments, however, had traditional approaches to balancing the national 
budget, and there was also continuing concern about economic developments in other 
countries, especially with the inflation and hyper-inflation in Germany.  
 
The issue of Imperial Preference had been on the political agenda since Joseph Chamberlain’s 
initiative in 1903. As referred to in the section above on party politics, this had the effect of 
dividing opinion within the Conservative Party, but had united and galvanised the Liberal 
Party. After the war, Baldwin’s inconclusive attitude to the subject contributed to the loss of 
his overall majority in the general election in 1923. Although the issue threatened to tear the 
Conservative party apart on various occasions, it did not do so, and it never achieved 
importance as a national economic issue. 
 
Perhaps the most significant economic decision during these years was that of the Baldwin 
Government, and specifically by Churchill when in charge of the Treasury, to restore the 
                                                 
49 Butler and Butler, Twentieth-Century British Political Facts, p.399. 
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pound to the Gold Standard as announced in the budget speech on 28 April 1925.50 Crafts 
took the view that ‘the key post-war policy decision, taken following the report of the 
Cunliffe Committee in 1919, was to seek a return to the gold standard pre-war parity of 
$4.86.’51 The 1925 decision was consistent with the generally deflationary policies since 
1920, and followed the relatively stable British economic situation since 1923 with industrial 
disputes down and weekly wage rates rising slowly. Those who argued against the 
restoration, and particularly against the pre-war parity, were concerned that the pound would 
be overvalued with effects on exports and on a continuing trade imbalance.  
 
The medium and longer-term economic and financial effects of the return to the Gold 
Standard, are outside the boundaries of this thesis, but it should be recorded that these 
decisions were being planned in early 1925 at the same time as the difficult cabinet 
discussions on European security issues. It is also relevant that it added to the feeling of a 
return to normality, and was therefore consistent with the diplomatic mood in that year of 
1925. There were clearly short and long-term implications of the financial developments 
during these years, but it is not reasonable to expect the political establishment to have seen 
the long-term changes at the time, and therefore the general welcome of the move back to 
the Gold Standard is understandable.              
 
Overall, during these years, the economic situation influenced military and foreign policy in 
respect of the debt burdens inherited from the war, and the effect of that and other pressures 
on balancing the budget at a time of traditional political attitudes to such budgeting. The 
issues of industrial relations and of imperial preference were important to some of the 
governments at certain times, but are not important for this thesis, except in adding to the 
general pressures on the governments. The so-called economic constraints will only be 
crucial to the foreign policy decisions if they directly affected military decisions and how 
those military decisions assisted, or prevented, foreign policy decisions. 
 
                                                 
50 Richard Toye, Churchill’s Empire (London: Macmillan, 2010), p.167, Churchill emphasised the Dominion 
link; that Canada was already on the Gold Standard, that other Dominions would join Britain in the new 
arrangement, and that a uniform standard of exchange would revive international and inter-imperial trade. 
51 Crafts Walking Wounded p.2. 
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Military Constraints   
 
The most important decision regarding military policy taken by the cabinet after Versailles 
was the so called ‘Ten Year Rule’ which refers to the conclusions of the cabinet in August 
1919, when it was decided that: 
 
         it should be assumed for framing revised estimates, that the British Empire will 
not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no 
expeditionary force is required for this purpose…The principle [sic] functions of 
the Military and the Air Forces is to provide garrisons for India, Egypt, the new 
mandated territory and all territory (other than self-governing) under British 
control, as well as to provide the necessary support to the civil power at home.52   
 
This cabinet decision was taken on 15 August, after apparently only a brief discussion of the 
foreign and military implications, but significantly after a full cabinet discussion on economic 
priorities ten days earlier on 5 August.53 There was no real discussion of the military 
implications except for the commitment to the costs of providing garrisons for India, Egypt 
and the new mandated territories, and saying that the maximum estimates to be aimed for 
were £60 million pounds per annum for the Royal Navy and a total of £75 million for the 
Army and the RAF. Bond recounted that there had been a cabinet committee meeting on the 
subject on 11 August, between the cabinet meetings, but with no representatives of the 
military departments present.54 It was clearly a financial decision rather than one of military 
strategy. The Ten Year Rule, which was kept secret from the British public and from foreign 
governments, continued to be the basis for British military planning throughout the next 
decade, and was not rescinded until 1932. 
 
This emphasis on financial constraints was not at all surprising, in view of the burden of war 
debts, and the problems of peacetime budgeting.  Kennedy emphasised the changing balance 
                                                 
52 Cabinet minutes, 15 August 1919, NA/CAB 23. The term ‘expeditionary force’ meant similar to the BEF in 
1914. 
53 Cabinet minutes, 5 August 1919, NA/CAB 23. 
54 Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 
p.25. 
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of government expenditure, for example between social services and military expenditure; 
within the total government expenditure of £197m in 1913-14, £35m was allocated to the 
army and £50m or 25% of total government expenditure went to the Royal Navy.55 
Adamthwaite explained that the expenditure on the Navy had been to ensure that ‘the old 
two-power standard of pre-war days,’ that is the principle that the Royal Navy should be as 
strong as the combined next two most powerful navies in the world, but that had to be 
modified after the war, and particularly at the Washington Conference.56  
 
Although the war was over, the military establishment had three challenging years between 
the armistice in 1918 and the Washington Conference in 1921; initially there were the 
problems of demobilising up to four million men and women; then there were the ongoing 
military commitments which did not stop in November 1918, initially in Russia, and then 
with imperial commitments in Mesopotamia, India, Egypt and Ireland; and finally in working 
out the shape of military resources in the much stricter budgetary situation from 1920. 
Military savings could at any stage get complicated by political priorities; in January 1919 
Churchill ‘set out to reduce Britain’s military expenditure everywhere except Russia, where 
he was prepared to spend whatever might be necessary to destroy the Bolshevik regime.’57 
 
Orde quoted from CID minutes in 1920 that naval policy should be ‘to maintain superiority 
at sea over any combination of powers likely to be arrayed against the forces of the Empire.’58 
The whole background of the importance of naval power with regard to the British Empire 
has often been described, including Sprout’s account of the historical analysis by Captain 
Alfred Mahan published in 1890.59 Gibbs described it that  
 
until late in the nineteenth century Britain, by her control of the seaways into 
and out of Europe, was able to use her command of the sea to ensure the 
                                                 
55 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976), p.272.  
56
 Anthony Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), 
p.31. Gupta wrote that ‘the traditional official aim of British strategy and diplomacy was to maintain 
the security of Britain’s imperial and commercial sea lanes, and also to prevent any one power from 
dominating the Continent.’ Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement. p.93.  
57 David Gilmour, Curzon (London: John Murray, 1994), p.514. 
58 Anne Orde, Great Britain and International Security 1920-1926 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1978), 
p.157, citing CID paper 251-B, 10 July 1920, CAB 4/7.  
59 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (New York: Low, 1890). 
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security of the British Isles themselves, the freedom of Britain's trade, and the 
safety of her colonies. Britain could exercise naval command as far afield as 
the Pacific because there, in all normal circumstances, a challenge to her 
authority could only come from the navies of Europe.60  
 
It is important to explore the extent to which British imperialist interests determined the shape 
and deployment of military resources and planning. Gooch for example maintains that after 
the war ‘imperial considerations impinged upon Britain at every turn, problems they were 
now predominantly internal threats within different parts of the empire, and as such not 
receptive to the action of the traditional British palliative, the Royal Navy.’61 The army had 
in February 1920, after the immediate effects of the demobilization program and the formal 
adoption of the Ten Year Rule, moved a considerable way towards deployment in peacetime 
conditions.62 There were then only 16,000 British troops in Germany, but in comparison to 
this small number close to home in Europe, there were large numbers in different locations 
within the Empire.63 The biggest commitment was the garrison in Ireland, which was seen as 
part of the home numbers, where the numbers increased from 53,000 in May 1919 to 80,000 
in July 1921 before the start of the negotiations. The spread of troops worldwide shows both 
the spread of imperial responsibilities and the inter-linkage with the Royal Navy.64  
 
With regard to the Royal Navy, Clayton pointed out that ‘almost half of the Navy’s effective 
strength was kept in the Mediterranean throughout the period. In the Mediterranean it was 
available for despatch against Japan without appearing to be in a challenging posture, it was 
                                                 
60
 Norman Gibbs, ‘British Strategic Doctrine’ in The Theory and Practice of War, Michael Howard 
(ed.) (London: Cassell, 1965), p.192. Gibbs argued that the Liberal Government in 1914 declared 
war ‘in support of the long tradition, that the upsetting of the balance of power in Europe could 
directly threatens Britain's naval supremacy.’ p.189. Kennedy said that ‘interconnections between 
her commercial expansion and her rise to maritime supremacy, and between her industrial revolution 
and the Pax Britannica, are historical facts which few would contradict.’ Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise 
and Fall of British Naval Mastery p.267.  
61 John Gooch, Armies in Europe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p.187. 
62 There were 20,000 British troops in Russia during the Civil War but they were all withdrawn during 1920. 
63 There were 9,000 British with 14,000 Indian troops in Turkey, 6,000 British troops and 20,000 Indians in 
Egypt, 10,000 British and 13,000 Indians in Palestine and 17,000 British and 44,000 Indians in Mesopotamia. 
Anthony Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower 1919-1939 (London: University of Georgia Press, 
1966), p.45. 
64 Clayton also wrote more generally about the inter-war years, that the British army had a strength of 
180,000. Approximately one-third of the army was stationed in India; smaller garrisons served in Egypt, 
Sudan, Palestine, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Jamaica, Malta, Gibraltar and later Cyprus. Clayton, 
Oxford History of British Empire Volume IV Twentieth Century, p.283.  
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not far from home for administrative purposes – for recall in the event of an emergency crisis 
with the Soviet Union or the USA, and there was the useful prestige to be gained by its 
presence in the Mediterranean itself .’65  Malta was, however, the farthest east that the largest 
naval ships could be maintained or repaired; all the details of the political, financial and 
inter-service rivalry about the proposal for a Singapore base were analysed by Mcintyre, with 
the first discussions on Singapore being as early as October 1919.66  
 
These military pressures reflect the ongoing commitments of a worldwide empire against 
financial constraints once the government receipts and expenditure became clear after April 
1920. As a result of Versailles, there were increased imperial commitments in the Middle 
East, but there was no considered thinking about the financial consequences. Churchill’s 
efforts to reduce costs in the Middle East were initially an attempt to slow the increase in 
costs; the change of strategy in Mesopotamia from traditional army occupation to a 
combination of the use of RAF squadrons and armoured car companies did reduce the annual 
expenditure there from £20m in 1921-1922 to £1.6m in 1927-1928.67 
 
The significant decrease of the total military budget from £195m in 1921-1922 to £138m in 
1922-1923 followed the work of the Geddes Committee which sat in the winter of 1921-1922 
in anticipation of the budget year from April 1922. The timing overlapped with the Irish 
peace talks that were completed in December 1921, and with the Washington Conference 
from November 1921 to February 1922.  Following the cabinet agreement on the Ten Year 
Rule in 1919, the effect on the military budgets is shown in the following table.68 
 
                                                 
65 Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, p.9. 
66 McIntyre, The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base. 
67 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London: Macmillan, 1941), Appendix on 
‘Pacification of the Middle East’ pp.461-466.  
68 H. M. Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars 1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976), Appendix VI. 
Although the totals for the three services are somewhat different from the total defence expenditure given 
above by Butler and Butler, the trend and relativities are clearly consistent. 
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 Royal 
Navy 
(£m) 69 
 
Army 
(£m) 
RAF 
(£m) 
Total 
(£m) 
1920-1921 91 125 23 239 
1921-1922 83 94 18 195 
1922-1923 65 62 11 138 
1923-1924 58 52 12 122 
1924-1925 56 45 15 116 
1925-1926 61 45 16 122 
 
Not all the details of the Geddes reports were implemented, but the major changes were the 
reduction in manpower of 50,000, the consequent disbandment of eight cavalry regiments 
and twenty-eight infantry battalions, further savings as a result of new equipment and the use 
of the RAF instead of troops on the ground.70 Amongst the infantry battalions disbanded were 
five Irish regiments and two battalions from surviving Irish regiments, which reflected the 
political situation, and seven battalions were withdrawn from overseas garrisons.71   
 
The results of the Washington Conference were mostly assumed in the financial thinking 
around the Geddes Committee, even if the diplomatic route to achieve them had not been 
finally reached. The four ‘super-Hood’ capital ships, which had been authorised earlier in 
1921, were never built. Treasury pressures were always present and an example affecting the 
wider foreign and military policies was recorded in the minutes of the CID in October 1921, 
when  Sir George Barstow for the Treasury said that ‘while not dissenting from the general 
staff note for the purpose of the Washington Conference, made the reservation that it must 
not be inferred from this concurrence that the Treasury was thereby precluded from pressing 
                                                 
69 The navy’s expenditure included a much larger amount of capital expenditure when a battleship could cost 
seven million pounds; Clayton, The British Empire as a Superpower, p.20, gives the cost of a de Haviland 
DH9A bomber for the RAF as only three thousand pounds. 
70 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, p.26. 
71 One Geddes proposal not accepted was the establishment of a single Ministry of Defence; this would have 
produced important long term strategic and cost savings, but was not implemented until the 1960s. Bond did 
quote that between 1922 and 1925 the War Office staff was reduced from 4,114 to 2,561. Ibid. p.27. 
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on the War Office the need from further reduction of military forces.’72 Although this referred 
to the War Office,  the Treasury was not any more sympathetic to the Admiralty. 
 
British politicians were sensitive about Britain’s military capability especially in comparison 
to France’s army; Curzon said at the Imperial Conference in 1923 that ‘we now have an army, 
in relation to the vast extent of Empire, of almost insignificant dimensions’ and this ‘puts us 
in chronic inequality with France.’73 France had not hesitated to continue to maintain a large 
conscript army after the war and The Economist openly commented in January 1924 that 
‘France is, of course, the greatest power in the world today.’74 There are very clear links 
between economic and financial circumstances and military policy and resources, because 
everything has to be paid for either at the time or through borrowing. However, links between 
military and foreign policy may not be so clear. In her detailed chapter on ‘Defence Policy 
and its relation to Foreign Policy’, Orde argued that connections between foreign and defence 
policies were in fact not close during this period:  
 
None of Britain’s international engagements contained military commitments; 
avoiding them was a feature of policy on international security. Although there 
was plenty of disorder and minor threat in and on the borders of British-
controlled territory there was no major threat to Great Britain or any part of the 
Empire, nor was it likely that the minor conflicts of other countries would 
seriously involve Britain….The army reverted to its peacetime function of 
providing garrisons for territory under British control: : its size was fixed not by 
comparison with that of any other country but by the needs of India and of 
overseas garrisons.75 
 
Orde’s conclusion seems to be correct in the overall assessment of foreign policy, but that 
does not invalidate the need for this analysis of possible economic and military constraints. 
Economic considerations did lead to the Ten-Year Rule, they did strongly influence policy 
in Mesopotamia and they were important in the positive approach to the Washington 
Conference. However, the possible economic and military constraints did not provide major 
determinants or limitations of British foreign policies during these years.  
                                                 
72 Minutes of the 146th meeting of the CID, 2 October 1921, NA/CAB 2/3.  
73 Minutes of the 3rd meeting of Imperial Conference, 5 October 1923, NA/CAB 32/9. 
74 The Economist, 5 January 1924. 
75 Orde, Great Britain and International Security, p.155. 
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Chapter Three: Global Challenges   
 
A contemporary view of Britain’s place in the post-war world, was that of the German 
historian, Erich Marcks, writing in the winter of 1920-1921 when he said:  
 
Russia and Germany have now collapsed, a colossal gain for England…she has 
secured the double aim of her Imperialism, to dominate the route from Cairo 
to the Cape, and from Cairo to Calcutta…the Indian ocean in its totality has 
become an English sea… She has strengthened her power and her trade. Has 
gained valuable new regions in Mesopotamia, Persia and Africa, and her world 
Empire has increased in land-size by around 27 per cent, and in population by 
almost the same. This has resulted in a global power and position as never 
before; England is the only winner from this war, England together with North 
America; one can see an Anglo-Saxon world mastery on the horizon.1  
 
              Darwin argued that ‘in the decade that followed the armistice of 1918, the danger of any 
serious threat to British imperial interests appeared remoter than at any time since 1880, with 
the collapse of Germany, the weakness and internal preoccupations of Russia, the 
isolationism of the United States, and the discretion with which Japan pursued her 
longstanding ambition of a larger influence in China.’2 To this could be added the exhaustion 
of France, Britain’s main colonial rival, and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Middle East in an area that Britain saw as vital to its imperial interests. Of the other powers, 
the growth of the United States was the clearest challenge to the British Empire. 
 
The concept of ‘Imperial Overstretch’ which was popularised by Paul Kennedy3 in 1988, 
when he analysed the imperial experience of western powers over the last five hundred years, 
and concluded that there was an emergent ‘bi-polar world’ dominated by the Unites States 
and Russia in the second half of the twentieth century.  His argument was that any empire 
can extend itself beyond its ability to maintain its political, economic and military 
commitments; it is clear in retrospect that Britain’s empire was unsustainable, in the new 
                                                 
1 Paul Kennedy The Realities behind Diplomacy : Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-
1980 ( London : Allen and Unwin, 1981) p.223. 
2 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation (London: Macmillan, 1988), p.34. 
3 Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London : Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
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political, economic and military situation after the Great War. However, looking at the 
situation in 1919 or 1925, it was not unreasonable for the British politicians, to see the British 
Empire as the most successful surviving ongoing empire, with no obvious signs of 
unsustainability. Before examining Britain’s imperial position during these six years, it is 
appropriate to consider the new position of the United States, and then that of Russia. 
 
 
 
              The United States 
 
              Britain’s relationship with the United States was clearly going to be very important after the 
Great War, whatever the results from Paris and the implementation of Versailles. During the 
previous twenty years, the United States had assumed an increasingly wider global role, 
starting with the 1898 war with Spain and the acquisition of the Philippines, Guam and the 
Guantanamo naval base in Cuba. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 was another 
reflection of the global aspirations of the United States, this time into the Pacific. In economic 
terms, by 1900 both Germany and the United States had already overtaken Britain in many 
aspects of industrial production and development. 
 
The global importance of the United States was emphasised during the war, initially by the 
effects of its neutrality, and then by the effects of its direct involvement after its declaration 
of war on Germany in April 1917. Although its direct effect on the war, and specifically on 
the western front, took 12 to 15 months to have a great influence, there were other more 
immediate effects during 1917 shown in its productive strength, its industrial potential, the 
speedy building of both merchant and naval ships and its ability to boost food exports to 
Europe. The direct contacts between United States and German leaders in October 1918, to 
the exclusion of Britain and France, gave a clear indication to the new diplomatic power of 
the United States. 
 
              The implementation of Versailles and the setting up of the League of Nations excluded 
Russia, whose regime had not even been invited to Paris; Germany, who was only invited to 
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Versailles to sign an Allied document; and the United States when Wilson could not persuade 
the Senate to endorse what he had agreed in Paris. The most immediate problem for Britain 
was the position of the United States and the relative ‘isolationism’ of President Harding 
from March 1921 till his death in August 1923, and his successor President Coolidge who 
was in office from 1923 till 1929. 
 
              The relationship between United States and Europe in the 1920s was complicated; Watt 
commented that ‘President Wilson’s fate taught American’s leaders that neither Congress 
nor the American electorate understood or would support permanent institutionalised 
American involvement in world politics’ and therefore initiatives such as the Washington 
Conference or the Dawes Committee had to be justified as being in the United States’ 
interest.4 Writing specifically of the relationship with Britain, McKercher said that ‘Britain 
and the United States struggled with one another throughout this period : Britain to retain its 
position as the only truly global power against the American challenge; and the United States 
to achieve its own global status over the opposition of the British.’5 
 
The relative and growing strength of the United States, the weakness of Russia and the 
stagnation of Central and Western Europe is clearly shown in some statistics cited by 
Kennedy, which compared changes in world indices of manufacturing production for the 
years from 1913 to 1925 as follows 
 
                                             1913           1920           1925 
            World                        100             93.6            121.6 
            Europe                       100             77.3            103.5 
            USSR / Russia           100             12.8            70.1 
            United States             100             122.2          148.0 
            Rest of World            100             109.5          138.16 
                                                 
4 Donald Cameron Watt Succeeding John Bull : America in Britain’s Place (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 1984) p.42. 
5 B.J.C. McKercher  Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s : The Struggle for Supremacy (London : 
Macmillan, 1990) p.209. 
6 Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London : Unwin Hyman,1988) p.361. 
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Britain had been the clear global and imperial power during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, and had generally avoided formal alliances with other major states during those 
decades, while trying to ensure a balance of power in Europe. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century formal treaties were signed with Japan in 1902, with France in 1904 in the 
‘entente cordiale’ and with Russia in 1907. After the war, there was Britain as the traditional 
but now weakened imperial power, and the United States, as the new global challenger.  
 
After the American rejection of Versailles, and her absence from many subsequent 
international obligations and discussions, there were a number of references in British 
discussions, to expressions such as that used by Curzon at the Imperial Conference in 1921, 
when he spoke of the  ‘the defection of America.’7  Relationships with the United States had 
also been affected since the war by the continuing problems in Ireland, the problems 
associated with Britain’s war debt to the United States, the general concerns about relative 
military power and the rivalry of oil companies in the Middle East, including Persia.8 
 
Given the history of the United States as a former colony of Britain and the millions of 
American citizens with British or Irish ancestry, it was not surprising that British views on 
the relationship with the United States were ambivalent, as to whether they were natural allies 
or rivals. Goldstein commented that ‘the United States remained throughout these years, an 
enigmatic factor in British policy globally, and in Europe.’9 However, although there were a 
number of possible conflicts with Britain, it is very significant that there were two major 
Anglo-American foreign policy events between Versailles and Locarno where major 
successes followed the United States determining that it was in their interest to take initiatives 
in the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922 and the London Conference in 1924, 
based on the Dawes recommendations. Both of these are examined in depth in subsequent 
chapters. 
                                                 
7 Minutes of 4th meeting of Imperial Conference, 22 June 1921, p.4, NA/CAB 32/2. Having not signed the 
Versailles Treaty, the United States on 2 July 1921 formally declared an end to hostilities of the world war; 
then in August 1921 peace treaties were signed by the United States with Germany, Austria and Hungary. 
8 G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period 1919-1924 (London: St. Martin Press, 
1995), chapter 9. 
9 Erik Goldstein ‘The British Official Mind and Europe’ Diplomacy and Statecraft Volume 8/3 1997. p.169. 
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Russia 
 
Unlike the position after the Second World War, Russia or the ‘Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics’ as the larger country was designated from 1922, was in no position to aspire to 
play a global role during these six years. The effect of the war on Russia, the fall of the 
Rovanovs and the subsequent revolution in 1917, and the humiliating treaty with Germany 
at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, were followed by the civil war which eventually ended in 
October 1922, and the consolidation of the Bolshevik regime. 
 
Russia was not invited to the Paris Conference, was ignored by its participants, was not a 
member of the League during these years, and was not normally involved in the international 
conferences, except with Germany at Rapallo in 1922.  Fortunately for the Allies, the secret 
agreement between Britain, France and Russia in March 1915, which would have given 
Russia both Constantinople and the Dardanelles was publicised and renounced by the new 
Bolshevik Government in 1917; this removed a dangerous complication from the Paris 
Conference. The Allies commitments in different ways to the ‘White Russian’ armies in the 
Civil War, were personified by the attitude and actions of Churchill who was secretary of 
state for war. Churchill’s commitment in 1919 and 1920 to assist the anti-Bolshevist forces 
has normally been seen as anti-Communist, although he did argue from a wider concern that 
Germany might go in the same direction, and that the whole continent might lapse into 
anarchy.10   
 
The new regime in Russia was in no condition to be a key global player at this time, and the 
figures quoted above on manufacturing production emphasise the economic difficulties of 
the new government.  Relationships with Russia were not central to British foreign policies 
after the withdrawal of the British forces in 1920, and also Russia was not seen as relevant 
in the discussions that led up to Locarno, when Poland was an active participant.  
 
                                                 
10 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London: Macmillan, 1941), p.143. 
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Perhaps the general British political establishment attitude to Russia during these years was 
best summed by the diplomat Harold Nicolson who wrote, in a memo to Chamberlain, which 
was then forwarded to the full cabinet, 
 
The Russian problem, that incessant, though shapeless menace, can be stated 
only as a problem; it is impossible to forecast what effect the development of 
Russia will have on the future strategy of Europe…Today she hangs as a storm-
cloud upon the Eastern horizon of Europe – impending, imponderable but at 
present, detached.11 
 
The main Russian issues that did appear in British foreign policies after 1920, were the 
assumptions, real or imaginary, of links between the new Russian regime and left-wing 
organisations in Britain. After the Bolshevik regime triumphed over the White Russian 
forces, British attitudes towards Russia were next tested during the Polish-Russian War with 
some establishment sympathies with the Poles, but with left-wing trade unions and political 
groups leading the ‘Hands off Russia’ campaign to prevent supplies being shipped to the 
Polish Government. After that, the issue remained in respect of the establishment of trade 
relations and diplomatic recognition, with the growing number of Labour MPs seeing the 
new Russian regime as the answer to their diplomatic and economic problems, and right-
wing MPs seeing Russia as a threat to the established order and linked to potentially 
revolutionary forces in Britain. The alleged ‘Zinoviev Letter’ in the 1924 General Election 
emphasised the sensitivity of the relationship.  
      
            Britain’s concern regarding the external security of India, and the assumed threat from Russia 
towards the warm water ports of the Indian sub-continent, was always in the background. An 
example from early in the period was Curzon’s concern about Persia, and Britain’s rivalry 
with Russia in areas west of India, immediately after the war. He said that ‘Our stake is the 
greatest, our knowledge of these parts of the world by far the most profound, our experience 
extends over a much longer period of time.’ 12  Russia was clearly seen as a threat by many  
British politicians, but Russia was not a direct influence on the important diplomatic events 
of these years. 
                                                 
11 Documents Volume XXVII, No.205, 20 February 1925, p.311.   
12
 Minutes of the 45th meeting of the Eastern Committee, 19 December 1918, NA/CAB 27/24.  
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The British Imperial Role  
 
In view of the history, size and complexity of the British Empire, an analysis of imperial 
developments is central to any reassessment of overall foreign policies during this period. 
The changing of the relationship with the Dominions, the unique position of India, the needs 
of the colonies mostly in Africa and the Pacific, and the newly acquired territories in the 
Middle East, all contributed to pressures on the British governments. The key responsibilities 
are initially examined in this chapter through study of the British imperial role, the 
importance of the Suez Canal and India, the new responsibilities in the Middle East and 
finally the developments in the Dominions, with particular reference to Canada. The majority 
of the imperial problems took place in the three years of the Lloyd George Government, 
rather than in the period from 1923 to 1925, but it is not suggested that this was due to the 
wisdom or otherwise of the different governments.  The different aspects of British imperial 
policies do not indicate failures during these years; rather there is a much greater continuity 
than might have been expected, from the pre-war years, despite the traumas of the war and 
the effects of Versailles. However, the very success, or at least the lack of failure, can be seen 
in retrospect as containing the seeds of long-term imperial decline. 
 
It is arguable whether the zenith of the power of the British Empire had been as early as 
Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897, or as late as just before the Second World War, 
but there is a strong argument that 1919 reflected the greatest imperial responsibilities. 
Darwin wrote that in 1914 ‘more than eighty separate territorial units acknowledged the 
sovereignty, or accepted the protection of the British Crown… scattered over the globe, this 
fragmented colossus covered more than 11 million square miles and counted over 400 million 
subjects.’13 The maximum geographic size of the empire was certainly then reached in 1919 
when, as the result of Versailles, Britain received directly, or indirectly through the mandates 
given to South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, responsibility for former German colonies 
                                                 
13 John Darwin in Sarah Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2008), p.1. 
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in Africa and the Pacific, former territories of the Ottoman Empire such as Palestine and 
Mesopotamia, and confirmation of responsibility for Egypt. 
 
Darwin spelled out Gallagher and Robinson’s classic analysis of British expansion by 
informal control wherever possible, and by direct rule only where necessary.14 Darwin 
described the different types of empire that emerged in mid-Victorian times and continued 
through the first half of the twentieth century; there were:  
 
the settlement colonies enjoying almost complete self-rule under the tag of 
responsible government; India, whose curious double government was entrenched 
and civilianised when the Crown replaced the (East India) Company in 1858; the 
numerous dependencies, from the Caribbean to Hong Kong, ruled by Crown 
Colony government …and the various cases of informal empire… where British 
business or diplomats exerted a preponderant influence, but without risking 
recourse to, or needing the help of, colonial rule. 15  
  
The emphasis on the Queen as the ‘Empress of India’ in the later years of Victoria’s reign, 
and the other imperial connotations including the jubilee celebrations in 1887 and 1897, were 
not reflected as strongly either in the short reign of Edward VII (1901-1910) or the longer 
reign of his son George V (1910-1936). George did spend 18 weeks in India when he was 
Prince of Wales, and returned there after his coronation in 1911 but, although long distance 
travel was becoming more feasible, Rose confirmed that ‘only once during his reign did he 
set foot in India, and never in Australia or New Zealand, Canada or South Africa; when 
implored to tour his Dominions, he would reply that he must do all or none, and that the 
pressure of home business denied him long absences from London.’16 The new Prince of 
Wales did undertake major imperial tours during George’s reign, but the King was not 
persuaded to do so. 
 
                                                 
14 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review, Volume 
6/1, 1953, pp.1-15. 
15
 Darwin in Stockwell, The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, p.8.  Examples of informal empire 
were Argentina, and China. Porter, referring to years before 1914, said ‘that the British were anxious to avoid 
adding control and further direct responsibility to their existing commitments, and expressed their Imperial 
ambitions above all in support for the more intensive development of existing formal possessions like India 
and the Dominions.’ Andrew Porter, European Imperialism 1860-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.69. 
16 Kenneth Rose, King George V (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p.348. 
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The constitutional developments in the Dominions at the beginning of the century had 
included the establishment of the Commonwealth Constitution in Australia in 1900 and the 
passing of the South Africa Act at Westminster in 1909. Between the Diamond Jubilee in 
1897 and the outbreak of war in 1914, the nature and apparent invincibility of the British 
Empire had continued but with two major problems. The South African War had shown the 
limitations of British military power, against a determined minority, but the sensible 
diplomacy after the war led to the establishment of the independent Dominion of South 
Africa in 1910. The positive developments in South Africa gave a stimulus to the concept of 
the Dominion, and the notion of sharing responsibilities such as defence; it therefore both 
reinforced British power and began to circumscribe it. The other major problem of Ireland 
had not been resolved before the wartime diplomatic truce, but most contemporary politicians 
would have seen Ireland as a domestic problem.  
  
The Colonial Conference of 1907 had taken place with Lord Elgin as colonial secretary, and 
Churchill as his parliamentary secretary. Among the conclusions were the adoption of the 
designation ‘Dominion’ for the self-governing countries; commitment to a more permanent 
secretariat for such conferences; and finally that although there would not be a separate 
Dominions Office, there would be a separation in the Colonial Office organisation between 
dealings with the Dominions and with colonies. After the 1911 Imperial Conference the 
separate Committee on Imperial Defence increased in importance, and after 1916 Hankey 
and his cabinet secretariat also serviced the Imperial Conferences. With the pressures of the 
war, the traditional links with the Colonial Office were bound to be less important, and the 
Dominions directly involved in the Imperial War Conferences and Imperial War Cabinet 
meetings in 1917 and 1918. The Imperial Conference in 1917 agreed that when peace came, 
there should be a full scale constitutional conference to regularise and amplify the new status 
of the Dominions, although this did not take place until 1926. 17   
 
In understanding the attitude of the British establishment to the imperial role, it is interesting 
to note Curzon’s submission to the cabinet in December 1917 about the future of the German 
colonies. Curzon defended the right of Britain to retain the colonies which she has won by 
                                                 
17 Robert Holland, Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1981), p.7. 
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conquest in war, and dismissed the argument that it might be desirable to purchase the 
goodwill of Germany in future by making concessions. He also dismissed the argument that 
said why ‘not avoid the odium of annexation, by internationalizing the territories which 
Germany has forfeited and cannot be allowed to redeem’; he argued the practical problems 
and the conflicting interests and ambitions that were associated with a number of nations 
being involved, and also suggested, ‘ask the native himself, and he will at once reply that he 
would sooner work out his own salvation under the aegis of any one of the Allied Powers 
whom he knows, than under a mixed Cabinet of nations.’18   
 
A very different emphasis came from another cabinet member, Edwin Montagu, the secretary 
of state for India. He said during a discussion about the Caucasus in December 1918 that:  
 
we seem to be drifting into the position that right from the east to the west there 
is only one possible solution of all our difficulties, namely, that Great Britain 
should accept responsibility for all these countries. For some reason, France is 
objectionable here; for other reasons, America is objectionable there, and the 
only solution is that we should be the tutelary power, the protecting power, or 
whatever the adjective is, although we agreed that there should be no 
annexation.19 
 
 Later that month Montagu’s views were recorded at the cabinet when he said ironically that 
‘it would be very satisfactory if we could find some convincing argument for not annexing 
all the territories in the world.’20 It was most unusual to find a senior minister like Montagu 
expressing such views, and it must be emphasised that they were very much a minority view.  
  
The political leaders  who had been born and grown up during the Victorian and Edwardian 
years, had to adjust to the imperial circumstances after 1918.21 The war had reinforced the 
                                                 
18 Memo to Cabinet, 5 December 1917, NA/CAB 24/4. 
19 Minutes of the 42nd meeting of the Eastern Committee, 9 December 1918, NA/CAB 27/24. 
20 Cabinet minutes 20 December 1918, NA/CAB 23/24.  Nicolson wrote in Paris that he was ‘distressed about 
Cyprus. The British Empire delegation have decided to retain it on strategical and other grounds. They are 
wrong entirely; its retention compromises our whole moral position in regard to the Italians.’ Harold 
Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1933), diary 19 January 1919. p.242. 
21 Pre-war attitudes may be seen in Vansittart’s description of Curzon and Hardinge in Paris in 1920, ‘the 
situation, said the ex-Viceroys adjusting Edwardian collars as they sat down to a simple six-course dinner, 
was explosive, but – mixing wines and metaphors – one must not rush one’s fences. The French were not 
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solidarity and continuity of empire in a number of ways; the politicians regularly stressed 
that it was not just Britain but the British Empire that was fighting the war; the Dominions 
and India suffered enormous casualties in support of the Mother Country, and Lloyd George 
had reinforced the role of the Dominions in the Imperial Conferences and the Imperial 
Cabinet from 1917. Early discussions in Paris identified problems regarding the status of the 
Dominions and India at the conference, with Lloyd George being forced by Canada and 
Australia to insist that the Dominions must have individual representation; an offer of one 
delegate per country infuriated the Dominions, as they were seen as no more important than 
minor Allies like Siam or Portugal.22 It was finally agreed that Canada, Australia, South 
Africa and India would be entitled to have two delegates each and New Zealand one. In 
practice, they were also members of the wider British Empire delegation, and many of the 
Dominion issues were discussed in detail at the meetings of that delegation.23 
 
While the British Empire had been reinforced at Versailles, the negotiations in Paris had 
directly or indirectly marked the end of the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires. Of the major empires, only the French Empire had also survived the war and gained 
from the peace terms, and the Anglo-French imperial rivalry was an important factor in those 
peace negotiations, particularly in the Middle East after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Britain’s acquisition of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Egypt brought a new emphasis and 
potential imbalance to the British imperial role, but the territories were important to Britain 
partly to resist French aspirations in the area, but also to reinforce or protect the trade and 
military routes to India. 
 
Opening the Imperial Conference in June 1921, Lloyd George expressed his vision of the 
empire by saying that ‘it is not so much that it combines men of many races, tongues, 
traditions, and creeds in one system of government. Other empires have that, but the British 
Empire differs from all in one essential respect. It is based not on force, but on goodwill, and 
                                                 
people to go tiger-shooting with, and tigers roused competitive reminiscences over the fish.’ Robert 
Vansittard, The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittard (London: Hutchison, 1958), p.262. 
22 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War (London: 
John Murray, 2001), p.52. 
23 Minutes of the British Empire delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, NA/CAB 29/28. 
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a common understanding. Liberty is its binding principle.’24  Lord Curzon25 said two days 
later in a more cautious tone, but still with a similar assumption of the rightness of the 
empire, that the objective was:  
 
to keep what we have obtained, sometimes almost against our will, not to seize 
anything else; to reconcile, not to defy; to pacify, not to conquer…a policy of 
splendid isolation is no longer possible, it is not possible for a country like 
Britain, geographically situated as we are. We are a country, by virtue of our 
insular position in Europe, and our Imperial position abroad, with maritime 
approaches on every side that make everyone our neighbour; our frontiers are 
the frontiers of every state, or almost every state, in the world. 26 
 
 
         Most British political leaders no doubt believed that their colonial record was better than 
others, and believed, to differing degrees, that Britain had a civilizing role throughout the 
empire. It would, however, be surprising if the majority did really agree with Robert Cecil’s 
statement in the Commons debate on the terms of Versailles, when he said he agreed with 
Lloyd George that it had ‘always been the principle of the British Colonial Policy – namely 
that we hold those countries, not in order to exploit them for the benefit of the Mother 
Country, but in order to do our utmost for the prosperity of the population they contain.’27  
                  
The size and complexity of the empire was reflected in the composition of the cabinet; 
although the colonial secretary was the main minister responsible for the empire, there were 
three other colleagues, in addition to the prime minister, who shared these responsibilities. 
Both India and Ireland had their own secretaries of state in the cabinet, and the foreign 
secretary had not only the overall responsibility for foreign affairs, but also had direct 
responsibility for Egypt and the Sudan. Ironically the main imperial pressures on the Lloyd 
George government were in India, Egypt and Ireland, but none of these were officially the 
responsibility of the colonial secretary. In view of the space available, a short detailed look 
will be made of the different colonial secretaries during these years, rather than other cabinet 
                                                 
24 Minutes of 1st meeting of Imperial Conference, 20 June 1921, p.6, NA/CAB 32/2. 
25 Curzon had been under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office from 1895 to 1898, when Lord Salisbury, as 
prime minister and foreign secretary, was in the Lords.  
26 Minutes of 4th meeting of Imperial Conference, 22 June 1921, pp. 2 and 4, NA/CAB 32/2. 
27 Hansard, Volume 118, 21 July 1919, column 988. 
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members, especially in view of the differences of their backgrounds and the roles they were 
asked to do, or took, within the department.  
 
Lord Milner, who was colonial secretary from January 1919 to January 1921, had been a 
colonial administrator in Egypt from 1889 to 1894, and then he returned to senior civil service 
roles in Britain. In 1897 Joseph Chamberlain sent him to South Africa as governor of Cape 
Colony and high commissioner to South Africa. Although his record during and after the 
South African War has been debated by historians, there are no doubts about his colonial 
experience or the later influence of his acolytes who had served within the so-called 
Kindergarten.  He was a senior minister in Lloyd George’s wartime government, and brought 
considerable administrative skills to his responsibilities, but his overall contribution to the 
Colonial Office was limited, and The Economist in 1924, writing on the death of Milner, 
commented that neither Milner or Curzon were ‘able to exchange the role of Imperial ruler, 
for that of democratic chief.’28 Milner’s contribution on Egypt was that, despite his colonial 
Egyptian background, he did move British thinking on Egyptian independence, or self-
government. This led, after he left government, to Britain unilaterally declaring Egypt’s 
independence in 1922, subject to conditions that Egyptian nationalists could not accept, and 
then to a more mutually acceptable settlement in 1936. 
    
            Churchill’s role as colonial secretary, from January 1921 to October 1922, is the most 
interesting; he can be seen at other times in his career as the jingoist young imperialist, as a 
soldier and a journalist in the Sudan and South Africa between 1898 and 1900, as the young 
minister at the Colonial Office from 1906 to 1908, as the leader of the opposition to the India 
Act in the early 1930s, and as the reluctant acceptor of imperial developments after 1945. It 
might therefore have been expected that he would have been an expansive colonial secretary, 
both in terms of his role with colleagues in the cabinet, and the role of his department.29 
However, in his time at the Colonial Office, Churchill was very much the pragmatist; his 
                                                 
28 The Economist, 16 May 1924, p.959. 
29 The personal pressures affecting a politician, are exemplified by the three family events that hit Churchill in 
1921; initially the suicide of his brother-in-law, in April; then the death of his 67-year-old mother in June, a 
month after a fall; she had remarried twice after the death of Lord Randolph Churchill but Churchill was still 
very close to her; and most tragically the death of his three-year-old daughter Marigold in August 1921. 
98 
 
prominent roles outside the normal Colonial Office responsibilities, in the Middle East and 
Ireland are discussed in the respective sections.30 
 
Leaving aside his involvement in the Middle East and Ireland, and indirect involvement in 
India and Egypt, Churchill’s main departmental work continued with varying attention to 
issues in territories such as Kenya or Nigeria. A traditional colonial response was shown in 
a debate in July 1921 when Churchill spoke about investment in Nigeria and said that they 
‘should try and encourage and accelerate the development of these great properties which 
have come into our possession, by supplying them with the necessary technical apparatus of 
railways, harbours, etc., which are needed to make their great natural wealth accessible for 
the advantage of the whole Empire.’31 There were however strong reactions in India to 
Churchill’s speech to the Kenya Colony and Uganda dinner in London in January 1922, when 
he said that ‘the democratic principles of Europe are by no means suited to the development 
of Asiatic and African people.’32 The Times devoted a number of critical editorials to 
Churchill as colonial secretary during his first six months in that office.33  
 
            The Duke of Devonshire was a Conservative MP from 1891 to 1908 when he became the 9th 
Duke and was elevated to the Lords; perhaps his most significant political role was as 
governor general of Canada from 1916 to 1921.34 Devonshire was appointed colonial 
secretary under Bonar Law and in Baldwin’s first cabinet. Hankey’s comment that he looked 
‘like an apoplectic idol and adds little counsel,’35 may have been unfair but Devonshire made 
                                                 
30 Richard Toye, Churchill’s Empire (London: Macmillan, 2010) only devotes forty pages to the period from 
1908 to 1922, and he does not pay particular attention to Churchill’s two years as colonial secretary. 
31 Hansard, Volume 144, 14 July, column 1623. 
32 Toye, Churchill’s Empire, p.122. In London, Montagu also objected strongly to Churchill’s words and it 
was left to their junior ministers, to find a joint policy on the position of Indians in Kenya. Ibid. p.156.  
33 On 21 January 1921 The Times editor wrote of the need for ‘An Imperial Secretary of State’, and on 23 
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34 One of his daughters became engaged to his ADC in Canada, Captain Harold Macmillan. 
35 Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets (London: Collins, 1972), Volume 2, p.323, quoting Hankey’s 
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no great impression in his role, and the obituary in The Times in 1938, while generally 
sympathetic of his role as a member of the social establishment and his role in Canada, could 
only say of his time as colonial secretary that ‘during his single year of office he managed, 
amid a great deal of other sound unobtrusive work, to present forcibly the case for settlement 
within the Empire.’36   
 
Although J.H.Thomas was a Labour MP and the leader of the National Union of Railwaymen, 
he brought a traditional approach to colonial matters and did not bring any radicalism to the 
role in 1924. He did use his union background to help settle a labour dispute which might 
have prevented the opening of the British Empire Exhibition by the King in April 1924, and 
dealt with the setting up of the Irish Boundary Commission. He also claimed success of his 
lengthy trip to South Africa, and particularly the commitment from Prime Minister Hertzog 
that South Africa would be represented at the Imperial Conference planned for 1926.37 
 
Leo Amery was appointed colonial secretary in November 1924, and was not always an 
admirer of his predecessors; writing in his diary he recorded a brief discussion with Churchill 
when he noted that ‘on the question of dividing the office he (Churchill) was not at all 
sympathetic, taking the view that the CO was lightly worked and that he had never had any 
difficulty in doing it all. I couldn’t very well reply that except for Ireland and Iraq he had 
largely neglected the work and that no one had really done it since Milner and I left in 1921.’38 
The organisation of the Colonial Office, established in 1907, did not change until Baldwin 
announced in June 1925 that there would now be two secretary of state roles, one for 
Dominions and one for colonies, although Amery continued to do both roles until 1929. 
During the parliamentary debate Amery described the relationships with the Dominions as 
being ‘political, consultative…quasi-diplomatic’ while that with the colonies as being 
‘administrative and directive.’39     
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The Suez Canal and India 
 
The Middle East and India were the major areas for British imperial activity during these 
years. While India was central to Britain’s imperial thinking, the Middle East was the area 
with the greatest increase in territory at Versailles, with the confirmation of responsibility for 
Egypt, the granting of mandated responsibility for Palestine and Mesopotamia,40 and the 
continuing strong informal interests in Persia, all following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire.41 As argued above, the British motivation for ensuring that significant Middle East 
territories came within its responsibilities, was to do with preventing the French from getting 
new possessions or influence, or to do with the British priority for the routes to India, rather 
than any real thinking through of the advantages for Britain, or any concern for the interests 
of the inhabitants. 
 
The importance of the Suez Canal in the Middle East, and crucially on the route to India, is 
clear in the statistical tables which were brought together by Farnie.42 The tonnage going 
through the canal rose from nine million tons in 1918 to twenty-six million tons in 1925, with 
the large British percentage varying between sixty and seventy per cent. The annual receipts 
of the Suez Canal Company rose from 92 million francs in 1918 to 608 million francs in 
1925, with dividends rising from 53% of total receipts in 1918 to an extraordinary figure of 
76% in 1925. Although its shareholding was not its main interest in the canal, the government 
shares had a market value of £35 million pounds in 1925 and it received in that year over a 
million pounds in dividends. 
 
India had long been the jewel in the imperial crown, in both the political and economic 
benefits it brought to Britain. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and Britain’s concerns 
about continuing Russian aspirations in the direction of the warm water ports of the Indian 
                                                 
40 The term ‘Mesopotamia’ covered the two Ottoman territories based on Baghdad and Basra; the term ‘Iraq’ 
reflected the larger country, including Mosul and Kirkuk, which was agreed with Turkey in 1926.  
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sub-continent, presented potential threats to India, and it was assumed that a British-
orientated Middle East, and a British-controlled Suez Canal, were essential. The significance 
of Egypt and the Suez Canal, as perceived in London, was well captured by Duff Cooper, in 
his Commons speech in 1924:  
 
         Our position in Egypt was described in analogy many years ago by Lord 
Palmerston. He said that a gentleman with an estate in the north of England and 
one in the south could not wish to own all the inns on the road – so it was 
unnecessary for us to own Egypt – but he said that such a gentleman would insist, 
or desire, that those inns should be properly run, and should be able to furnish 
him with post-horse and mutton chops. That is still our position in Egypt and that 
is why we cannot afford to allow any other power to step in.43  
  
As early as 1902, there had been an agreement between the British and Indian authorities, 
that India should bear a financial responsibility for Egypt, ‘so far as the security of the Suez 
Canal is affected,’ as well as for Persia, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan.44 The relative 
closeness of India to the Middle East, and the fears that India was vulnerable on both its 
northern and western flanks,  was also shown in India’s responsibility for the war efforts in 
Mesopotamia up to 1917 and the administration of the area immediately after the war.45 Other 
members of the empire expressed concerns regarding the Suez Canal; for example, at the 
1921 Imperial Conference both Australia and New Zealand had these concerns, with the New 
Zealand prime minister, William Massey, describing the canal as ‘the British Empire 
highway from the very heart of the Empire, where we are today, to India, to Australasia, to 
the whole of the Far East’ and saying that it would not be possible to ‘run the Empire without 
keeping control of the main artery.’46 An additional link to the Middle East was that the large 
Muslim minority in India had seen the Caliphate in Constantinople as their spiritual leader. 
 
Cabinet, and especially cabinet committee, discussions at the end of the war often referred to 
India. When Montagu asked why Britain should push herself out in the directions of Armenia 
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and the Caucasus, as suggested by Curzon, he answered himself with the word ‘India’. 
Balfour argued later at same meeting that the gateways of India were always getting further 
and further from India, and Britain should not take on fresh responsibilities in so distant a 
region as the Caucasus.47 It is therefore necessary in understanding Britain’s concerns about 
the Middle East to stress the position of India, and the importance to Britain of the sub-
continent; India was central in Britain’s imperial thinking for a combination of economic, 
diplomatic, military and prestige reasons.  
 
There had been important political developments in India in 1917 when the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms proposed ‘increasing association of Indians in every branch of the 
administration and gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the 
progressive realisation of responsible government in India, as an integral part of the British 
Empire.’48 The subsequent 1919 Government of India Act ensured the implementation of the 
reforms which had the stated objective of eventual self-government, despite the misgivings 
of many Conservative MPs. However, any possible positive effects of the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms were overtaken in India by the political reaction and general unrest 
opposing the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act passed in Delhi in March 1919, and 
known as the Rowlatt Acts, which increased powers for the arrest and summary trial of 
political suspects. Moreover, economic difficulties were accompanied by the spread of the 
influenza epidemic which was responsible for at least six million deaths across India.49  
 
1919 also marked both the Indian Army’s involvement in the Third Afghan War from May 
to August, and the infamous Amritsar massacre which took place in April 1919, even if the 
parliamentary clashes did not take place until July 1920. Apart from the Amritsar debate, the 
Middle East was now more often on the agenda of the cabinet than India, partly because India 
had its own dedicated secretary of state and viceroy and partly because the new Middle East 
territories brought more problems. After Amritsar, the Indian National Congress, now 
dominated by Gandhi, was committed not to reforming the British Raj but replacing it by 
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Indian self-rule. Gandhi launched a non-cooperation movement encouraging the boycott of 
British goods and refusal to serve the British in any capacity. At the same time the Muslim 
minority was disturbed by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, and the threat to the Caliphate; 
Gandhi saw the opportunity to unite Muslims and Hindus in opposition to British rule.  
 
Although Gandhi initially gathered support for his non-violent civil disobedience, this did 
not lead to any progress towards Indian self-rule or independence. The Muslim leaders saw 
that the Turks themselves retained little enthusiasm for the Caliphate and it did not survive 
the establishment of the new Turkish state. The main non-cooperation movement did not gain 
great momentum, and Gandhi lost control of the civil disobedience movement, particularly 
when it degenerated into anti-government mob violence, as when twenty-two police officers 
were burnt alive at Chauri Chaura in February 1922. Gandhi was arrested later in 1922 and 
sentenced to a prison term. It would have appeared in both London and New Delhi that the 
political crisis of the previous two years had passed, and that the economic situation was 
somewhat better and had alleviated some of the distress that had fuelled the discontent. With 
pressures on military budgets, and increased confidence in India, there was a significant 
reduction in the armed forces; between 1921 and 1925 the Indian army was reduced from 
159,000 to 140,000, and the British troops in India from 75,000 to 57,000.50 The years after 
1922 were to be relatively quiet for the nationalist movement, until the failure of the British 
Government to appoint a single Indian to the Simon Commission in 1927 gave new 
momentum to the nationalist movement. However, in 1925, it must have appeared in both 
Delhi and London that there was a relatively stable situation in India. 
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New Responsibilities in the Middle East 
   
Anglo-French rivalry had been at the heart of the British acquisitions in the Middle East in 
1919; the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had drawn a line across the area giving 
France post-war responsibility for Greater Syria, and for the Mosul region, with Britain 
taking south of the line including Mesopotamia, with Palestine being under some 
international control, and no decision being taken about the Arabian lands which would 
mostly become Saudi Arabia.51 In November 1918, the members of the cabinet’s Eastern 
Committee agreed that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was an ‘unfortunate agreement, which 
has been hanging like a millstone round our necks ever since.’52 This was not because of any 
sympathy for France, but because the committee was looking for solutions which ensured 
that as Turkey lost its wider territories, that they should not be formally annexed by Britain, 
but rather that Britain would see ‘indigenous Arab administration or administrations’ with 
foreign relations being conducted by Britain.53  
 
Egypt was the largest and most strategically-placed country in the region. Britain had 
assumed responsibility for Egypt in 1882, but it had formally remained part of the Ottoman 
Empire until the start of the war in 1914, when it was declared a British protectorate. After 
1918, and with no support arising for Egyptian nationalists in Paris, there was a clear 
resurgence of that nationalism under the leadership of Saad Zaghloul Pasha.54 Pressures to 
open talks with Britain were rejected by London and following violence and suppression, the 
existing high commissioner was replaced by General Allenby. As Egypt was seen as the 
strategic location on the route to India, it was surprising that the Milner Mission on the 
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possibilities of Egyptian movements towards independence was appointed as early as 
December 1919. After submitting his conclusions to Curzon in May 1920, Milner was 
allowed to have discussions with Zaghloul during 1920, and this was followed by further 
inconclusive negotiations between Curzon and Adly in 1921.55 Britain eventually conceded 
self-government to Egypt in February 1922, but with conditions that the Egyptian 
government could not accept. Ironically in view of his views elsewhere on Ireland, Churchill 
was a critic of any movements towards independence in Egypt.  
 
After Versailles, Palestine was allocated to the Foreign Office, while the India Office took 
responsibility for Mesopotamia. At the end of 1920, there were detailed cabinet discussions 
about these different responsibilities in the Middle East, bearing in mind the costs of the new 
territories; and these discussions led to changes in favour of Churchill and the Colonial Office 
early in 1921. Churchill appears to have had mixed feelings when Lloyd George offered him 
the move from the War Office to the Colonial Office, and he did not receive the formal seals 
of office until 7 February. Churchill was apparently attracted to the Colonial Office, by the 
cabinet decision that the Colonial Office would have the full responsibility for the Middle 
East, which essentially meant Mesopotamia and Palestine, and therefore bringing together 
responsibilities previously spread between the Foreign Office, the War Office, the Colonial 
Office and the India Office. 
 
Churchill’s arranged for a conference in Cairo at the beginning of March. Although held in 
Egypt, it was not about Egypt but about the other Arab lands that had been part of the 
Ottoman Empire and especially Mesopotamia and also Palestine, including the area to be 
known as Transjordan. Churchill was trying to combine his acceptance of Britain’s 
responsibilities in the former Ottoman Empire, his commitment to reduce Britain’s military 
costs in the area and his wish to look for local dignitaries who could rule and work with the 
British. His ideal scenario was for internal administrations under local Arab Leaders, with 
the Royal Air Force, rather than expensive ground forces, being responsible for British 
military and diplomatic interests. Cannadine wrote that ‘Churchill had evolved into a fully-
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fledged social conservative, who was dismayed by the demise of the old world, with its 
princes and potentates, its secure ruling classes and its splendid social pageantry. He much 
regretted the disappearance of the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns and the Romanovs, and the 
collapse of settled values and ancient institutions.’56  
 
Responsibility for Palestine arose from the conquest by Allenby’s troops in 1917, the need 
to prevent French influence spreading from Syria, the moral obligation of the Balfour 
Declaration, and the views of those like Curzon and Amery that Palestine should be seen as 
part of a strategic buffer related to Egypt and the Suez Canal.57 Churchill supported Prince 
Feisal to be ruler of Iraq and his brother Prince Abdullah to be ruler of what was going to be 
Transjordan. Later in March Churchill travelled on to Jerusalem for talks with Sir Herbert 
Samuel, the British high commissioner, and other local political leaders. Churchill had said 
in January 1921 of the new government in Baghdad that ‘western political methods are not 
necessarily applicable to the East, and the basis of election should be framed.’58 He also said 
that ‘no province of the British Empire has ever been acquired by marching in and 
maintaining a large regular army at the cost of the British exchequer, but always by skilful 
and careful improvisations adapted to its special needs.’59  
 
After the initial concentration on the Cairo Conference, and the discussions in Jerusalem, 
Churchill’s Middle East responsibilities continued through the next eighteen months with 
day-to-day issues in all the territories, including sensitive matters such as Jewish immigration 
to Palestine. The implementation of the RAF’s formal responsibility for Iraq came into force 
on 1 October 1922, and Feisal finally agreed to the terms of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty on 5 
October; both of these events took place in the middle of the Chanak Crisis. Looking back at 
those eighteen months, Churchill could express in July 1922 some political satisfaction when 
he emphasised in the Commons that despite there still being no final settlement with Turkey, 
‘so far as Iraq proper (not Kurdistan) and Palestine are concerned, not only have we had this 
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colossal reduction of expenditure’ but that this had been achieved ‘in a period in which no 
one representative of Imperial authority has lost his life.’60   
 
Apart from the importance of the routes to India, and the management of the new territories 
in the Middle East, the third reason for the importance of the Middle East after the war was 
the growing concern about the importance of oil. Although Darwin pointed out that the 
Middle East only provided 1% of world output of oil in 1920, mostly from south west 
Persia,61 and this was only to grow to 5% by 1939, the British percentage would have been 
higher in each case, and perceptions regarding the importance of oil were clearly growing.62 
The Admiralty, with its growing reliance on oil-fired naval ships, was a strong advocate of 
the importance of securing supplies,63 and Hankey was briefing Lloyd George on the 
importance of Mosul for possible future oil supplies in 1918.64 However, Jeffery’s conclusion 
is convincing when he wrote that at this time ‘the primacy of India and imperial 
communications was never challenged by petroleum.’65 
 
During the cabinet discussions about the Middle East in December 1920, Hankey’s reaction 
to the alternatives of the Foreign Office or the Colonial Office taking responsibility, was 
instructive, as he records that ‘I should personally have voted for the Foreign Office had I 
had a vote, though I would have preferred to clear out of both Palestine and Mesopotamia.’66 
This was an extraordinary comment from a key player in the British delegation to Paris less 
than two years previously, when Britain put the greatest emphasis on achieving the mandates 
for these territories. In contrast to Hankey, Churchill’s commitment to the responsibilities 
assumed at Versailles is reflected in what the editor of the Daily Mail wrote after lunching 
                                                 
60 Hansard, Volume 156, 11 July 1922, column 1118. He could have emphasised the comparison with 1920; 
Chandavarkar wrote that in that year the ‘rebellion in Iraq cost the British £50 million and some 400 soldiers’ 
lives to suppress.’60 Rajinarayan Chandavarker, ‘Imperialism and the European Empires in Europe’ in Julian 
Jackson (ed.), Europe 1900-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.149. 
61 Despite arguments from Curzon and Milner, the cabinet agreed to pressure from Churchill and Wilson to 
withdraw troops from Persia by June 1921. 
62 John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000 (London: Allen Lane, 
2007), p.387.  
63 Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, p.35. 
64 James Barr, A Line in the Sand, p.65. 
65 Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, p.36.  
66 Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, p.202. 
108 
 
with Churchill. After talking about the costs of Mesopotamia, and asking what was 
Churchill’s objection to Britain leaving Mesopotamia altogether, Churchill ‘replied that it 
was only because it would be disgraceful to do so. We have undertaken liabilities, turned out 
the Turks, and we cannot turn our backs on it all. All we can do is to reduce the costs of our 
liabilities to the lowest possible level.’67  
 
The ambivalent attitudes to the new territories in the Middle East were highlighted by Darwin 
when he wrote ‘what is surprising in retrospect is how little interest the British seemed to 
take …in the new Treaty Empire they had founded in the Middle East.’68 He went on to 
wonder whether this was partly because of ignorance of Islamic lands, partly the absence of 
causes such as a struggle for souls in Africa, and partly because it was a time of introversion 
and exhaustion in Britain, with priority being given to domestic politics. He also wrote of the 
Middle East in an article in 1999, when he commented that the Middle East was the poor 
relation in historiography of the Empire and that ‘compared with those heartlands of colonial 
rule in India or tropical Africa, it was an awkward case: acquired by subterfuge; ruled (for 
the most part) by proxy; abandoned in confusion.’69 The territories were different from both 
the traditional imperial dominions and from the colonies; they had no history of links to 
Britain and no British settlers; on the contrary, they had a varying, but growing, educated 
middle class with clear aspirations for independence rather than just accepting being 
transferred from one empire to another. There was no British strategic plan for the Middle 
East, apart from thwarting the French, and that the decisions during this period were 
essentially pragmatic, and carried out against a background of strong financial constraints. 
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The Middle East played a central role during the years of the Lloyd George Government from 
1919 to 1922, but was relatively quiet for the next three years, although there were long-term 
issues in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia to be resolved. The expansion of the empire at 
Versailles in the Middle East had not been thought through, and was already being 
questioned, and Hankey’s reservations went to the heart of the problem. Egypt, Palestine and 
Mesopotamia did not have any British traditions, apart from any short-term links in the 
previous forty years in Egypt, and they did not fit into either the Dominion concept or the 
British colonial definition.  
 
 
 
 
Dominion Developments, especially related to Canada   
 
Much contemporary political discussion about the empire concentrated on the Dominions, 70 
and there were significant development about the Dominions, although the changes cannot 
be associated with one particular colonial secretary or one prime minister. Reference has 
already been made to the Colonial Conference in 1907, the adoption of the term Dominion 
for the self-governing countries, the commitment of the Dominions, and India, to the war, 
the involvement by Lloyd George of the Dominion prime ministers in the Imperial 
Conferences and the War Cabinet in 1917, and the active participation of the Dominions in 
Paris. Against this background it was surprising that the Imperial Conferences in 1921 and 
1923 did not seriously discuss the concept of real independence for the Dominions, even 
though the conference in 1921, for example, had thirty-four main sessions, with the prime 
ministers surveying a multitude of imperial, European and other issues.71  
 
Alongside the other Dominions, Canada had been founder members of the League of Nations, 
and although Canada cooperated with Britain, and the other imperial delegations, the 
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Canadian delegates received their ‘instructions’ from Ottawa.72  In October 1922, the most 
important implications of the Chanak Crisis were not so much as a contributory factor in the 
fall of Lloyd George, or even the miscommunication to the Dominion prime ministers, but 
that the Dominions, with the exception of New Zealand, did not automatically rally to the 
support of Britain at the time of possible conflict.73  It has, however, been rather too easy for 
historians and others to refer to the ‘White Dominions’, ie Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
South Africa, and technically including Newfoundland at this stage, and Southern Ireland 
from December 1922, as a common grouping.  In practice, there were many differences of 
policies and emphasis, bearing in mind their global geography and their emotional ties to 
Britain.  
 
Of the White Dominions, Canada had a particularly significant position, partly due to the 
balance of British and French history, languages and traditions, which was reflected in 
Canada’s reaction to the war, partly due to the natural closeness and relevance of the United 
States as shown in attitudes to the possible renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty before the 
Washington Conference, and partly just by her greater political concern to exercise her own 
national identity. There had, for example, been a public face of imperial unity at Paris, after 
the agreement on representation, but the Canadian prime minister, Sir Robert Borden wrote 
to his wife from Paris of ‘an anomalous position; a nation that is not a nation.’74 
 
The term ‘Dominion’ with the very clear difference from that of a ‘colony’ had in fact first 
been used for the ‘Dominion of Canada’ in 1867, before being adopted on a wider basis in 
1907. In the years immediately after Versailles, Canada was particularly concerned, about 
differences with Britain; for example, at the 1921 Imperial Conference there were clashes 
between Canada and McKenzie King who ‘promoted harmony with the United States’ above 
everything else, with Lloyd George and Australia and New Zealand on the danger of 
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offending Japan regarding the Anglo-Japanese Treaty;75  and then there were the Chanak 
differences about possible commitments in Europe, in October 1922. 
 
The growing independence of the Dominions, and specifically Canada, was then shown in 
the ‘Halibut Treaty’ which Canada signed in her own right with the United States in March 
1923 regarding fishing rights in the Pacific, and therefore established the principle of a 
Dominion making its own international treaties without the involvement or approval of 
Britain.  Although the 1923 Imperial Conference did not discuss the independence issue in 
detail, Hillmer and Granatstein emphasised that Canada influenced the conference resolution 
on foreign affairs and the role of the Dominions, and Britain had ‘to regard the halibut treaty 
not as an aberration, but as a precedent.’76 
 
In asserting Canada’s role on a wider stage, Hancock emphasised how in the deliberations of 
the League ‘Canada had sought for the deletion or modification of the territorial guarantee 
contained in Article X of the Covenant; in 1923 the League Assembly voted an interpretative 
resolution…which took account the political and geographical circumstances of each state 
and laid it down that no Member should be under the obligation to engage in any act of war 
without the consent of its parliament, legislature, or other representative body.’77  
 
Canada’s greater autonomy in foreign policy was analysed by McKercher, regarding the term 
of office of Sir Esme Howard, British Ambassador to Washington from 1924 to 1930, and 
his assistance in helping Canada establish its first permanent diplomatic mission in a foreign 
country, which was established in Washington in 1927.78 Howard’s previous experience in 
the Washington Embassy between 1908 and 1910, as counsellor for Canadian-American 
relationships, and the contacts he had established with McKenzie King, and others, ensured 
greater British sympathy for Canada.  
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More generally, the implicit changes in relationships with Britain at the time of Chanak and 
Lausanne was shown more clearly in 1925 in the non-involvement of the Dominions in the 
process in leading to Locarno, and the conference itself. In the Foreign Office Documents, 
there is correspondence in January 1925 from the colonial secretary, Leo Amery, to the 
governor general of Canada, quoting a telegram from Baldwin to his Dominion colleagues, 
indicating that there were ‘great difficulties in arranging for special meeting of the Imperial 
Conference at beginning of March 1925 to discuss problems arising out of Geneva 
Protocol.’79  
 
During the next few months it became clear to the British government that it was not 
practicable to include the Dominions in the commitments in Europe that would eventually be 
written into Locarno. In the Commons debate on 24 June 1925, on the ‘Proposed Security 
Pact’, Chamberlain was challenged, particularly by Percy Hurd MP, that he had not covered 
the crucial question about the position of the Dominions.80 Chamberlain replied in a non-
committal way when saying that:  
 
the Dominions have been kept fully informed of all the proceedings of His 
Majesty’s Government. With the exception of New Zealand, which has 
expressed its complete confidence in the policy of His Majesty’s Government, 
and its readiness to leave the decision in their hands, they have not declared 
themselves. But no Dominion can be committed except by its own 
Government, acting with the consent of its own Parliament.81 
 
Writing about what he called ‘the refusal’ of the Foreign Office to consult the Dominions 
over Locarno, Holland concluded that ‘it arose from a real anxiety that Dominion 
involvement in British policy-making on such a contentious issue would seriously restrict 
Britain’s ability to play the mediating role which the Versailles system had thrust upon her.’82 
The September 1925 issue of The Round Table accepted that the Dominions ought not to be 
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expected to sign any Rhineland guarantee pact because ‘it is not reasonable to expect peoples 
at the other end of the earth to commit themselves formally on a territorial question in Europe 
under conditions as they are today’ and that Britain ‘subject to consulting the Dominion 
Governments at every stage of the negotiations, must take the primary responsibility for 
deciding whether in the interests of her own security and the stability of Europe she should 
give such a guarantee.’83  
 
The British Government must have realised earlier in 1925 that they had to accept the 
reluctance of some of the Dominions to commit themselves to further involvement in 
European security. This would be true of both the traditional Dominions, and especially of 
the Irish Free State which had recently achieved Dominion status in contentious 
circumstances. There are no consultative documents published in the Foreign Office 
Documents, and it appears that the possible inclusion of the Dominions was quietly and 
conveniently left out of the discussions during the diplomatic exchanges during the summer. 
Article 9 of the Locarno document was drafted to say that ‘The present Treaty shall impose 
no obligation upon any of the British Dominions, or upon India, unless the Government of 
such Dominion, or of India, signifies its acceptance,’ and none of those countries did sign 
then, or later. 
 
During the Commons debate on 18 November on the conclusions at Locarno, Percy Hurd 
was again concerned regarding the lack of involvement of the Dominions and pointed out 
that the treaties would however be ‘signed on our behalf by the Sovereign as King of the 
United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, and 
Emperor of India.’84 Chamberlain just repeated that he deeply regretted ‘that the 
circumstances of the different Governments of the Empire made it impossible for His 
Majesty’s present advisers, before they entered into any negotiations with foreign countries, 
to have a conference with the Dominion Governments.’85 The Imperial Conference which 
settled the status of the Dominions in 1926, and which is detailed in chapter seven, showed  
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according to Hillmer and Granatstein, that ‘the radicals in the British Empire were no longer 
the Canadians, but the Irish and the South Africans who were pressing for decentralisation 
on a grand scale.’86 
 
The imperial challenges during these years led to some different reactions and policies from 
the different governments from 1919 to 1925, but there were no great differences between 
the political parties or governments, with all the British politicians assuming that a continuing 
British Empire was the most natural government for about a quarter of the world, and with 
India still being the jewel in the imperial crown. There were, however, surprisingly pragmatic 
views on particular developments, close to home in Ireland, but also with regard to 
Mesopotamia and Egypt.  
 
Looking back from the twentieth first century, it is clear that even the imperial successes such 
as the Washington Conference, the Dominion developments, and the settlement in Ireland, 
involved symptoms of longer-term decline, and which would eventually have implications 
for India, the Middle East, and finally for the colonies. Despite these signs of imperial decline 
that can be seen in retrospect, Britain could and still did control its empire in 1925.  
Kennedy’s arguments about ‘Imperial Overstretch’87 regarding how any empire can extend 
itself beyond its ability to maintain its political, economic and military commitments, is 
clearly relevant in retrospect to the British Empire during these years; as it is clear in 
retrospect that Britain’s empire was unsustainable, in the new political, economic and 
military situation after the Great War. However, looking at the situation in 1925, it was not 
unreasonable for the British politicians, to see the British Empire as the most successful 
surviving ongoing empire after both the Great War and the challenging years between 
Versailles and Locarno, with no obvious signs of unsustainability. 
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Chapter Four: The Washington Naval Conference    
 
 
The analysis of ‘Global Challenges’ has demonstrated both the size and complexity of 
the British Empire after the Great War, and the example of the development of the 
Dominions that was both a success for Britain, but also an indicator of a longer-term 
decline of the empire. The Washington Naval Conference was important because it found 
an expression of equality between Britain and the United States on the issue of battleships, 
which could be accepted both by Britain as the existing major power, and the United 
States as the up-and-coming major power, even though it can also be seen now as part of 
the British Empire’s longer-term decline. The conference which lasted from 12 November 
1921 to 6 February 1922, was a diplomatic landmark between Versailles and Locarno. It 
was a significant event in British imperial history, because the same government that 
established the widest definition of the empire in Paris, accepted that parity with the 
United States on the question of battleships. These conclusions were important to 
Australia and New Zealand, which relied on the Royal Navy and were fearful of the 
strength of Japan in the Pacific, in economic terms because of the financial pressures, and 
in domestic political terms because of the surprising lack of opposition even from the 
Diehard wing of the Conservative Party.  
 
Usually referred to as the Washington Naval Conference, it was in fact a mixture of 
negotiations on naval armaments and on wider diplomatic issues. It was not held under 
the auspices of the League; it had its origins both in the accession of the new Republican 
President Harding in March 1921 and in the British Imperial Conference which met from 
June to August 1921.1 The Washington Conference was then important because 
agreement was reached on limiting expenditure on capital ships, which included Britain’s 
acceptance that it could no longer be the premier naval power on its own, and the United 
States’ acceptance that at this stage it would not overtake Britain;  moreover, the Anglo-
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Japanese Treaty, and the diplomatic irritant of whether it should be renewed or not, was 
replaced without great acrimony. 
  
The conference covered a wide range of military and diplomatic issues that led to seven 
different treaties: the three most important were the Five Power ‘Treaty for the Limitation 
of Armaments’ limiting the naval forces of Britain, the United States, Japan, France and 
Italy, and defining the status quo with regard to the fortification of naval bases in the 
Pacific; then the diplomatic ‘Four Power Pact’ between the United States, Japan, Britain 
and France which also replaced the Anglo-Japanese Treaty; and finally the ‘Nine Power 
Pact’ regarding China, between the signatories to the Naval Treaty, China itself, and also 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium,2 which aimed according to the wording of the 
treaty ‘to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China 
and to promote intercourse between China and other powers on basis of equality of 
opportunity.’3 France perhaps played a somewhat negative role in complicating the 
negotiations, and there were some critical statements about France in London, but Anglo-
French rivalry was not a major issue. 
 
Most historiography has concentrated on the detailed negotiations on the limitations on 
capital ships, including the scrapping of existing ships, a ten-year moratorium on new 
construction and the fixing of the relative size of fleets in the ratio of 5, 5, 3, 1.75 and 
1.75 for the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy respectively; no agreement 
was reached on other surface ships, on submarines, auxiliary craft or land armaments. 
British objectives at the conference were a mixture of meeting the pressing financial 
pressures to achieve a balanced budget; maintaining the British imperial role including 
the guardianship of Australia, New Zealand and the other colonial territories in the Far 
East; managing the relationship with the United States, and the pressure from Canada to 
put the United States as a priority rather than Japan; and dealing with the continuing wish 
of the Foreign Office to extend the existing relationship with Japan, which had been 
renewed for ten years in the 1911 Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The British Empire 
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delegation included Australia, New Zealand, Canada and India, but Smuts had asked 
Britain to look after South Africa’s interests. 
 
In an article in December 1920 on the future of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in The Round 
Table, the author spoke of British interests as being ‘peace and security for British 
territory, good relations with all Far Eastern powers, the open door for trade with China, 
and the capable and progressive government in China itself’ and that ‘before the alliance 
is renewed, the whole Far Eastern question should be frankly and openly discussed.’4 A 
study of the  Documents in 1921 show that they included technical discussion on whether 
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty would expire if it was not renewed, some lengthy posturing 
about the best process, and some exchanges on the nature of British interests in China.5 
 
The diplomatic skirmishes before the conference included the suggestion that the 
American Ambassador had approved the idea of a preliminary conference in London.6 
There was also some scepticism about American politicians, as when the British 
Ambassador to Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes, commented to Curzon in London that 
‘no member of United States Government except Mr Hoover knows practically anything 
[sic] about the war, except what he read in newspapers while it was going on.’7 Curzon 
then said at the Imperial Conference that at the end of the Wilson era ‘official relations 
with the American Government almost ceased to exist, and for ten months we practically 
did no business with America at all.’8 In September 1921, The Round Table had a special 
article on the American view, including that ‘those Americans whose interests in British 
affairs consists mostly in preoccupation with the Irish Question’; that ‘the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance breeds mistrust and should be terminated’ and wondered what 
feelings would be aroused in England by an American-Chinese alliance.9  
 
A Foreign Office paper in October 1921 provided an analysis in advance of the 
Washington Conference on political, economic and racial issues in the Far East, and 
emphasized in a somewhat nostalgic tone that until the ‘advent of Japan as the pivotal 
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factor in the Far East, the supremacy of British Economic interests and naval power went 
unchallenged.’10 The Committee on Imperial Defence, which would have been the central 
point of  preparations for the Washington Conference, did not meet between 28 July and 
14 October when Churchill commented that he ‘trusted that the British delegates would 
not go to the conference, as if the British nation were unable to maintain at least an 
equality, and probably a superiority, in naval programmes to any other power.’11 
 
Although there were no obvious references in the Cabinet or C.I.D. papers to the position 
before 1914, the post-war leaders must have been very conscious of the costly Edwardian 
naval arms race with Germany. That naval competition with Germany had been very 
significant in military, diplomatic and financial terms. After 1918 the German naval 
challenged had disappeared, but the British politicians had now to react to the growth of 
the American military, especially their navy.  
 
There was one major debate on the conference in the Commons, in the autumn of 1921, 
when a motion was approved on 4 November, without a division, that ‘this house warmly 
approves of the meeting of the International Conference at Washington and trusts that a 
supreme effort will be made to arrive at such a measure of agreement as will secure a 
substantial and progressive reduction of the crushing burden of armaments.’12 The 
chairman of the parliamentary Labour Party, John Clynes, proposed the motion and set 
the tone by saying ‘we have been victorious in the War; how heavy are the liabilities and 
the burdens of victory, we in this country now know.’13 Sir Donald Maclean, leading for 
the Asquithian Liberals, stressed the costs that the country had to bear with his analysis 
that Britain was spending twenty per-cent of income tax on armaments and forty per-cent 
on the ongoing costs of war debts.14 During the low key debate, it was emphasised that 
this was an opportunity to further the cause of peace, and that it was an initiative that was 
complementary to the work of the League and a way to involve the United States; there 
was concern, but understanding, that Lloyd George was not going to Washington because 
of the sensitivity of the Irish negotiations.  
 
                                                 
10 Documents, Volume XIV, No.404, 20 October 1921, p.434. 
11 Minutes of the 145th meeting of the CID, 14 October 1921, p.4, NA/CAB 2/3. 
12 Hansard, Volume 147, 4 November 1921, column 2093. 
13 Ibid. column 2094. 
14 Ibid. column 3001. 
119 
 
There were no backbench pressures either from the Diehard MPs on the needs of the 
empire or alternatively from Labour MPs on the effect on employment in their 
constituencies of cutbacks in the building of capital ships. The silence from Labour was 
more understandable because of their priority for peace, but the absence of comment from 
the Diehards was surprising. Any other references in the Commons to the conference 
between November and February were of a supportive or mundane nature. The Times had 
commented in an editorial before the November debate that ‘two subjects are of prime 
concern to Britain. One is close to home – Ireland…the other is very far away – the Far 
East.’15 After the November debate, the opening statements in Washington, and the day 
after Armistice Day, The Times headed its editorial with the title ‘The Dawn of Hope’ 
and talked only of the prospects for peace, with no reference to threats to the empire or to 
the issues regarding capital ships.16 
 
Among the major factors in achieving success in Washington were the chairmanship of 
the American secretary of state, Charles Hughes, the American tactics of the ‘big bang’ 
initial presentation which set the tone and structure of the negotiations, and President 
Harding’s decision to include both Republican and Democratic Senate leaders.17 The 
American decision to go straight to a detailed solution on battleships was a very different 
process than that used at the various European conferences. There were various 
difficulties in the negotiations; for example, for the Japanese on keeping the Matsu, which 
had been financed by public subscription, for the French on accepting the capital ships 
ratio, and for the Americans themselves on the definition of naval fortifications in the 
Pacific, but these were all diplomatically managed.18  
 
Balfour, as leader of the British Empire delegation, gave the initial response to Hughes’ 
presentation, and although he had not been briefed on the proposals in advance, gave both 
a statesmanlike initial response, and continuing measured support during the negotiations. 
Balfour, now aged 73, managed in a pragmatic way the military and diplomatic pressures 
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with generally supportive messages from Lloyd George and the cabinet in London.19 On 
the major issues of the limits on capital ships, the ‘ten-year holiday’ on building, which 
was objected to by British naval experts in both London and Washington, and on helping 
to achieve a finessing of the existing Anglo-Japanese Treaty into the new Four Power 
Treaty, Balfour showed diplomatic skills which had been developed over forty years. He 
probably felt that Britain was not at the centre of the most difficult negotiation issues and 
could therefore give his support to Hughes. Churchill, acting as chair of the CID meeting, 
reacted to Hughes’ opening proposals by saying that they were fair and honest.20 At a 
further meeting in December, he made clear that the cabinet was sticking to the ten-year 
holiday in capital ship building, when Lord Beatty on behalf of the Navy, emphasized 
that ‘without sea power the British Empire would cease to exist.’21 
 
It was significant that the apparently minor issue of Wei-Hai-Wei, a leased naval outpost 
in China, led to some of the tensest exchanges between Balfour and the cabinet in London 
during the negotiations, and exposed issues about British attitudes to empire. Ironically it 
was Balfour who had signed the lease in 1898, when he was acting as the junior Foreign 
Office minister under his uncle, Lord Salisbury. The issue was highlighted before the 
conference because of the similarities, on a much smaller scale, to leases within the 
maritime province of Shantung, which the Japanese had taken from the Germans during 
the war, and which they had resolutely refused to give back to the Chinese in Paris, much 
to the annoyance of the Chinese and their American supporters. 
 
Balfour was inclined to make a magnanimous gesture of giving up the lease on Wei-Hai-
Wei, but Curzon wrote to Balfour on 24 November saying that the ‘Colonial and Foreign 
Offices attach much greater value to retention of Wei-Hai-Wei than you appear disposed 
to do.’22 Churchill was amongst those leading the opposition, partly on the grounds of the 
precedent that would be set, given the dependence that Hong Kong Island had on the lease 
of the New Territories. However, a week later at the CID, with Curzon in the chair, it was 
agreed that the location had no strategic value, and could only be used as a sanatorium. 
                                                 
19 Even Curzon, who was not a great admirer of Balfour, said of his performance in Washington that it 
was ‘a masterpiece of tact and intellectual superiority’. David Gilmour, Curzon (London: John Murray, 
1994), p.503. 
20 Minutes of the 149th meeting of the CID, 14 November 1921, NA/CAB 2/3. 
21 Minutes of the 154th meeting of the CID, 12 December 1921, NA/CAB 2/3.  
22 Documents, Volume XIV, No.446, 24 November 1921, p.501. 
121 
 
Vice-Admiral Oliver, the second sea lord, added that it was not defensible, and that in the 
event of war with Japan, it should be evacuated at once.23 Balfour’s initiative regarding 
the surrendering of the lease on Wei-Hai-Wei, and the reluctance in London to give up a 
base, is an interesting example of a country dealing with the issues of imperial 
possessions, however obtained and however unimportant.24 
 
Sprout’s analysis of British media reaction to the Washington settlement concludes that 
both the Conservative and Liberal papers were enthusiastic.25 The Times talked about ‘a 
great day for all time in the history of the world’26 while the Daily Telegraph ‘found cause 
for great satisfaction in the psychological and material results of the Conference.’27 The 
Daily Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian Weekly were also very supportive of the 
results with the Guardian saying that ‘the Conference has made a unique contribution to 
world peace.’28 Looking in more detail at The Times, there was an earlier editorial in 
December,29 headed ‘A Triumph for Peace’ regarding ‘the unanimous adoption by the 
Washington Conference of the draft quadruple treaty,’ and of more interest, a letter to the 
paper at the end of December from the president and chairman of the Navy League.30 The 
letter gave fulsome praise to Balfour, and the results of Washington, and goes on to say 
‘that the primary object for which the Navy League exists remains unaltered – namely, to 
secure the adequate naval protection of British subjects and British commerce all the 
world over’ but that ‘the League cannot but believe that the Four Power Agreement will 
add strength to his aim and benefit all mankind.’ Although the letter referred specifically 
to the Four Power Agreement, rather than the restriction on capital ships, the shape of the 
agreement restricting capital ships was very clear.   
 
Sprout’s analysis of the weekly and monthly press found that most specialist military, and 
especially naval, views accepted what might be seen as inevitable, such as the editor of 
Brassey’s Naval Annual saying that as a result of the conference ‘the trident of Neptune 
passes into the joint guardianship of the English-speaking peoples’ and that ‘while 
                                                 
23 Minutes of the 152th meeting of the CID, 1 December 1921, NA/CAB 2/3. 
24 Documents, Volume XIV, No.580, 4 February 1922, p.636, lists Balfour’s final conclusions on why 
Wei-Hai-Wei should be given up.  
25 Sprout, p.263. 
26 The Times, 2 February 1922, p. l1. 
27 Daily Telegraph quoted in New York Times, 5 February 1922, p.2. 
28 Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10 February 1922, p.101. 
29 The Times, 12 December 1921. 
30 The Times, 31 December 1921. 
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Englishmen might view this result with misgiving, it was preferable to the expenditure of 
vast sums in a vain effort to out-build Japan and the United States.’31 Much more critical 
were views  about the cabinet’s ‘humiliating acquiescence in the arms proposals of the 
United States’32 or ‘the bloodless surrender of the world’s greatest Empire.’33 The most 
vitriolic criticism came from retired Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wester-Wemyss; in an article 
published simultaneously in London and Paris he wrote that England’s voluntary 
surrender was ‘an act of renunciation unparalleled…in history’ and that England’s voice 
would ‘no longer carry the same weight as heretofore’ in the councils of the nations; 
Britain, he maintained, had won the late war on the sea only to lose it at the conference 
table – ‘truly a paradoxical result of the greatest victory’ in history.34 
 
It would have been expected that such views would be reflected in the Commons by the 
Diehard faction in the Conservative Party, but Morgan pointed out that they were 
generally unsuccessful in the Commons, and that although they had many aspirations, 
including that ‘they would have revoked the naval disarmament agreed to in Washington,’ 
they were not really a threat to the government.35 He also pointed out the lack of 
leadership in the Diehards and maintained that the only person of stature was Joynson-
Hicks who was to be a ‘predictably conservative, puritanical, unimaginative Home 
Secretary’ in Baldwin’s Government from 1924 to 1929.36 For whatever reasons, the 
Diehards did not provide the opposition that might have been expected, either to the 
principles of the conference, and to the agreements themselves. 
 
The Commons did not sit from 10 November to 14 December, or from 19 December to 7 
February, and when it was sitting, the only references to the conference were of a 
procedural or positive nature, such as when an MP requested the publication of the 
                                                 
31 Fortnightly Review, Volume 117, March 1922, p.396. 
32 Saturday Review, Volume 133, 11 February 1922, p.137. 
33 The English Review, Volume 34, March 1922, p.260. 
34 Roslyn Baron Wester-Wemyss, ‘Washington and After’, Nineteenth Century, Volume 91, March 1922, 
p.405ff. Wester-Wemyss was an illegitimate great-grandson of William IV, a friend of the future George 
V as a naval cadet between 1879 and 1882, see Kenneth Rose, King George V (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1983), p.10, and allegedly still a friend of George. He had been first sea lord from 1917 to 
1919, had been the chief naval representative in Paris, and was appointed admiral of the fleet and a baron 
when he retired in 1919. 
35 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p251. 
36 Ibid. p.252. 
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agreements in a ‘popular form for record of achievement.’37 During the six months after 
the conclusion of the Washington negotiations, the main discussions of naval matters 
were within the naval estimates debates in March and July when much of the discussion 
was around the effect of the cuts in government expenditure.38 One MP, Lieutenant-
Colonel Ashley, recognized the constraints on his imperial dreams when he said that he 
would ‘like to see the whole world red, because the British Government is the best form 
of Government ever invented by man. But we must come down to realities… (that the 
agreements) …enabled us, who are financially poorer, to have a navy equal to that of the 
Americans, who have all the money in the world.’39 
 
The parliamentary procedures to ratify the Washington agreements did not start until 20 
June in the Lords, when the government case was put by Lord Lee who, as first lord of 
the Admiralty, had been part of the Washington negotiating team, and 7 July in the 
Commons by Leo Amery, the parliamentary secretary to the Admiralty.40 Writing his 
memoirs thirty years later, Amery was very concerned with the politics and figures 
dealing with overall government expenditure and the naval estimates, but did not discuss 
the rights and wrongs of the Washington Agreements.41 Some of the limited discussion 
in the Commons was taken up by the technical explanations of which parts of the 
agreements actually needed new legislation. There were no voting divisions, and there 
was a general mood of self-congratulation; the main regrets were that the naval 
agreements did not include submarines, and that there were no proposals on land 
armaments. There was again no attack on the agreements by the Diehards. The only 
serious dissent came from Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke, the MP for Devonport, and Major 
Sir Bertram Falle, MP for North Portsmouth, reflecting the concerns of their naval 
constituencies.42  
 
Historical views of the Washington Conference have generally been positive about the 
results of the conference, where it has been analysed as to what was realistically 
achievable at that time. Richardson, as one of the key secondary sources on progress on 
                                                 
37 Hansard, Volume 151, 6 March 1922, column 836. 
38 Hansard, Volumes 152 and 156, 24 March 1922 and 18 July 1922. 
39 Hansard, Volume 152, 24 March 1922, column 842. 
40 Hansard, House of Lords Volume 50, 20 June 1922, column 979ff, and Hansard, Volume 156, 7 July 
1922, columns 717ff.  
41 L. S. Amery, My Political Life: War and Peace 1914-1929 (London: Hutchinson, 1953), pp.216-221.  
42 Hansard, Volume 156, 7 July1922, columns 745ff.  
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disarmament in the 1920s, starts from his conclusion about Versailles, that ‘the peace 
settlement of 1919 was not conducive to general disarmament since it failed to provide a 
security system that was acceptable or adequate for all nations.’43 Leaving aside whether 
that was fair view of Versailles, his strongest criticisms are reserved for the second 
Baldwin Government, after 1925, which he summarises as ‘in essence, Britain’s policy 
was one of procrastination verging on duplicity,’ rather than the earlier years covered by 
this thesis, including the Washington Conference. 44 
 
From a very different perspective, Gordon understandably discussed the negative effects 
of the agreements on the naval shipbuilding industry and the experienced skilled 
workforce. He emphasised that with the limited programmes permitted after Washington, 
much capacity did become derelict and many thousands of skilled jobs were lost. He 
added that the Admiralty help was very limited and ‘in 1924, a suggested addition to naval 
estimates of £5m. to offset unemployment in shipbuilding was cut by the Treasury to 
£1.8m. and not repeated.’45 Maurer wrote on broader naval strategy that for Britain’s 
leaders, ‘parity in battle-fleet strength did not mean overall equity. Instead, they insisted 
that Britain’s special strategic requirements of defending a global empire meant that the 
Royal Navy must be superior in overall strength; in particular Britain required a superior 
force of cruisers.’46 This however relates more to disarmament issues in the later 1920s 
and is somewhat similar to arguments about Locarno, in that it was far better to get 
agreement on battleships, or Germany’s western borders, even if cruisers or the eastern 
borders could not be addressed at that time, as long as the first agreement did not prejudice 
the chance of a second agreement. 
 
Financial issues had clearly become more central to government priorities in 1921 than 
1919, and were of key importance in establishing the attitude of the government to the 
Washington negotiations. The conference was a diplomatic success for Britain partly 
because it helped balance the national budget and removed the threat of international 
naval escalation, partly because the agreements were acceptable to the various 
                                                 
43 Dick Richardson The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London : Pinter, 1989) 
p.4. 
44 Ibid p.v. 
45 G.A.H.Gordon  British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars (Annapolis : Naval Institute 
Press, 1988) p.76-77. 
46 Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds.) The Washington Conference 1921-22 (London : Frank Cass, 
1995) p.277. 
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Dominions, and partly because it found a diplomatic solution on whether the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty should be renewed.  The equality between Britain and the United States 
in battleships was an imaginative solution which suited both countries at least in the short-
term. The British political establishment, apart from some of the serving admirals, and 
ex-naval men like Wester-Wemyss, could accept the situation of no longer having the 
most powerful navy in the world, as long as it was not openly demoted. There was 
practically no reaction in the Commons from the Diehard wing of the Conservative Party; 
the atmosphere reflected the approach of the government, which seems to have been a 
mixture of keeping a low profile in case it was a disaster, some distrust in London about 
the American positions, and then relief that a balanced agreement was possible.  
 
The Washington Conference was not, of course, applauded by all the interests on either 
side of the Atlantic; on the American political scene, Cordell Hull, a leading Democrat 
and future secretary of state, wrote in his autobiography that he ‘felt that the achievements 
of the conference were very partial, and that the United States had paid a heavy price 
compared with other countries.’47 This might also be a compliment to Balfour, but more 
widely any considered assessment must be that the conference was a successful 
diplomatic negotiation, with compromise on all sides. Although in the long term it can be 
seen as a significant step in Britain’s long-term decline as a global imperial power, it 
would be reasonable in 1922 or 1925 to see the conference as a diplomatic success, which 
also reflected the hopes in the country for more permanent peace. 
 
                                                 
47 Cordell Hull The Memoirs of Cordell Hull Volume 1 (London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) p.117. 
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Chapter Five: European Stability  
     
 
The problems in Europe were more complex than those in the British Empire, and Britain 
was only one of the major powers involved. The Great War was not just a European war, 
and Versailles was not just a European settlement, but the majority of the fighting, and 
the most difficult problems facing the diplomats in Paris, were in Europe.  Europe was 
very different after the war, with the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires, the changes in regimes in Russia and Germany, and the number of new states 
established in Central and Eastern Europe.  It can be argued how successful the statesmen 
were in Paris, but it certainly left many problems unresolved. In analysing British policies 
towards Europe, concentration on France, Germany, and Poland, means that it is not 
possible to include, for example, analysis of Lloyd George’s support for Greece, of Italy 
and the rise of Mussolini or of Spain after its neutrality in the war,   
 
Analysis of the relationship with France concentrates on the background to the alliance, 
the experiences of being allies during the war, and then the difficult years between 
Versailles to Locarno with regard to what type of alliance was possible and what form of 
security guarantees Britain might give to France. The subject of relationships with 
Germany does not concentrate on the wartime enmity; rather it seeks to explain the 
growing antagonism in the years before 1914, when the post-war leaders grew up 
politically, and the difficulties of dealing with Germany after the war. Discussion of 
Poland is important because a major criticism of Locarno was that it did nothing to 
address the German/Polish border issues, and more generally because Britain was very 
reluctant to get involved in Eastern Europe.  Before looking at relations with those 
countries, it is appropriate to look at the League of Nations, as the new international 
backcloth to the national arguments in Europe.  
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The League of Nations  
 
One of the most profound decisions at the Paris Conference was the establishment of the 
League of Nations which came into existence on 1 January 1920. There had been no such 
permanent international organisation before the war for the solution of diplomatic 
problems between nations. This thesis is not concerned with an assessment of the 
League’s first two decades and its failure to prevent the Second World War but the 
League’s first six years did cover the period from Versailles to Locarno.   
 
The League will always be associated with President Woodrow Wilson, partly because it 
would not have been created without his promotion of the idea in Paris, and partly because 
he could not then convince the American Senate or the American people that the United 
States should become a member. Mazower has emphasized that internationalism was 
already very active in American foreign policy thinking before the war, with much 
emphasis on lawyers and international arbitration.1 Both President Theodore Roosevelt 
in 1906 and his former secretary of state, Elihu Root, were recipients of the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1912, for their contributions to international peace; Root was a leading member 
of the American Society of International Law but unlike Root, Wilson wanted to keep the 
power with the politicians, rather than give it to lawyers.2 
 
After Wilson had emphasised the League in his Fourteen Points speech in January 1918, 
the details were developed in Paris by the Commission that drafted the League Covenant. 
While Wilson was involved personally in the work of the Commission, Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau left it to others to be involved. The concept had been supported by various 
strands of British and Dominion political opinion,3 including Cecil and Smuts who were 
nominated by Lloyd George as his representatives on the Commission. The main powers 
had different agendas in the discussions; France saw the League as a vehicle for collective 
security while Britain and the Dominions saw the League as a potentially useful body for 
                                                 
1 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Penguin, 2012).  
2 Ibid. p.119. 
3 The British League of Nations Society was founded in 1915 to support the ideas being discussed in 
various liberal circles internationally. 
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investigating and solving disputes.4 Wilson personally saw the establishment of a new 
form of international relationships as central to the objectives of the conference. It was 
tempting for politicians in Paris to support Wilson’s aspirations for the League in 
exchange for Wilson’s support on other matters. The final form of the Covenant, which 
was incorporated into the peace treaties with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, 
was closer to the British concept, and the League came into effect on 1 January 1920, 
when the Paris Conference formally ended.5  
 
The establishment of the League was significant, even if the history of the League was 
later to be derided when it failed to solve the international problems of the 1930s, and 
even if Hankey could write in his diary in Paris that the British Empire was worth a 
thousand League of Nations,6 and Churchill said that the League was ‘no substitute for 
the British fleet.’7 The failure of Wilson to get Senate approval for Versailles and the 
League was partly due to his tactics and his illness, and partly to domestic disquiet and a 
general American feeling for isolationism after the war. The Republican Party leaders 
took advantage of this and emphasised the danger of the League dragging the United 
States into European wars, and that Britain and her Dominions would have a total of six 
votes in the League Assembly. Wilson can still take credit for many of the achievements 
at Paris, even if he could not deliver his own country to Versailles and the League.   
 
In looking at other contemporary views, The Round Table in March 1918, while 
supportive of the proposals for the League, expressed caution in saying that ‘it is 
important, however, to realise clearly the essential limitations of the League of Nations 
idea. For the chief danger to it is that it should become discredited through its inability to 
live up to the expectations which have been formed of it’8 and six months later that ‘it is 
in the first few years, perhaps in the first few months, after the war that the possibilities 
of international co-operation will be most severely tested.’9  British politicians said the 
                                                 
4 Erik Goldstein, The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925 (London: Pearson Longman, 2002), 
p.35. 
5 The International Labour Organisation, which was established under the auspices of the League actually 
met before the end of 1919, before the League came into effect; it uniquely continued as a United Nations 
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6 Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets (London: Collins, 1972), volume 2, p.80, diary 12 April 1919. 
7 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers : The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War (London 
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8 The Round Table, Number 30, March 1918, p.224. 
9 The Round Table, Number 32, September 1918, p.681. 
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right things in public, such as Curzon in early 1920 telling the Lords that ‘the League of 
Nations is an absolutely essential structure, not only as a guarantee and security against 
the repetition of the horrors which already, perhaps, are beginning to fade from our minds, 
but as a guarantee of the peaceful settlement which we are trying to set up.’10   
 
Two other bodies were set up by the Allies in Paris, outside the League, to follow up 
issues from Versailles. The ‘Conference of Ambassadors of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers’ was also effective from January 1920, based in Paris, and consisting 
of the French foreign minister, the ambassadors from Britain, Italy and Japan, with the 
United States ambassador as an observer. This ongoing conference, which reflected 
continuity from the Paris Conference, was concerned with problems of interpretation or 
enforcement of the peace treaties which were not dealt with at top level Allied 
conferences. The other new body was a military ‘Inter-Allied Military Control 
Commission’ which had specific responsibilities to supervise German disarmament and 
conformity to the terms of Versailles.11  
 
The League had an annual assembly for all members each September, a small council 
which met quarterly, and a supporting secretariat; there were initially 42 members and 
this number rose to 54 by 1925.12 There were some examples of success for the League 
in the years to 1925, including the resolution of the 1920 dispute between Finland and 
Sweden about the Aaland Islands; the setting up of the International Refugee Organisation 
in 1921 under Fritjof Nansen; involvement in 1921 and 1922 in settling the German-
Polish frontier in Upper Silesia; and the assistance given with regard to the so-called 
‘Corfu Incident’ in 1923 between Greece and Italy. After the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, 
the question regarding the status of the Mosul region, which affected Britain directly, was 
referred to the League and eventually awarded to Iraq, and this was accepted by Turkey 
in a treaty in 1926. 
 
                                                 
10 Hansard, House of Lords Volume 39, 10 February 1920, column 25.  
11 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed : European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2005) p.430, confirms the Conference of Ambassadors dissolved the IMCC with effect 
January 1927. 
12 The first secretary general who served from 1920 to 1933 was a British diplomat, Sir James 
Drummond.  
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The detailed history of the League has been covered by a number of historians including 
Walters,13 Henig,14 Scott15 and Northedge.16 More recently Pedersen reviewed the 
historiography about the League; this did not greatly relate to British polices, but 
concentrates on an analysis of the achievements of the League in the different areas of its 
contribution to contemporary peacekeeping, its work in stabilizing new states and running 
the minorities protection and mandates systems, and its efforts to regulate cross-border 
trafficking.17 The analysis shows a slow and detailed development of the new 
organization, having some successes. In the years up to 1925 the peacekeeping roles often 
had to operate in parallel with the major powers’ conferences either because some of the 
key powers were not members, or because some powers, primarily Britain and France, 
thought the matters were too important to be handed over to the League. Efforts to 
reinforce the Covenant of the League included Cecil’s independent, and unsuccessful, 
initiative for a draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee in 192218 and then importantly the 
drafting of the Geneva Protocol in 1924 which is discussed in the next chapter.19  
 
One potentially difficult outcome from Versailles for Britain was that the League had a 
continuing involvement with the former German colonies and Ottoman territories which 
had been assigned under the concept of ‘Mandates.’ The three levels of mandates 
established, were category ‘A’ covering former Ottoman territories such as Syria and 
Lebanon for France, and Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia for Britain; ‘B’ 
covering mainly countries in Africa such as Tanganyika; and ‘C’ covering mandates 
mainly in the Pacific but also South West Africa. While ‘A’ mandates reflected much 
more developed national institutions, ‘C’ mandates were hardly distinguishable from old-
fashioned colonies. The term ‘sacred trust’ of civilized nations had been written into the 
League’s covenant in respect of mandated territories, but the problems that Britain had in 
                                                 
13 F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952). 
14 Ruth Henig, The League of Nations (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1973).  
15 George Scott, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations (London: Hutchison, 1973). 
16 F. S. Northedge, The League of Nations: its Life and Times 1920-1946 (Leicester: University Press, 
1986). 
17 Susan Pedersen, ‘Review Essay: Back to the League of Nations’, American Historical Review, Volume 
112/4, October 2007, pp.1091-1116. 
18 Cecil was later lord privy seal May 1923-January 1924; and chancellor of duchy of Lancaster 
November 1924-October 1927. Cecil was also the representative of South Africa to the League from 1920 
to 1922. 
19
 Some countries including Canada were already apprehensive of the powers agreed at Versailles; as 
indicated above in the section on the Dominions. 
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mandated territories, particularly in the Middle East, were not the result of them being 
mandates, or because of interference from the League.20  
 
The overall attitude of the different British governments to the League during its initial 
six years can only be described as ambivalent. Walters, who had been deputy secretary-
general of the League, wrote thirty years later, more specifically about the Lloyd George 
government, that ‘The British Government was indifferent; a foreign policy based on the 
Covenant might appeal to the nation, but it had no charms for the sentimental 
adventurousness of Lloyd George or the old-fashioned imperialism of Curzon.’21 This 
was despite Curzon’s positive message in 1920, but Curzon does not even appear in the 
indices of Henig or Northedge.22 Curzon did not get involved in the workings of the 
League, but Balfour  was Britain’s representative at the League from 1920 to 1922. Henig 
argued that the mood within British politics was that ‘Britain stayed in the League not out 
of conviction but rather out of cowardice. The public believed in it, and to disavow it 
might be to court electoral disaster.’23 She also saw Cecil being included in Conservative 
cabinets as a kind of guarantee to supporters of the League that the policy they so much 
desired was safe. 
 
A contemporary foreign office analysis by Nicolson emphasises the difference between 
minor and major international issues when he wrote in that ‘as a clearing-house for 
international disputes, the League of Nations is a wholly admirable institution. In many 
minor questions, it has already played a most useful part, but at present, and probably for 
many years, it will be unsafe to count upon its authority being sufficient to restrain a great 
power in any case in which that power considers its vital interests to be at stake.’24 
 
During the first six years of the League’s existence, from its first meeting in January 1920, 
it is then possible to distinguish a number of features about the League and its relationship 
                                                 
20 Susan Pedersen The Guardians : the League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford : Oxford 
University Press, 2015) described the work of William Rappard, Director of the Mandates section; this 
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with British foreign policy. The League was slowly getting established during these years 
even though the successes were mainly on the less important international problems. The 
British governments were ambivalent as to support for the League; they did not go far to 
help it develop but they did nothing to undermine its work and Balfour was a senior figure 
to attend the Geneva meetings. The key international conferences, including Washington, 
London and Locarno, took place outside the League’s direct auspices either because 
Germany and America were not members or because Britain and/or France were 
determined to keep the main negotiations within their own control. The draft Geneva 
Protocol was both the League’s major initiative and its major failure during these years. 
 
 
 
France: Britain’s Wartime Ally   
 
A much quoted statement of Curzon was his observation in 1921 that  
 
the Foreign Office is only too painfully aware that in almost every quarter of 
the globe, whether it be Silesia or Bavaria or Hungary or the Balkans – 
Morocco or Egypt or Turkey or Mesopotamia – the representatives of France 
are actively pursuing a policy which is either unfriendly to British interests 
or, if not that, is consecrated to the promotion of a French national interest 
which is inconsistent with ours.25   
 
This extract was from a much wider review of Anglo-French relations whose overall 
implications will be discussed below with regard to the Locarno negotiations. The French 
could be equally bitter on such matters as, for example, when Clemenceau remarked 
privately late in 1919 that ‘England is the lost illusion of my life! Not a day passes that I 
do not receive from one of our agents abroad reports indicating veritable hostile acts. I 
had hoped that the fraternity of arms...would suppress the old traditional prejudices.’26 
 
Despite the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904, and the common sacrifices of the 
war, there was an underlying theme that Britain and France still had a degree of enmity 
                                                 
25 Documents, Volume XVI, No.768, 28 December 1921, p.860. 
26 Andre François-Poncet, de Versailles à Potsdam (Paris: Flammarion, 1948), p.65. 
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and a lack of understanding, and that the closest neighbours were not closest friends.27 
One of the most perceptive quotes on the relationship between Britain and France was 
from D’Abernon, who commented in 1929 that there was ‘No real hatred even when 
enemies – no real comradeship even when Allies.’28  At the beginning of the Great War, 
the foreign minister Sir Edward Grey had said  the appropriate diplomatic words in the 
Commons when he declared that ‘for many years we have had a long-standing friendship 
with France…when the late Government made their agreement with France – the warm 
and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had perpetual 
differences in the past, had cleared these differences.’29 The war produced tensions 
between two allies with different languages, traditions and military systems; as Bell 
observed ‘it is a notorious fact in the history of warfare that alliances are subject to many 
strains, and it is remarkable that in 1914-18 France and Britain held so well together at 
all these different levels.’30   
 
It would be assumed that the mutual sacrifices of the war would have bound the countries 
together, but the relative sacrifices may not have been appreciated by either the French or 
the British public. The estimated figures of those killed, missing or who died of wounds 
were for Britain 743,000 and for France 1,384,000, but it is further estimated that France 
also suffered 200,000 civilian deaths, 600,000 war widows, and 1,100,000 men left with 
permanent disabilities, 56,000 of them amputees.31 France lost 350,000 men in the battles 
at Verdun during 1916, and Kedward recorded that ‘two thirds of those killed at the front 
were from rural occupations. Peasant communities were decimated. Arriving at a village 
Monument aux Morts, it is still a traveller’s first reaction to find the number of names 
inscribed there unbelievable.’32  
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Following the German offensive into Belgium and France in 1914, it was fortunate that 
Britain and France did not have to openly agree on war aims; Britain would have 
emphasised the restoration of Belgium’s independence, the destruction of the German 
fleet, and the preservation or enhancement of the British Empire. France had the direct 
motivation to ensure the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine; this enabled the maximum 
national unity within the Union Sacrée, and the objective of the permanent destruction of 
Germany’s military ability to threaten France. French fears of Germany were based on 
memories of 1870, on the unfavourable comparisons with Germany in respect of 
economic power, and on the projected growth of populations. 
 
At the height of the battle of Verdun in 1916, The Times published a very sympathetic 
editorial entitled ‘The War Spirit of France’ in which it observed that:  
 
the battle of Verdun has utterly disappointed the confident expectations of 
the German General staff and has completely upset their carefully elaborated 
plans for the spring and summer campaign…the whole combination has been 
shattered by the skill and the dogged valour of our glorious French 
Allies…we wish that it had been our good fortune to share with her the 
labours and the glory of this immortal feat of arms. 33  
 
Editorials in The Economist in 1916 sometimes concentrated on the possibilities of peace, 
but a main article recognising the start of the Battle of the Somme said that ‘the Germans 
launched five months ago that terrific assault on Verdun, which has been sustained by the 
French with such incomparable heroism.’34 
 
During the war, there was increasingly closer working by British and French politicians, 
generals and civil servants, which led Bell to conclude that ‘by 1918 the two countries 
had built up from nothing the institutions and working habits of an alliance. In four years 
of suffering, death and destruction, it was no small achievement.’35 Britain and France 
must have felt more appreciative of each other in October 1918 when the exchange of 
diplomatic notes between Germany and the United States about a possible armistice 
excluded them both. However, MacMillan wrote of the Paris Conference that France’s 
allies became exasperated with what they saw as ‘French intransigence, French greed and 
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French vindictiveness’36 and Kedward concluded that the process which led to Versailles 
was ‘a secret, difficult, and at times acrimonious compromise between the Allies, unable 
to agree on how to control the power of Germany.’37 As the Allies were released from the 
wartime bonds of necessity, the different priorities of Britain and France reflected their 
wartime aims, as France was primarily concerned with punishing Germany, destroying 
Prussian militarism and ensuring that Germany could not invade France again, while 
Britain was most concerned with its own imperial position. However, France’s secondary 
interests, for example in Greater Syria, touched a nerve of Britain’s imperial interests and 
added to tensions regarding the main issues in Europe.  
 
The Economist’s correspondent based in Paris during the negotiations wrote, with an 
understanding of the French position, ‘if, as seems possible, Russia and Germany form a 
solid block in the future, the financial situation of the Allies will be dangerous in the 
extreme, unless the Rhine frontier and the other necessary military safeguards are 
provided for,’38 and just after the treaty was signed, the correspondent discussed the effect 
of the destruction of the fleet in Scapa Flow, the fact that France with all its financial 
concerns had actually seen those ships as a means of replenishing its own navy and that 
the German admiral who sunk the ships had forced the French to embark on a large 
shipbuilding programme which it could not afford.39 Lloyd George said in the Commons 
on returning from Versailles, and with understanding of the history since 1870, ‘France 
has a legitimate reason for feeling a nervous apprehension… France sees herself there 
with only the Rhine between her and this foe, which has trampled upon her ruthlessly and 
torn her flesh twice within living memory.’40 
 
Eventually the French Senate approved the treaty unanimously on 11 October,41 but 
Martin wrote that by the end of 1919, there was bitter resentment in France at the 
influence in Britain and the United States of Keynes’ diatribe against Wilson, 
Clemenceau and Versailles in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and to Lloyd 
                                                 
36 MacMillan, Peacemakers, p.36. 
37 Kedward, La Vie en Bleu, p.97. 
38 The Economist, 26 April 1919. 
39 The Economist, 28 June 1919. These effects of Scapa Flow on France are not normally emphasised; 
Britain had acquired 1,653,000 tons of German merchant shipping. See Bell, France and Britain: 1900-
1940, p.137. 
40 Hansard, Volume 117, 3 July 1919, column 1224. 
41 France still had 900,000 men under arms in July 1920, and 850.000 a year later, of whom 100,000 were 
in Germany.  J.F.V. Keiger France and the World since 1870 (London : Arnold Hodder, 2001) p.55. 
136 
 
George’s remarks to the Commons that an American refusal to conclude the defensive 
pact with France meant that Britain need not do so either.42  
 
John Maynard Keynes is automatically associated in history with the inter-war years 
because his great contribution to economic theory and practice, written during the years 
and normally referred to as ‘Keynesian Economics’ had such a major effect on economics 
and politics in the second half of the century. However, his major work, General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money was not published until 1936, and Peden emphasised 
that even ‘when in 1924 Keynes first advocated public works as a cure for unemployment, 
he too believed that the nation’s supply of capital was limited, and his proposals involved 
only a diversion of existing funds.’43 
 
However, Keynes’ influence on the years from 1919 to 1925, was ironically not as an 
academic economist, but rather as a result of that book about Versailles entitled The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace  published in December 1919. 44 This was within 
only six months of his resigning from the Treasury in June 1919, following his frustration 
at the leaders in Paris not adopting the more sympathetic attitudes to the German 
economic situation, which he was advocating in his role as chief treasury representative 
in the British delegation. He therefore took this opportunity of his new independence from 
the Treasury to write this extremely critical book of the Paris negotiations and the terms 
of Versailles, particularly on those ‘economic consequences’ for Germany and therefore 
for the international economic system. Keynes wrote of Clemenceau: ‘he felt about 
France what Pericles felt of Athens – unique value in her, nothing else mattering’ but his 
theory of politics was Bismarck’s believing that from the position of France ‘you must 
never negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate to him.’45 Keynes’ 
biographer commented that it was not surprising that reception to the book was least 
enthusiastic in Paris and he lists the various French critics.46 
 
                                                 
42 Martin, France and the Aprés Guerre, p.44. Lloyd George said, ‘If there should be such a possibility as 
the United States not ratifying that compact, undoubtedly we are free to reconsider our decision’, 
Hansard, Volume 123, 18 December 1919, column 762. 
43 G.C. Peden Keynes, the Treasury and British Economic Policy (London : Macmillan, 1988) p.27. 
44 J.M.Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London : Macmillan, 1919).  
45 Ibid p.29.  
46 Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes Volume 1 (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.397. 
137 
 
There was no doubt that his book was highly successful commercially as by April 1920, 
as many as 18,500 copies had been sold in Britain, 70,000 in the United States and was 
then translated into eleven other languages including French, German, Russian, Japanese 
and Chinese. There was, not surprisingly, great enthusiasm about his book amongst his 
various colleagues in the Bloomsbury Group, and amongst his Liberal and Labour 
political friends. In reality the book was more like a modern political memoir where the 
politician re-expresses his views soon after a political or diplomatic event, and tends to 
reinforce the different attitudes taken by different parties at that event, such as the Paris 
Conference. Keynes’ criticisms were in fact aimed at most of the participants in Paris, 
rather than only at France, but the book clearly had an effect on Franco-British relations.47 
  
However, although Keynes sold all those copies and the publication made him famous, it 
should not be assumed that his views were widespread in Britain. The Times, in a stinging 
editorial after the book was published, argued in a lengthy three column leading article, 
not only about Keynes’ economic criticisms of the reparations policy but also more 
personally by asking ‘how, unless his bias had been throughout akin to that of a 
conscientious objector, could he place the Allies persistently on the same moral level as 
Germany in regard to the war?’48  
 
Keynes’ Economic Consequences was followed by the publication of his A Revision of 
the Treaty in 1922.49  As Skidelsky pointed out, the main British criticisms were not about 
his economic arguments, but about priorities of the key statesmen, and he quoted R.W. 
Seton-Watson who said that ‘the revision of political frontiers was an absolutely vital 
preliminary to the world of building a New Europe.’ 50   
 
In discussing the effects of the war, Keynes wrote of  exaggeration by the French, and 
argued that ‘not above 10 per cent of the area was effectively occupied by the enemy, and 
not above 4 per cent lay within the area of substantial devastation.’51 However, Martin 
was more convincing, when he emphasised that unlike Britain, a considerable proportion 
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of French land had been fought over and occupied, and wrote that ‘although a mere 7 per 
cent of the nation’s land area, and inhabited by only 10% of the population, these 
Departments were an industrial giant, in 1913 accounting for 60% of French coal mining, 
66% of textile production, and 55% of metallurgical production,’52 and Kent emphasised 
the same point when saying that the ten Departments were the centre of France’s iron, 
coal, woollen and cotton industries, with 20,000 factories partially or totally destroyed.53  
During the war, the French increased their national debt by 177 billion francs, equal to 
roughly two-thirds of its gross national product in 1913;54 private capital in France was 
reduced by 25% during the war, of which two-thirds was the result of war damage and 
one-third the result of losses on investments in Russia in 1917.  
 
Versailles was not expected to lead easily to reconciliation between the former 
combatants, but what was less predictable was that it led to considerable disharmony and 
bitterness between Britain and France, as they struggled with the problems of 
implementing the treaty. Dutton wrote that the major failing of Versailles was:  
 
its inability to settle the question of Franco-German relations on other than 
a temporary basis. The war left Germany still potentially the strongest 
nation in Europe but embittered beneath the more punitive clauses of the 
peace settlement. By contrast France sought desperately to perpetuate the 
essentially artificial verdict of 1919, seeking the guarantees of her future 
security which only a major ally could ensure.55   
 
Some problems were inherent in the treaty, while others were in the failure to implement; 
Bennett emphasised that ‘Clemenceau had been persuaded to drop his demand to annex 
the west bank of the Rhine in exchange for an Anglo-American guarantee of French 
security, but the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the guarantee left France 
without the security of either the guarantee or a frontier along the Rhine.’56 The Rhineland 
area between the River Rhine and the German western borders with France and Belgium, 
was occupied by the Allies with provisions that a small area near Cologne would be 
evacuated after five years, an area near Coblenz evacuated after ten years and the rest 
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occupied for fifteen years.57 Fortifications within the Rhineland were forbidden in 
perpetuity; and the land on the eastern bank of the Rhine was demilitarised to a distance 
of fifty kilometres. Lloyd George had been determined at Paris that the Rhineland should 
not become an ‘Alsace-Lloraine in reverse’ and create another ongoing problem in the 
heart of Western Europe. 58 
 
The relationship between Britain and France was described by Sharp as there being the 
British dilemma as to whether there ‘should there be an alliance with France in the hope 
of providing France with the stability and confidence to offer generous treatment to 
Germany, or would such an alliance only encourage French intransigence, secure in the 
knowledge of British support.’59 Later in the twentieth century, British diplomats and 
historians could look back on two world wars when Britain and France had been allies 
against Germany, but in the 1920s Britain could look back on one war in that situation, 
and one when France and Germany fought the war of 1870-71 with no British 
involvement. Arthur Ponsonby, emphasised this point in the Commons in June 1925, 
saying that ‘we have got to face the fact that this Pact…means that there can never be a 
dispute between France and Germany, there can never be a recurrence of this thousand-
year-old quarrel between those great peoples, without Great Britain being brought in. The 
attitude we adopted in 1870 and 1871 will be impossible in future.’60 
 
Versailles may have been flawed, but the parties were dealing with a number of very 
difficult problems, and it was not surprising that there were major problems of 
implementation. French attitudes on the importance of reparations from Germany were 
even built into the national budget, which after the war was divided into a budget 
ordinaire for current expenses, a budget extraordinaire for expenses of an exceptional 
nature, and a budget des dépenses récoverables for war pensions, interest on loans and 
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reconstruction costs, which it was assumed would be recovered from reparations.61 
Although it is easy to produce quotes very critical of the French, it is more difficult to get 
below the surface and assess whether British politicians genuinely appreciated the 
problems. The Times appeared to show appreciation in wartime and peace, and The 
Economist’s editorials in London were also not unsympathetic to the French point of 
view.                             
                            
The discussions on the Channel Tunnel exemplified the suspicions of the Anglo-French 
relationship. The project had been talked about for over a hundred years, and in 1919 
there was pressure in France to progress the project for strategic and commercial reasons.  
Lloyd George was initially enthusiastic, but nothing came from these proposals as the 
opponents in Britain including Hankey ensured that the project was not progressed; the 
most common argument against the project was that a tunnel would compromise British 
national security. In 1922 the rivalry with France was so great that the British air staff 
considered that war with France was the most likely threat to Britain, and the Foreign 
Office argued against the possibility of a tunnel because relations with France ‘never have 
been, are not, and probably never will be sufficiently stable and friendly to justify the 
construction …it is almost certain that we shall have conflicts with France in the future.’62  
 
There were also continuing difficulties between Britain and France in the Middle East; 
for example, France negotiated secretly with Ataturk, and then Poincaré pulled the French 
forces out of Chanak in 1922 leaving the British on their own close to the Turkish forces. 
Ongoing suspicions on issues in the Middle East were clearly illustrated by Barr who, 
writing of Britain’s decision to make Amir Feisal King of Iraq, indicated that Britain’s 
decision to support a man who had just been kicked out of Syria quickly raised hopes of 
self-government elsewhere; as an angry former Secretary-General of Comité de l’asie 
Française reacted, ‘Traitor and perjurer, assassin of French soldiers: this is the man whom 
our British Allies have just raised to the throne.’63 
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While the suspicions continued in many areas of diplomatic contact, the majority of the 
differences continued to relate to Franco-German disputes. The 1923 occupation of the 
Ruhr was not a sudden or surprising event.64 Adamthwaite, commenting on the twenty-
four conferences including Britain and France during three years said that they ‘often met 
without adequate preparation’ and he quoted Nicolson who wrote that the conclusions of 
the conferences ‘were inevitably inconclusive, intangible, specious, superficial and 
unreal.’65 Bell was right when he said that ‘France had one overriding anxiety, security 
against a German danger, which the British thought was exaggerated or unreal. Britain 
had a series of problems which had little to do with Europe, and in which Germany only 
figure as part of the solution.’66  
 
On 11 January 1923 French and Belgian troops occupied the industrial Ruhr, which was 
adjacent to the Rhineland, to seize German industrial output because they believed that 
Germany had not met their commitments on reparations. The area occupied was only 
sixty miles deep and thirty miles wide, but covered eighty per-cent of German coal and 
steel production. However, for France the reparations were still not forthcoming, the 
occupation was costly and the franc was declining in value. The conference in London in 
December 1922 had led to a careful study of the differences between the two countries in 
The Economist on 6 January; there was a full explanation of the British and French 
positions and a balanced editorial in London wrote of the ‘steps we are prepared to take 
in helping to lift from France the nightmare of insecurity, but…we can have no part even 
to the extent of benevolent spectator in course of action which is likely to plunge Europe 
into deeper economic chaos.’67  
 
The Times, in a not unsympathetic editorial of 8 January 1923, also said that ‘the question 
of how best to induce a reluctant debtor to honour her signature has produced a profound 
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difference of judgement between his principal creditors’…but dwelling on the common 
sacrifices of the war, ended by concluding that ‘no political vicissitudes can change these 
symbols of unity, nor any statement destroy them.’68 The occupation of the Ruhr took 
place during the Commons recess; Bonar Law, as the new prime minister, spoke in 
measured tones on the first day of the new session. He said he was disappointed with the 
French attitudes and quoted an anonymous source in Paris saying that ‘many of us who 
are recommending the adoption of the proposal to occupy the Ruhr do not believe that we 
can get any money out of it, but we are satisfied that French public opinion will not accept 
the situation until this has been tried.’69  
 
                   Dutton, in emphasising Chamberlain’s friendship with France, quoted him in the 
Commons in July 1924 saying that: ‘we would make the maintenance of the Entente with 
France the cardinal object of our policy.’70 However, a closer look at Hansard shows that 
Chamberlain, speaking from the opposition front bench regarding the meeting between 
the prime ministers at Chequers, actually spoke of three underlying principles for a future 
Conservative government:  
 
                                   we would accept and uphold the Versailles Treaty and its subsidiary or 
collateral Treaties…we would make the maintenance of the Entente with 
France the cardinal object of our policy…and...we should make the 
observance by Germany of her obligations a not less cardinal feature of our 
policy in foreign affairs, and in return, if Germany frankly accepted and 
loyally fulfilled the obligations, as now presented, we should be prepared to 
respect the integrity of Germany and to welcome her back into the comity of 
nations.’71 
  
Herriot was still saying to MacDonald, at that Chequers meeting, that ‘common efforts, 
sacrifices, deaths in war, all that will have been useless if Germany can once more have 
recourse to violence…can we not try to find a formula of guaranteeing against a danger 
of such a sort.’ 72  The various cabinet debates on policies towards France during these 
years, would have been very conscious of views like Herriot’s, but their thoughts should 
have been consistent with that Curzon document of December 1921, when his argument 
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was that any formal alliance between Britain and France was unacceptable to Britain apart 
from ‘a narrowly defined and easily intelligible object, such as the defence of the eastern 
frontier of France.’ Curzon had added that, in view of the mistrust between the two 
countries, there would be a fear ‘that a treaty of alliance with France may drag us into a 
war in which direct British interests are not involved.’73 It was that narrowly defined 
commitment, that was acceptable to Chamberlain at Locarno, and which was consistent 
with the earlier analysis by Curzon.  
 
 
 
Germany : Britain’s Wartime Enemy  
 
While France had been both a nation state and an enemy of Britain for centuries, Germany 
had only become a unitary state in 1871 and there had been no wars involving all the 
European powers since 1815.74 However, in the years before 1914 antagonism developed 
between Britain and Germany; this antagonism was despite the close family, but greatly 
fluctuating, relationships between the German and British descendants of Queen Victoria. 
Not only were Victoria’s mother and husband German, but six of her ten children married 
Germans, and the Kaiser attended the funeral of Edward VII in 1910 and the unveiling of 
the Queen Victoria Memorial in 1911, and his son attended the coronation of George V 
also in 1911. Kennedy asked the key question, ‘why was it that the British and German 
peoples, who had never fought each other and whose traditions of political co-operation 
were reinforced by dynastic, cultural, religious and economic ties, drifted steadily apart 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?’75 
 
The growing antagonism between Britain and Germany had three main strands: these 
being industrial, diplomatic and colonial, and military especially naval. Since 1871 
Germany had developed dramatically as an industrial power both in its own right, and in 
comparison with Britain, and particularly in military-related industries such as chemicals, 
engineering and steel. In 1871 Germany’s steel output was half that of Britain, but by 
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1914 it was twice the size of Britain. The rapidly rising population of Germany can also 
be seen in the comparison with Britain; from 1891 to 1911 Germany increased from 49 
million to 65 million and Britain from 38 million to 45 million, with the effects of a 
changing birth rate and net migration.76 On the diplomatic and colonial front, direct 
colonial rivalry with Germany was limited, because of Germany’s late and relatively low-
key entry into the colonial race; however, between 1884 and 1914 Germany had belatedly 
secured various possessions in Africa and the Pacific,77 had antagonised British opinion 
by support for the Boers in the South African War, and had established German 
concessions in China, in a country where Britain’s informal empire accounted for 
considerable British exports.78 
 
The main diplomatic incidents during the Edwardian years, where France and Germany, 
and to some extent Britain were involved, were with regard to Morocco.79  In the Entente 
Cordiale in 1904 Britain had recognised Morocco as being within France’s sphere of 
influence, but between 1905 and 1912 there were three periods of high international 
tension with Germany about influence in Morocco; initially leading to the Algeciras 
Conference in January 1906, then in 1908 the Franco-German Casablanca dispute, and 
particularly in 1911 with the Agadir Crisis when the German naval gunboat Panther was 
dispatched to the area, before the Treaty of Fez confirmed Morocco as a French 
protectorate. Although it was France involved in the disputes with Germany, it had a 
strong effect on British concerns and it was in the aftermath of Agadir that Lloyd George, 
speaking at the Mansion House dinner, ventured with Asquith’s agreement into 
international affairs. The speech was significant partly because of Lloyd George’s 
Gladstonian and ‘pro-Boer’ past and partly because of the Kaiser’s vigorous protest about 
the speech; Lloyd George had said, following stressing the importance to Britain of world 
peace: 
 
but if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be 
preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won 
                                                 
76 Ibid.  p.292. 
77 Most importantly, Tanganyika, South West Africa, Cameroun and Togoland in Africa, and German 
New Guinea, Nauru, German Samoa and the Marshall Islands in the Pacific. 
78 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p.166. 
79 T.G. Otte The Foreign Office Mind : the Making of British Foreign Policy 1865-1914 (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) refers to British attitudes at this time, when commenting that ‘there 
was a clear understanding of the nexus between the constellation among the powers in Europe, and 
Britain’s ability to defend her overseas interests’ p.399. 
145 
 
by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated, 
where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the 
Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a 
humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.80  
 
Lloyd George had in fact been on a lengthy visit to Germany in August 1908, just after 
his appointment as chancellor of the exchequer; his itinerary was predominantly 
concerned with learning, as a Liberal politician, about the well-established German 
policies on social reform, but Morgan emphasised that he also had discussions with the 
German vice-chancellor Hollweg and therefore came into direct contact with the  
‘aggressive, intransigent outlook of the Prussian Junkers and the military caste.’81  
 
The growing military competition between Britain and Germany was seen most clearly 
in the naval rivalry where Britain saw itself as the undoubted world power; the rivalry 
was particularly shown in the building and operation of the new class of Dreadnought 
battleships with new turbine engines and ten twelve-inch guns. They were named after 
the first of these British battleships which was launched in 1906 and which started the 
naval arms race. Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz followed suit with new legislation in 
1908 with a target of four new Dreadnought battleships or battle cruisers a year, which 
then led to demands in Britain for eight Dreadnoughts a year within the 1909 naval 
estimates. 
 
Kennedy added the further issues of the relative proximity of Germany, compared not 
with France but with the other more distant growing powers of the United States and 
Japan, and the ideological differences seen in Britain between ‘liberal’ England and 
‘reactionary’ Prussia. He concluded that:  
 
         the Anglo-German antagonism basically arose from the fact that in the half-
century under scrutiny Germany grew out of its position as a cluster of 
insignificant states under insignificant princelings; and…that this growth 
gradually threatened to infringe perceived British interest, and that these 
economic shifts increased the nervousness of British decision-makers already 
concerned about saving the Empire.82  
 
                                                 
80 Mansion House speech, 21 July 1911. 
81 Kenneth O. Morgan Ages of Reform : Dawns and Downfalls of the British Left (London : Tauris, 2011) 
p. 81. 
82 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p.466. 
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Despite the growing antagonisms, there were many continuing close links between 
Britain and Germany. Bostridge recently emphasised that until the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, and the arrival of Jews from Eastern Europe, Germans had formed 
the largest foreign community in Britain.83 However, with the background of the 
antagonisms before 1914, and the costs in both human and economic terms of the war 
itself, feelings towards anything German were extreme between 1914 and 1918. Prince 
Louis of Battenberg, of German-Polish ancestry, but a British citizen since childhood, 
and who had risen to be first sea lord from 1912 to 1914, had to resign after a press 
campaign concentrating on his Germanic background. In 1917 following rising anti-
German feeling, the British royal family replaced the historic German name of Saxe-
Coburg-Gotha with the very British ‘Windsor’, and the Battenberg family finally agreed 
to renounce their German titles and adopted the surname of ‘Mountbatten.’84 
 
Germany was, not surprisingly, the centre of the wrath of British politicians in the 1918 
election; Germany had been the main enemy throughout the war, except for the Turks at 
the time of Gallipoli. The calls during the election to ‘hang the Kaiser’ and ‘make 
Germany pay’ were not limited to the more extreme candidates. In the debate on the 
King’s Speech, in February 1919, the message to Lloyd George was clear. Brigadier 
General Page Croft, who was elected as a ‘anti-German Protectionist’ MP in 1910, could 
be expected to speak his mind from the coalition benches, and he asked for very clear 
indications of government policies upon the indemnities, the punishment of the criminals 
responsible for the war, the treatment of all enemy aliens, and the safeguarding of the 
interests of the Dominions in the conquered German colonies.85 However, Ronald 
McNeill, a more mainstream government MP, who was to be under-secretary at the 
Foreign Office under Curzon and Chamberlain, talked of the destruction by Germans of 
the famous library at Louvain in Belgium, and even suggested that the splendid library at 
Leipzig should be taken from Germany to make good the loss at Louvain.86  
 
                                                 
83 German numbers stood at approximately 47,000 in 1914. Germans were the largest body of foreign 
students at Oxford University with thirty-four Germans matriculating in 1913-14 compared with four 
Frenchmen, and the majority of honorary doctorates in 1914 were for Germans or Austrians. Mark 
Bostridge, The Fateful Year: England 1914 (London: Penguin, 2014), pp.123, 124. 
84
 Another example was the forced resignation of Lord Haldane, from the cabinet in 1915, because of 
alleged German sympathies; he had led an unsuccessful diplomatic mission to Germany in 1912. 
85 Hansard, Volume 112, 11 February 1919, column 85. 
86 Ibid. column 136.   
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Some thinking during and after the war did show greater ambivalence in British attitudes 
towards Germany; in a submission to the cabinet in 1916 General Robertson argued that 
‘if the balance of power in Europe is to be maintained it follows that the existence of a 
strong Central European Power is essential, and that such a state must be Teutonic, as a 
Slav nation…would always lean towards Russia…it would be in the interests of the 
British Empire to leave Germany reasonably strong on land, but to weaken her at sea.’87 
Some British politicians realised that they did not need to like the Germans in order to be 
very concerned about the government of Germany. Churchill sat in the Commons with 
Page Croft and McNeill, but had a very different view of the support that should be given 
to Germany. Churchill’s antipathy to the new Bolshevik regime in Russia, and his 
attempts to support the White Russian armies, were apparently encouraged by a genuine 
fear that Germany could be heading in the same direction. Writing to Lloyd George in 
March 1920 he said that ‘Russia has gone into ruin. But Germany may perhaps be 
saved…You ought to tell France that we will make a defensive alliance with her against 
Germany, if and only if she alters her treatment of Germany…you should send a great 
man to Berlin to help consolidate the anti-Sparticist anti-Ludendorff elements into a 
strong left centre block.’88 Sharp said that ‘British policies towards Germany in the early 
post-war years veered between exasperation at its failure to execute the terms of the treaty 
and suspicions that some of the treaty clauses were impractical, if not actually wrong, and 
worse still, that Britain might be at fault.’89   
 
The attitudes of the German people themselves in 1919 were against the background that 
Germany had not been invaded during the war, and that most Germans found it difficult 
to believe that they had actually lost the war. Only the Rhineland was occupied after the 
war, which was very different from the unconditional surrender and the four-power 
occupation of Germany in 1945. Doerr pointed out that Germany lost 13% of its land area 
as a result of Versailles, and 10% of its population.90 There was also no ‘Hitler’ to blame 
                                                 
87 Staff memo from General Robertson to the cabinet, 31 August 1916, NA/CAB 41/18/10. 
88
 Letter from Churchill to Lloyd George, 24 March 1920, cited in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill 
(London: Heinemann, 1975), Volume IV, p.384. Churchill was the most outspoken voice on such matters, 
but Milner was saying much earlier in December 1918 that the most certain way of ‘Bolshevising 
Germany would be to put an excessive burden on her.’ NA/CAB 23/42 for 24 December 1918.  
89 Sharp Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policies in the 1920s, p.80; he also points out, p.79, 
the continuity of personnel in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the German state in general, in Weimar 
Republic.   
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for the defeat, and there were immediate revolutionary pressures which threatened the 
establishment of a democratic state. Clark described the chaotic state of Germany in 1919 
including the general strike and bitter internal fighting in Berlin in March 1919 when 
15,000 armed Communists and fellow travellers seized control of police stations and rail 
terminals, and the authorities led by the Social Democrats brought in 40,000 government 
and Freikorps troops, with twelve hundred people dead before the fighting ended.91 
 
It was against this background that the Weimar Republic was formally established in 
August 1919, after the national humiliation when the treaty had been imposed on the 
German representatives at Versailles. Although British foreign policies were not directly 
affected by the internal problems of the Weimar Republic, an understanding of those 
problems is relevant to how Germany was perceived in Britain. Looking at the effects of 
Versailles, Hinden wrote that it suited all shades of political opinion to be obstructive 
about the execution of the terms: 
 
Hence the effective avoidance of the clauses demanding action against the 
Kaiser and war criminals, the defiant German propaganda to disprove the 
charges of war guilt, the temporising of German governments over the demands 
to dismantle the paramilitary organisations, and the outright hostility shown 
towards the various Allied control commissions watching over the 
implementation of the peace times.92 
 
Another German historian, Peukert, referred to the nationalistic frenzy of 1914, the harsh 
treatment that Germany had itself imposed on Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk , the 
terms of the armistice conditions of November 1918 and the subsequent Treaty at 
Versailles, and finally that the Allies in Paris were also affected by wars continuing in 
Russia, Turkey and elsewhere.93 Peukert’s view was that the substantive conditions 
imposed by the peace settlement were severe, but they were bearable, and on the eastern 
borders comments that ‘the drawing of the boundaries with Poland caused particular 
indignation among Germans. Given the mixed national pattern of settlement over a wide 
                                                 
91 Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600-1947 (London: Allen Lane, 
2006), p.626. The new republic had an inheritance from the war of 2 million Germans killed, 4.2 million 
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Germany after the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.275. 
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area of contiguous territory, any German-Polish frontier was bound to leave a sizeable 
minority on the wrong side, but whereas this fact had worked in the Germans’ favour 
under the frontiers of 1815 to 1918, this time the Poles were the beneficiaries.’94 Although 
the terms at Versailles were not surprising, after the nature of the war and the harsh 
German terms on Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the terms were seen as 
unacceptable to nearly all German citizens. 
 
D’Abernon saw the defects of Versailles under three headings: that it was imposed on 
Germany under duress; that it based Germany’s responsibilities for reparations on the 
assertion that Germany was responsible for the war; and finally that large units in central 
Europe were broken into a number of smaller states.95 When D’Abernon presented his 
credentials to the German President Ebert in July 1920, he commented that the situation 
which faced the different governments was one of ‘unexampled difficulty’ and Ebert 
himself also used this specific expression in his reply.96 Writing in 1929, D’Abernon 
argued that there had been two alternatives for Britain after Versailles:  
 
      Either Germany could be regarded as a permanent enemy, against whom the 
forces which were allied in the Great War must be kept ranged in serried ranks, 
armed cap-à-pie, and maintained in wakeful suspicion by a continuance of war 
propaganda and war recrimination, or an attempt had to be made to include 
Germany in the Western European group. This could only be achieved by 
diminishing mutual suspicion between ex-enemies through the establishment 
of efficient safeguards for reciprocal security.97  
 
Although the new republic had a sympathetic friend in the British Ambassador, it could 
not expect much sympathy from the different British governments which were still living 
with the consequences of the war, together with other domestic and international 
problems. Therefore, British politicians’ attitudes to Germany in this period are likely to 
be seen in degrees of hostility, as opposed to the complexity of the ‘love-hate’ relationship 
with France. The greatest sympathy for Germany arose from the rigid anti-German 
attitude of French politicians like Clemenceau and Poincaré.  Moreover, unlike the more 
regular contact of the British politicians with their French counterparts, direct contact 
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95 D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, Volume I, p.25. 
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with German politicians was much more limited, with Germany not being represented at 
most international conferences and not being a member of the League until 1926.98  
                 
A detailed study of D’Abernon’s contemporary diaries, and his later comments in 1929, 
give a good feel to the problems present in diplomatic circles from 1920 to 1926, whether 
or not his influence in Berlin or in London was as great as he suggested. He had regular 
diplomatic and social access to all the major figures in the Weimar Republic and when he 
visited England he recorded his discussions with the prime minister of the day; 
commenting on Curzon’s death, he happens to mention that they were schoolboys 
together at Eton. The main impressions of his accounts are to reinforce both the 
difficulties of the problems, and the extreme antagonism between France and Germany. 
In discussing the Ruhr invasion, he stated that the French had a mixture of reasons for the 
action including the punishment of Germany for failure to pay reparations, the seeking of 
the best way of getting reparations paid, and the belief that force was the only way of 
ensuring advantage in military and economic spheres, with the only safe frontier being 
the Rhine.99 Regarding German attitudes, he felt that the German government appreciated 
that England had a more reasonable attitude regarding reparations, and were also more 
helpful regarding Upper Silesia, if both were compared with France.   
 
There are a number of conclusions relevant for the assessment of British foreign policies 
from the factors affecting British relationships with Germany. British politicians of the 
post-war era grew up, or their careers developed, in a pre-war era in which there was 
growing rivalry and antagonism with Germany. After the war, the direct political contacts 
between British and German politicians were limited by the inheritance of war, the many 
changes in the Weimar governments, Germany’s exclusion from the League and other 
diplomatic conferences, and with British priorities being elsewhere. British attitudes to 
the Weimar Republic were not particularly hostile, but there was reaction to the extreme 
views of French politicians, concern that Germany could suffer from the instability which 
                                                 
98 Germany’s deep seated suspicion of the League, arising from the terms of Versailles, was also 
consistent with attempted German friendship with Russia. 
99 D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, Volume 2, p.1. Writing in retrospect he says that the German 
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had led to revolution in Russia, and of course Britain was still dealing with the very recent 
enemy. 
 
 
 
 
Poland within Eastern Europe  
 
The choice of Poland is partly because of its size and significance within the new or re-
established nations of Eastern Europe, but also because one of the major criticisms of 
Locarno has always been the failure of Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann to deal with 
the German/Polish border issues.  There were over twenty million people who could claim 
to be of Polish extraction in Eastern Europe in 1919, and there were great expectations 
for the Polish leaders who travelled to Paris. The old Polish state had disappeared as long 
ago as 1795, and by an additional treaty in 1798 the major powers had even decided to 
abolish the very name of Poland. The Polish territories and population had been spread 
between the Russian, Austrian and German Empires and were greatly affected by the war, 
both by the military casualties in the different imperial armies, but also in that all the 
different main belligerents accepted the concept of some form of independent Poland, and 
therefore tried to influence that situation by supporting different factions within the Polish 
political establishment. 100  
 
After the armistice on 11 November, Jozef Pilsudski had been declared head of state of a 
new Polish Republic just three days later, but Davies emphasized that at that date there 
were ‘no frontiers, no established territory, no government, no constitution, and no 
international recognition.’101  The inclusion by President Wilson of a pledge regarding 
Poland as one of his ‘Fourteen Points’ in January 1918, was specific in proposing ‘a 
united, independent, and autonomous Poland, with free, unrestricted access to the sea.’ 
This ensured that this was firmly on the agenda in Paris, and that the discussions about 
Poland were about the details of an independent Poland and its boundaries, and not about 
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the principles of independence and access to the sea. Polish factions all agreed that access 
to the Baltic was essential; the important city of Danzig was located at the mouth of the 
Vistula River and while the population of the city was ninety per-cent German, the 
surrounding rural land was overwhelmingly Polish. Goldstein indicated that the Eastern 
European settlement was dominated by the principles of the New Europe; it was presumed 
that frontiers as closely as possible on ethnic lines would help assure a stable future.102 
 
In Paris the different Polish factions looked to both Wilson and Clemenceau for support. 
Wilson was committed by his clear statement in the Fourteen Points and this was 
supported by the arguments for self-determination, the number of Polish sympathizers in 
his delegation and the large number of Polish-American voters. Clemenceau’s support for 
Poland was also clear, as he saw a new strong Polish state as a significant balance to 
Germany in Eastern Europe. The Poles did not look to Britain for sympathy; the pattern 
at Paris was for Lloyd George to be much more sympathetic to German concerns, for 
example on not allocating Danzig to Poland and in the discussions about the allocation of 
land in Silesia.103 British attitudes can be argued to have been motivated by Britain 
wishing Germany to have the resources to ensure payment of reparations, and more 
generally for Britain to give support for the new democratic German republic and for 
stability in Central Europe. MacMillan in analysing the discussions about East Galicia in 
Paris emphasizes Lloyd George’s concern about Poland’s attempt to take the territory, 
and quotes Lloyd George’s statement that ‘if they let Poland get away with it, they would 
have yet another Alsace-Lorraine’ in Eastern Europe.104  
 
Most of the Polish territory and the new frontiers were established by force of arms by 
the Poles themselves, quite separate from the diplomatic negotiations in Paris. The 
diplomats were only responsible for the Polish western borders with Germany, with the 
award of West Prussia and the ‘Polish Corridor’ to Poland, the decision to make Danzig 
a free city, the commitments to plebiscites in East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and the 
                                                 
102 Erik Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning and the Paris Peace 
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decision to divide the Cieszyn in July 1920. 105 The Polish/Soviet war which began in 
February 1919 eventually ended in the Treaty of Riga in March 1921; this established an 
eastern border for Poland considerably further east of the ‘Curzon Line’ discussed in 
Paris, and brought millions of Ukrainians, Belarussians and non-Polish Jews within the 
new Polish state.106  
 
Davies estimated that the Polish gains in territory, predominantly on its Eastern borders, 
meant that only two thirds of the inhabitants of the new Polish state had Polish as their 
first language, with 15% being Ukrainian, 9% Jews, 5% Byelorussians, and 2% Germans. 
The Germans were mainly prosperous middle classes in the Western provinces; the 
Ukrainians and Byelorussians were in the Eastern provinces and overwhelmingly the poor 
peasants.107 It was only in March 1923 that the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, 
acting as the executive organ of the Allied powers, finally recognised Poland’s Eastern 
frontiers. 
 
Other local conflicts in Eastern Europe, including one between Poland and Lithuania, left 
Poland intact, but isolated without obvious allies in the region. Both Weimar Germany 
and Soviet Russia resented Poland’s resurgence; the capture of Wilno left a very resentful 
Lithuania, and Poland’s traditional sympathy with the defeated Hungary inhibited both 
the development of links with Romania and any Polish adherence to France’s ‘Little 
Entente.’108 This diplomatic isolation was at same time as domestically ‘there were six 
different currencies in circulation; five regions maintained separate administrations; there 
were four languages of command in the Army; three legal codes; and two incompatible 
railway gauges.’109 
 
            During the discussions of the Upper Silesian referendum in 1921, France was seen to 
support Polish interpretations of the results, with Britain generally being supportive of 
German concerns. The Franco-Polish Treaty of February 1921 established a formal 
                                                 
105  In August 1918 Balfour had suggested that they ‘leave the difficult question of the western frontier of 
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relationship between the two countries in respect of ‘Political, Economic and Military 
Co-operation.’ According to D’Abernon, in personal discussions he had with the prime 
minister in March 1921, Lloyd George said of the discussions in Paris that it was ‘entirely 
due to England that Germany has a chance of getting the whole or part of Upper Silesia. 
President Wilson was anxious to give the whole country to Poland, so were the French: 
the English were alone in resisting.’110 
 
            Lloyd George’s attitude to Poland in 1919 and 1920 was examined by Davies as long ago 
as 1971, against a background of historical arguments ranging from that Lloyd George 
was attempting to save Poland from the Russian Bolsheviks, to alternatively that he was 
hostile to Poland and was always trying to limit Poland’s ambitions. Davies went into 
great detail on the issues, but he did put this matter into context by pointing out that the 
Lloyd George file on Poland for the eighteen months contained only two documents; 
moreover, Poland only appeared once in the cabinet minutes between January and June 
1920, and that was only in context of trade links with Russia. 111 Davies summarises the 
Polish views on Lloyd George when he wrote that:  
 
            There can be few countries in which Lloyd George was more heartily 
vilified than Poland. His actions at the Paris Peace Conference were 
deplored; his supposed opinions about the Poles being ‘children who gave 
trouble’, his confession that he had never heard of Cieszyn, the lèse-majesté 
of his remarks about Paderewski, were widely reported in Poland, where, it 
is no exaggeration to say, Lloyd George was in 1919-20 usually regarded 
as a public enemy.112  
 
            
            There was clearly an extremely volatile situation in Eastern Europe following the 
disintegration of the three imperial empires, the decisions at Versailles, the military 
fluctuations of the Russian civil war and the establishment of the new Polish state. In 
looking at the different British views, there was a general policy of not getting involved 
in Eastern Europe, especially after Churchill’s policies towards Russia. It was difficult to 
conclude what was ‘in Britain’s interest’ with the developments in Eastern Europe, 
especially with the concerns about the stability of democratic governments in Germany, 
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and there was no discussion in Britain as to what would be in the interest of Poland itself. 
The key decision of the ‘Ten Year Rule’ in August 1919, assumed no European war in 
the next ten years, and there was certainly no reference or thought about Eastern Europe 
or Poland.113 
 
The discussions about Poland in Paris illustrated the problems of moving from large 
multi-ethnic empires to smaller national states which have to establish frontiers and 
accommodate minorities. The importance of academics in general, and historians in 
particular, to these diplomatic negotiations were outlined by Goldstein; this included the 
academics in the New Europe group during the war, the most prominent of whom was R. 
Seton-Watson, with his particular interest in minority populations in the Habsburg 
Empire.114 Between the Upper Silesian plebiscite in 1921, and the discussions leading to 
Locarno in 1925, Poland did not feature prominently in British foreign policy issues. 
Curzon commented in his presentation to the Imperial Conference in 1923 that ‘the Polish 
question, which took up a good deal of my time in 1921, has ceased to be acute.’115 
Goldstein summarised Britain’s attitude to Eastern Europe when he wrote that Britain 
was ‘far less concerned about Eastern Europe, where stability was the key. Britain 
preferred Eastern Europe to remain stable and thereby avoid causing consequential 
disturbances to the Western European balance.’116 
 
            Chamberlain’s famous words about Poland and the British grenadier were written in a 
private letter, about policy towards France, to Lord Crewe the British ambassador in Paris 
in February 1925, when he said that 
 
            a form of guarantee which is so general that we undertake exactly the same 
obligations in defence, shall I say of the Polish corridor (for which no 
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British Government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British 
Grenadier) as we extend to those international arrangements or conditions 
on which, as our history shows, our national existence depends, is a 
guarantee so wide and general that it carries no conviction whatever and 
gives no sense of security to those who are concerned in our action.117  
 
Poland has been seen as the major loser at Locarno in that Germany made no movement 
towards accepting its eastern borders which had been imposed at Versailles, that France’s 
eastern guarantees now had to be seen in the context of the Locarno agreements and that 
Britain was not prepared to get involved in Eastern Europe. Dutton quoted personal 
correspondence from Chamberlain in December 1925 saying that ‘with time and patience 
we might yet see some similar settlement as Locarno mutatis mutandis for the countries 
of Central Europe’, but that ‘the initiative must come from themselves.’118 Opening the 
Commons debate on the Locarno Agreements on 18 November 1925, Chamberlain 
identified criticisms that the agreements at Locarno had not taken steps towards general 
disarmament, that they had not secured Russia’s membership of the League and that they 
had not included the Dominions. However, neither he, nor his critics, emphasised the 
position of Poland; in fact, Chamberlain went out of his way to emphasise that, contrary 
to any speculation to that effect in Locarno, the Polish government had not been a major 
obstacle to the agreements, and that any such stories were not correct and that ‘some 
injustice was done to Poland and the distinguished representative of Poland in that 
conference’ in this respect. 119  
 
Any analysis of Poland during these years shows the complexities of the Polish situation, 
with its many antagonistic neighbours and newly defined borders, and it is not surprising 
that Britain was anxious not to get involved. It was reasonable for Chamberlain to decide 
not to include German-Polish border issues in the Locarno discussions, because they 
would have been impossible to solve at that time. This would have been a positive reason 
for this type of inaction, rather than Britain’s unwillingness to get involved in attempts to 
find solutions.            
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118 Dutton, Austen Chamberlain, p.260.  
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The examples of France, Germany and Poland show the difficulties that Britain and the 
other powers faced in Europe in the years after Versailles.  Franco-German problems 
were the most immediate, and 1923 started with the further complication of the French 
occupation of the Ruhr. In the next chapter, a chronological study of events becomes more 
appropriate in the run-up to the London and Locarno Conferences. 
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   Chapter Six: The European Road to Locarno: 1923-1925 
 
Events in 1923 and 1924 eventually led to the Treaties of Locarno, also known as the 
‘Locarno Pact,’ which were formally signed in London on 1 December 1925. The treaties, 
which could be described as the four treaties, or the seven treaties, were: 
 
• A treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German and the Belgian-German   
frontiers, with Britain and Italy as guarantors; 
• German-Belgian and German-French arbitration treaties;  
• German-Czechoslovak and German-Polish arbitration treaties; 
• Treaties of mutual assistance, in the event of German aggression, between France    
and Poland, and between France and Czechoslovakia. 
 
The contemporary euphoria about the treaties was excessive, but the diplomatic situation 
had greatly improved compared with the situation at the fall of Lloyd George in October 
1922, or at most times during 1923, where any assessment would indicate a clear 
deterioration since Versailles. 1923 had seen the French-led occupation of the Ruhr, the 
German hyper-inflation and consequent unemployment, and the extremist political threats 
to the Weimar Republic. However, later in 1923, there were indications of possible 
recovery and stability, with Stresemann’s economic and political actions in Germany, and 
the growing diplomatic effort that was going to lead to the Dawes Report and the London 
Conference in 1924. The statesmen then met under the auspices of the League in Geneva 
in September, and Macdonald played a leading role in drafting the Protocol; the election, 
however, brought Baldwin back to power, and his government was not going to support 
the Protocol, even if a final decision was not taken until the spring of 1925. 
 
In this chapter, the chronology of events is more relevant, during the two years from the 
difficulties of 1923 through to the Locarno Conference in October 1925. The analysis of 
the problems of the Anglo-French relationship, and the various views expressed in the 
Commons, shows the context of the achievements at both the London and the Locarno 
Conferences. After looking at the details of Locarno, there is some further reference to 
historiography and to why Locarno should be seen positively when viewed from the 
circumstances of 1925.  
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1923: A Turning Point? 
    
The year of 1923 marked both the nadir of the problems in Western Europe and also, in 
retrospect, showed the first signs of possible optimism, which can then be traced through 
to the success of the London and Locarno Conferences. The centre of both the pessimism, 
and at the end of the year, possible optimism, was in Germany. Attempts to resolve the 
post-Versailles issues, particularly on German reparations, had not been successful during 
the Lloyd George government, despite all the diplomatic effort. The three years from the 
fall of Lloyd George in October 1922 to Locarno involved four different British 
governments. Domestically, 1923 was a year when politicians were getting used to both 
a return to traditional party politics after the wartime and peacetime coalitions, and to the 
growth of the Labour Party in the elections of November 1922 and December 1923. To 
assess the temperature of the political feeling towards foreign affairs, just before and 
during 1923, it is helpful to look in detail at the debate in the Commons on the King’s 
speech in November 1922, and to a further debate on a second King’s speech in February 
1923.1 The analysis gives a wide view of feelings in the Commons, with the lengthy 
debates before and after the Ruhr invasion in January 1923. 
 
The most significant theme from the debate in November 1922 was the concentration on 
the domestic problems of unemployment and the possible solutions. Of the six days 
allocated for debate, two days were allocated to issues concerning unemployment, but 
even on the day allocated to foreign policy, the linkages to unemployment were strong. 
To take examples from each of the main parties, William Pringle, a Liberal but a fierce 
critic of Lloyd George, said that ‘if the Treaty of Versailles in respect of reparation is not 
fundamentally revised, there will be no economic recovery of Europe, there will be no 
revival of trade in this country, and there will be no diminution of unemployment.’2 
Aubrey Herbert, a back-bench Conservative, criticised policy in the Middle East and 
emphasised that the Allies had  ‘partitioned the whole of the Ottoman Empire…and the 
Ottoman Empire was an economic unit…when you divide economic units you destroy 
                                                 
1 There was a King’s speech for the first session of the 32nd Parliament and a full six-day debate, in 
November 1922; this session was adjourned on 15 December and a new King’s speech for a second 
session led to a further six-day debate from 13 February, which was after the occupation of the Ruhr. 
2 Hansard, Volume 159, 23 November 1922, column 150.  Asquithian Liberal MP for Penistone, 
Yorkshire.  
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the possibility of economic life.’3 Edmund Morel, for Labour, said that reparations had 
destroyed trade, and that ‘apart from restoration of the devastated areas in France, upon 
which we are all agreed, we ought to wipe out reparations altogether as a mere cash 
transaction.’4  
 
There was therefore a heavy concentration on the difficulties of unemployment; Pringle 
had referred to the new depression and he emphasised that the current rate of 
unemployment was about 15% compared with a pre-war average of 5%; he talked of the 
burdens of war aggravated by all the failures, and follies and blunders of the peace. During 
discussions on foreign policy issues, there was wide support for the process with Greece 
and Turkey that would lead to the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, considerable debate 
about links with Russia raised by Labour MPs who saw this as both politically important 
but also as possible help to the unemployment situation, and then back to the economy 
and unemployment including criticisms of reparations along the lines that reparations 
were in practice self-defeating for Britain’s economy. The unemployment levels in these 
years may not seem unreasonable in retrospect, especially compared with the levels that 
were to follow in the 1930s, but contemporary views were very critical, bearing in mind 
both the comparison with the pre-war levels, and the expectations raised by the sacrifices 
in the war. 
 
The problems about German reparations had not been resolved during 1922, despite much 
effort, including attempts at the Genoa Conference. Poincaré as France’s prime minister 
had then appeared to be looking for the next occasion when Germany failed to make a 
reparations payment, and this situation arose on 26 December 1922, when the Reparations 
Commission resolved by three to one, with Britain dissenting, that Germany had not made 
required deliveries of timber. Germany was therefore technically in default and subject to 
sanctions under the terms of Versailles, but the matter had to be referred to the four 
governments, who met in Paris on 2 January. France, Belgium and Italy accepted the 
Commission’s report and agreed with France’s proposal to occupy the Ruhr which went 
ahead on 11 January; the majority of troops were French, but with some Belgian troops 
and some Italian technical support. Bonar Law voted against the proposal in Paris, and he 
                                                 
3 Hansard, Volume 159, 23 November 1922, column 189. Conservative MP for Yeovil. 
4 Ibid. column 221. As Labour candidate, Morel had just defeated Churchill for one of two seats in 
Dundee. 
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disassociated Britain from the occupation. To occupy the Ruhr, the French and Belgians 
moved their troops through, or from, the Rhineland which was the area, under the terms 
of Versailles, where Germany was ‘forbidden to maintain or construct any fortification 
either on the left bank of the Rhine, or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty 
kilometres to the east of the Rhine.’ It was this arrangement, linked to the proposed, but 
unfulfilled, United States and British guarantees to France, which had persuaded France 
to compromise in 1919 rather than press for an independent Rhineland state.  
 
The Ruhr Crisis has been considered in depth in a number of modern secondary sources; 
for example, it is arguable that Poincaré and the French Government were not as 
intransigent as traditionally seen, especially in the months up to September 1923,5 or that 
the whole episode did irreparable damage to the new Weimar Republic.6 However, in the 
context of this thesis,  these considerations only re-emphasise the difficulties of the 
European diplomatic climate in 1923, and the achievements in 1924 and 1925.  
 
The Commons debate in February 1923 was to some extent a repeat of the November 
debate, but the invasion of the Ruhr brought more immediacy to the foreign policy 
discussions. The fourth and fifth days involved critical amendments from the Labour 
Party and the Liberal Party respectively, which the government voted down by 277 to 180 
and then by 305 to 196. It was relatively easy for the opposition parties to put down and 
argue critical amendments, given the gravity of the situation, with the Labour 
amendment7 giving more emphasis on economics and unemployment, and the Liberal 
one8 more on international diplomacy; both of the amendments were critical of the 
Conservative Government, but  much more critical of the French Government. 9 
 
What is more interesting is the government’s arguments against the amendments, given 
the strength of the government’s own feelings against the French action. On the 16 
February Baldwin spoke of a common approach to security and economics but that ‘we 
are more likely to attain those ends by maintaining our friendship with an old ally, in the 
                                                 
5 For example, in arguments in Elspeth O’Riordan ‘British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922-1924’ in 
Diplomacy and Statecraft Volume 15 2/2004 pp. 221-251.  
6 Conan Fischer The Ruhr Crisis 1923-1924 (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003). 
7 Hansard, Volume 160, 16 February 1922, column 495. 
8 Ibid. column 665. 
9 See discussion of those amendments, in chapter two above, on party political differences. 
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hope and belief that the time may come when our services as mediator and helper may be 
possible, and may be effective,’10 and the next day Bonar Law summing up the debate 
said that ‘though we differed from the French, we did not think that either our own 
interests or the interests of the world would be helped by taking up an attitude antagonistic 
of the French.’11 A different view was taken by Smuts at the Imperial Conference in 1923 
when he said that ‘this may be loyalty to France, but it is not loyalty to Europe, or the 
great ideals for which we fought the Great War.’12 
 
While the emphasis in the Commons in the debate on the February King’s Speech was on 
domestic economics and unemployment, concerns which were surely reflected in the 
electorate, the Foreign Office had to deal with the continuing problems in Europe and 
particularly with reparations. At least with the new team of Bonar Law and Curzon there 
was reversion to the normal Foreign Office role, as Bonar Law did not replicate Lloyd 
George’s attempts to lead foreign policies from Downing Street. However, the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices had to manage the situation, while trying to recover from the effects 
of Chanak on relationships with both France and with the Dominions, and the new 
diplomatic crisis in the Ruhr. 13 
 
The Ruhr crisis was just one part of the range of major problems that the German 
governments had to deal with during 1923. D’Abernon saw the years that he was in Berlin 
from 1920 to 1926 split into two distinct periods; 1920 to 1923 being characterised by 
extreme international demands for reparations, repeated conferences, sanctions and short-
lived settlements, giving a picture of confusion and exasperation; and a more positive 
period starting later in 1923.14 D’Abernon’s diary entry on the last day of 1923 brings 
home the breadth of the problems that the Weimar Republic had faced during 1923 when 
he emphasises not only the Ruhr Invasion but the communist rising in Saxony and 
                                                 
10  Hansard, Volume 160, 16 February 1923, column 554. 
11 Hansard, Volume 160, 19 February 1923, column 766. 
12 Minutes of the 5th meeting of the Imperial Conference, 8 October 1923 p.7, NA/CAB 32/2. 
13 The next debate on a King’s Speech was to be in January 1924, Hansard, Volume 169; this was 
unusual because Baldwin had stayed in office after losing his majority in December 1923. The 
Government then fell and Ramsay MacDonald’s minority Labour government was sworn in after the 
debate on the King’s Speech, which started on 15 January, and which concluded with a vote of censure on 
21 January. 
14 Lord D’Abernon, Ambassador of Peace: Pages from the Diary of Viscount D’Abernon (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), Volume 1, p.26. German governments were mainly from the centre-left from 
1919 to 1923 and from the centre-right from 1924 to 1929, but the possible significance of this is a 
different matter. 
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Thuringia, Hitler’s attempted putsch in Bavaria, the unprecedented financial crisis, and 
the separatist movement in the Rhineland.15  
 
The major threats to German democracy from the occupation of the Ruhr, the hyper-
inflation and the activities of extremists on the right and left, are relevant to the analysis 
of British foreign policies, in showing the extremity of the problems facing Germany, and 
therefore Western Europe in general during 1923. The threats were separate in origin, but 
were clearly interlinked and fed off each other. The passive resistance in the Ruhr and the 
imposition of French military rule contributed to a very confrontational situation; apart 
from the economic effects, the Ruhr crisis led to 188,000 people being expelled from their 
homes, and 132 Germans killed.16 Carr indicated that the ‘Ruhr occupation was the last 
straw for the German economy…the new burden of paying wages and salaries to workers 
and officials on strike in the Ruhr proved too great.’17 The political agitation on the 
extreme left and right took advantage of the problems in the Ruhr and in the economy. 
 
The conference of Imperial prime ministers in October 1923, like the previous one in 
1921, is again interesting more for its review of world affairs than for any decisions. 
While Baldwin had replaced Lloyd George as chairman, Curzon continued his key role, 
as the foreign secretary, as the prime reviewer of the international scene. At the opening 
meeting, Baldwin said that the 1921 meeting had ended on a moderately hopeful note but 
that ‘contemplating Europe as we do today and comparing with what we had hoped for 
three or four years ago, we can find little to encourage us in our labours.’18 The 
experienced Smuts, tried to draw an optimistic note, saying that ‘two years ago…the state 
of affairs in Ireland was about as black as anything which exists in Europe today; but the 
difficulties were resolutely grappled with and as a result we have the Irish Free State 
represented here at this great conference.’19 It is doubtful that the British governments 
would have drawn the same optimism from the example of Ireland, and the Irish 
delegation was an uncomfortable member of the imperial conference. 
                                                 
15 Ibid. Volume II, p.290, 31 December 1923.  
16 Paul W. Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (Manchester: University Press, 1998), p.141. 
17 William Carr, A History of Germany 1815-1990 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991), p.273. The 
value of the mark to the American dollar had moved from 4:1 in 1914, to 9:1 at the end of the war, and 
then to 19:1 in January 1922, 18,000:1 in January 1923 and with hyperinflation in 1923 to four billion to 
one by November. Erik Goldstein, The First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925 (London: Pearson 
Longman, 2002), p.83. 
18 Minutes of 1st meeting of the Imperial Conference, 1 October 1923 pp.2 and 7, NA/CAB 32/9. 
19 Ibid. p.10. 
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When Curzon gave his overview of problems, he was positive about the Washington and 
Lausanne Conferences but looking across Europe he felt that with the exception of  
Scandinavia, there was scarcely a single state where there was not some unrest, and where 
British interests were not actively and sometimes perilously involved.20 Speaking just 
after the ending of German passive resistance in the Ruhr, Curzon was scathing both of 
the French, who in their dealing with Britain had an almost chronic lack of loyalty, though 
he admitted their ‘blood is still boiling with the memories of the war’ and of the Germans 
who were ‘burning with an unslaked wrath and thinking of future revenge’ and were 
‘absolute children in diplomacy…they make every conceivable blunder in dealings with 
France.’21 Although Curzon was pleased with the ending of passive resistance he was not 
sure if the parties were any nearer a settlement. At a subsequent meeting it was agreed to 
support an approach to the United States regarding involvement in the mooted ‘Expert 
Committee on Reparations.’22 
 
Nineteen Twenty-Three is unlikely to feature strongly in the historiography of either 
British domestic politics or for the developments in British imperial history. The debt 
agreement with the United States in January was important but initially split the new 
Conservative cabinet, and the significance of the Halibut Treaty between Canada and the 
United States was part of a longer-term evolvement of the Dominions. The positive signs 
for foreign policies in 1923 would have been difficult to appreciate at the time, but in 
retrospect they were the resolution of the issues between Greece and Turkey at 
Lausanne,23 the ending of German passive resistance in the Ruhr and the successful 
establishment of the Rentenmark, both the German examples under the very brief 
premiership of Stresemann. In addition to these developments, following a meeting with 
Baldwin in Paris in September, Poincaré surprisingly agreed in October to that idea of a 
                                                 
20 Minutes of 3rd meeting of the Imperial Conference, 5 October 1923 p.2, NA/CAB 32/9. 
21 Ibid. pp.4 and 26.  
22 Minutes of 13th meeting of the Imperial Conference, 29 October p.6, NA/CAB 32/9. The final meeting 
of the conference was held on 8 November. 
23 Although Lausanne was correctly seen as a diplomatic success, and the conclusion of a major problem 
outstanding from Versailles and Sèvres, it should be recorded that from a Greek point of view it was the 
confirmation of a national disaster for Britain’s wartime ally. Greece had a larger territory in 1923 than 
before 1912, but it was still a bitter settlement for Greece. As a diplomatic achievement, it did not leave 
any obvious  problems except for Cyprus, which was not included in the discussions, and ongoing issues 
regarding the Kurds. 
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committee of economic experts including those from the United States, which was to lead 
to the Dawes Report in 1924.24  
 
 
 
 
1924 : The Dawes Report, and the London and Geneva Conferences:  
 
After all the problems in 1923, the successful London Conference in July and August 
1924, which adopted the Dawes Report, had its origins in that meeting of experts in 
January 1924 which specifically included the United States experts who were officially 
acting in their individual capacities, but were strongly supported informally by 
Washington. The Americans were led by the Chicago banker and former director of the 
budget, General Charles Dawes, who had served in Paris in 1918 on the Military Board 
of Allied Supply and had good contacts amongst the Allies, as well as being appointed a 
Commander of the Legion of Honor. 25 Also on the American team were the Californian 
banker, Henry Robinson, and Owen Young, the Chairman of General Electric, who was 
to play the central role with the ‘Young Plan’ in 1929, in the lead up to the Hague 
Conference. 
 
 Despite the diplomatic isolation of the United States after Versailles, the Americans had 
already shown at the Washington Conference that they were prepared to be fully involved 
on international problems, outside the League, when they thought it was in the interests 
of the United States. After the political and economic in Europe, and especially Germany, 
in 1923, they now felt that it was in the United States’ interest to bring its influence to 
bring economic, and hopefully greater political stability. Therefore in completely 
different circumstances, the Washington Conference, the Dawes Report and the London 
Conference all showed the Americans willingness to take diplomatic initiatives even in a 
period of isolationism.   
 
                                                 
24 But Anne Orde, after studying all the background papers, concludes that ‘Poincaré had done his best to 
limit their field of enquiry’ British Policy and European Reconstruction after the First World War 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.245. 
25 Dawes received the Nobel Peace Prize with Chamberlain in 1925; Briand and Stresemann had to wait 
until 1926. 
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The principles arising out of the Dawes Committee, which led to the ‘Dawes Report’ in 
April, and which were incorporated as the ‘Dawes Plan’ into the agreements at the 
London Conference in August, were a complex mixture of economic and political 
national commitments. In essence, the United States made a large financial loan to 
Germany to assist her recovery and restore confidence; France accepted that it could not 
repeat its military occupation of the Ruhr, and that there should be a programme that 
would lead to the evacuation of French troops by August 1925; and finally there was a 
rescheduling of the previously agreed total of Germany’s reparation payments. 
 
In economic terms, the Dawes Plan set the German reparation payments at one billion 
marks in the first year, and then increasing annually to two and a half billion marks after 
five years. Various mechanisms were proposed and agreed on matters such as how the 
reparations would be collected and paid, and it was agreed that Germany would receive 
loans amounting to eight hundred million marks, mainly from the United States. Detailed 
accounts such as in Steiner and Marquand showed the complexity of the financial 
problems, mainly dealt with by the American and European experts.26 The Dawes Plan 
did have the intended positive effect on the German economy, in respect of confidence, 
the currency and a fall in unemployment. 
 
In diplomatic terms the main challenge was to get France’s acceptance that there must be 
an agreed timetable for its troops to be withdrawn from the Ruhr, and that there must be 
an ongoing acceptance of Germany as an equal, as for example in membership of the 
League, and not as the defeated power at Versailles. The problems were best exemplified 
by the tortuous negotiations that MacDonald, who was both prime-minister and foreign 
secretary, had initially with Poincaré and then with Herriott from May 1924. 27  
 
In the widest political terms, the economic and diplomatic progress made between 
January and August 1924, provided the basis for the signing of the London Agreement. 
These efforts ensured greater stability than had been possible at the Paris Conference in 
                                                 
26 Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp.240-248 and David Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1977), pp.333-351. 
27 Carolyn J. Kitching ‘Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary : the Dual Role of James Ramsey 
MacDonald in 1924’ Review of International Studies Volume 37/3 2011 pp. 1402-22,  correctly 
emphasises MacDonald’s achievements in 1924, which should not be diminished with any domestics 
reputation established after 1931.  
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1919, and provided the basis that made the Locarno Agreements possible, a year later. As 
Schuker emphasised, ‘the political distinctions between the victors and the vanquished in 
the First World War did not disappear at once…but the London Conference marked a 
decisive turning point.’28 The Dawes Plan was a necessary condition for the wider 
diplomatic success in 1925, but it was not a sufficient condition, as much more diplomatic 
work remained to be done. 
 
The analysis by Cohrs emphasised the 1924-1925 Anglo-American context in the longer-
term developments of the twentieth century, and closely links the twin successes of the 
Dawes financial settlement at the London Conference in 1924 and the Locarno diplomatic 
settlement of 1925.29 However, he over-emphasises the American influence in 1925, and 
he does not analyse the change of key diplomatic players between 1924 and 1925, 
particularly Chamberlain for MacDonald and Briand for Herriot. The Dawes Report was 
indeed a necessary condition for diplomatic success in 1925, but it was not a sufficient 
condition. Therefore, Cohrs’ emphasis on the Dawes Report as being the key backcloth 
to Locarno, is not pursued in this thesis; firstly, although he makes a good case for Dawes 
being that necessary pre-condition before Locarno, it does not appear to have overlapped 
with the 1925 diplomatic negotiations, and secondly contemporary thinking appears to 
have been linked much more specifically with the discussions of alternatives to the 
Geneva Protocol. It may also be significant that although Steiner listed Cohrs’ work, she 
did not appear to discuss his arguments. 
 
While the American contribution was therefore vital to the Dawes Report and the London 
Conference, they were not involved a month later at the next international conference in 
Geneva as it was held under the auspices of the League.  Although the resulting Geneva 
Protocol was never ratified, it is nevertheless important because much of the discussion 
on European security during 1925, leading to Locarno, took place against the backcloth 
of the Protocol. MacDonald, as both prime minister and foreign secretary, was one of 
those leaders who agreed to the draft Protocol, which would have committed the countries 
both to a disarmament conference in 1925, and crucially to be bound by a new system of 
                                                 
28 Stephen Schuker The End of French Dominance in Europe (North Carolina : University Press, 1976) 
p.383. 
29 Patrick O. Cohrs, ‘The First Real Peace Settlements after the First World War’, Contemporary 
European History, Volume 12/1, 2003, pp.1-31.   
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arbitration to settle international disputes, in addition to the existing powers and 
procedures of the League. MacDonald was a most unusual figure in the meetings of 
statesmen of the ex-Allies, in that he had been consistently opposed to the Great War. 
MacDonald’s approach in Geneva was in line with the Labour Party general election 
manifesto in 1923 which said that the party stood ‘for a policy of international co-
operation through a strengthened and enlarged League of Nations; the settlement of 
disputes by conciliation and judicial arbitration…and disarmament.’ MacDonald had 
appointed Lord Parmoor as his minister in charge of League affairs; he was a 
distinguished lawyer, a former Conservative MP, and a founder member of the British 
League of Nations Society in 1915. Walters was however very critical of him, writing 
that he ‘was a man of ability, an eminent lawyer, devoted to good causes. But his views 
on foreign affairs and on the working of the League were those of religious pacifism,’ 
and he added that ‘the officials of the Foreign Office, with few exceptions, continued to 
treat the work of the League as having no essential connexion with the practical business 
of their profession.’30  
 
Marquand described in detail MacDonald’s visit to Geneva, and the first speech by a 
British prime minister to the assembly of the League, on 4 September 1924. 31 MacDonald 
emphasised that ‘what was needed was a system of arbitration to remove grievances and 
unmask would-be aggressors, an early but well-prepared disarmament conference and, 
above all, a steady extension of the influence and authority of the League.’ After various 
difficulties, a joint Anglo-French resolution was adopted two days later, and after three 
weeks of detailed negotiations, a draft agreement, designed to prevent aggressive war, 
and known as the Geneva Protocol, was unanimously recommended on 2 October to all 
League members. In view of the later discussions on the difficulties of arbitration, it 
should be clear that MacDonald was up-front on the principle of arbitration, and it was 
not something that just arose in the detailed negotiations.  
 
The provisional agreement on the Protocol was overtaken in Britain by the dissolution of 
parliament and the general election on 29 October, which was won by the Conservative 
Party with a clear overall majority, with Conservatives winning 415 seats, Labour 152 
                                                 
30 F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p.264. 
31 Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald,  pp.352-356. 
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and the Liberals 42. There was also a substantial break from the past at the Foreign Office; 
significantly Baldwin did not reappoint Curzon,32 who had been foreign secretary from 
1919 to 1923 under Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Baldwin himself, and instead 
appointed Chamberlain.33 Apart from being in the Commons, Chamberlain’s appointment 
was important for a number of reasons: it helped to reunite the Conservative party as 
Chamberlain had been the most prominent member of the pro-coalition MPs during the 
last months of the Lloyd George government, Chamberlain also did not have the imperial 
and allegedly Francophobe background of Curzon, and finally he brought to the Foreign 
Office a very experienced politician who could look afresh at long-standing problems. 
 
MacDonald’s commitment to the Protocol was not accepted by the new Conservative 
government who set up a review by the CID; the new committee was chaired by Curzon, 
presumably as some compensation for no longer being foreign secretary. The role of the 
CID was demonstrated in the minutes of 4 December 1924. While it looked at the Protocol 
from all the political and military aspects, it is clear that the most contentious issue was 
that of compulsory arbitration. Curzon summarised the main objections as being the 
probable impartiality and competence of the court, the risks and perils that may be 
involved in this system, the attitude which the Dominions would be expected to take up 
towards it, and finally the unwillingness of both the British and the Dominion parliaments 
to accept the decisions of such a court. He gave recent examples, on which Britain would 
not agree to arbitration, as the position in Egypt, the status of the Sudan, and the 
provisions to be adopted for the security of the Suez Canal.34  Much of 1924 could be 
seen as a period of uncertainty between the crises in Europe in 1923 and what turned out 
to be the achievements at Locarno in 1925. Ironically, the success of the London 
Conference in August and the apparent failure of the Protocol after September 1924 both 
contributed in their different ways to the achievements of 1925. 
                                                 
32 Michael Hughes British Foreign Secretaries in an Uncertain World (London : Routledge, 2005) p.35 
writing about Curzon said ‘it is certainly possible to mount a convincing defence of British foreign policy 
during the years following the Paris Peace Conference, on the grounds that Britain contributed to the 
maintenance of peace in Europe, while simultaneously managing to defend its imperial interests across 
the globe.’ 
33 Ronald McNeill MP was reappointed to the position of under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, 
which he had held from 1922 to 1923; McNeill was appointed Baron Cushendun in 1927.  
34
 Minutes of the 190th   meeting of the CID, 4 December 1924, NA/CAB 2/3. Unusually, Baldwin was 
present, while Chamberlain was absent on urgent diplomatic business. The attendance list shows the full 
range of senior cabinet ministers and chiefs of staff.  Clearly departments gave high priority to the 
meeting, and assumed that conclusions would be ratified by the cabinet.   
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The Twelve Months Leading to Locarno   
 
The Treaties of Locarno in 1925, which superseded the defunct Geneva Protocol, did 
represent a watershed in the diplomatic relationships in Western Europe.35 Although 
Churchill was very much in the anti-Chamberlain faction of the cabinet in the spring of 
1925, he wrote in 1929 that ‘the Treaty of Locarno can be regarded as the old world 
counterpart of the Treaty of Washington…twin pyramids of peace, rising solid and 
unshakable on either side of the Atlantic.’36 Although the treaties can be seen as only 
partly successful, as they only dealt with German relations with its western neighbours, 
and they were to be swept away in the 1930s, they represented a considerable achievement 
at the time. The thirteen months from the drafting of the Protocol in September 1924 and 
the agreements at Locarno in October 1925 were particularly interesting in respect of the 
changing or non-changing British diplomatic attitudes towards France, and also in the 
content and feelings of the Commons discussions on foreign and imperial affairs in the 
first year of the second Baldwin government.  
 
The treaties were the culmination of diplomatic processes resulting from pressures in 
Britain, France and Germany. Chamberlain was the new British foreign secretary, Briand 
succeeded Herriot as French foreign minister in April 1925 and Stresemann was already 
looking for a solution to Germany’s outstanding problems, at least on Germany’s western 
borders. In December 1924, the Allied Conference of Ambassadors accepted the French 
view that Germany’s record on disarmament justified delay in the evacuation of the allied 
troops from the Cologne area of the Rhineland due in January 1925. However, the 
German diplomatic initiative, initiated with the British on 20 January and with the French 
in February, eventually led after months of diplomatic activity to the conference in 
Locarno in October. This was a classic example of diplomatic manoeuvring, including 
full use of the ambassadors in key countries regarding the possible reaction to different 
                                                 
35 Although only one of the agreements related to the Rhineland, they were often referred to as the 
‘Rhineland Pact’. Chamberlain indicated, Hansard, Volume 185, 24 June 1925, column 1657, the 
additional complications that language brings to diplomacy when he pointed out that the French for 
‘covenant’ was ‘pacte’!  
36Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: The Aftermath (London: Macmillan, 1941), p.459.   
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ideas. The British understood that the major work needed to be done with the French; 
looking back in January 1926, the Foreign Office official Sterndale Bennett put the 
French problem into perspective by saying of 1925 that ‘the first five months were spent 
in overcoming the suspicions of the French Government and in dissuading them from 
postulating conditions which might have wrecked the chances of agreement with 
Germany or which might have made impossible the co-operation of his Majesty’s 
Government.’37 There was still work to be done in Locarno, but it was a very different 
process to that of either the Paris or the Washington Conferences. 
 
While the position of the Dominions was diplomatically left on one side, and the demise 
of the Protocol agreed but not announced, the British relationship with France was central 
to British thinking early in 1925. Narizny concluded that in the years after Versailles ‘with 
the empire secure, the Conservatives no longer had any compelling reason to make further 
sacrifices on behalf of the French. They were willing to guarantee the border between 
France and Germany, but they refused to enter into any other diplomatic commitments.’38 
Nicolson opened the discussion in February 1925 in a Foreign Office document, which 
Chamberlain forwarded to the cabinet, and argued why a pact involving guarantees to 
France could now be in Britain’s interest. 39 He reminded his colleagues that the proposed 
1919 guarantee  to France from the United States and Britain, had only very reluctantly 
been accepted by France as the alternative to the considerable pressures from Foch and 
others that German territory must be restricted to the east of the Rhine. Nicolson accepted 
that it had been, and still was, difficult for France to agree to evacuate the Rhineland, 
without some compensating security guarantee.  
 
If Nicolson’s analysis was correct, it must be clarified why Britain had been so reluctant 
to enter a pact with France, after the United States and then Britain withdrew from the 
proposed Versailles. A document written by Hankey, a central figure and a leading 
sceptic, in January 1925, partly explains why he and many others had previously objected 
to a pact with France before 1925. Hankey wrote that he had objected to a pact because it 
could have led to the guarantee being invoked when France was not threatened, it could 
                                                 
37 Documents, Series 1A, No.1, 10 January 1926, p.12. 
38 Kevin Narizny ‘The Political Economy of Alignment : Great Britain’s Commitments to Europe 1905-
39’  International Security Volume 27/4 Spring 2003 p.205.  
39 Documents, Volume XXVII, No.205, 20 February 1925, p.311. Harold Nicolson, diplomat, politician, 
historian and biographer, served in the Foreign Office from 1909 to 1929. 
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encourage France to maintain what he refers to as a continuously provocative and over-
confident attitude towards Germany, and that it could lead to the risk of greater military 
commitment. 40    
 
However, Hankey went on to say that a pact would now be in Britain’s interest, because 
if Britain was at loggerheads with France, Britain could suffer in that imperial 
communications would be jeopardised in respect of both the Channel ports and the 
Mediterranean ports used by the Royal Navy. He also considered that as the Protocol was 
now part of all diplomatic discussions, and a pact with France would be much less 
detrimental. Finally, Hankey was reassured by the wording of a draft document which 
had been produced by Crowe. Hankey’s conclusion was that there should now be an 
attempt to agree a pact, subject to the use of Britain’s forces remaining entirely within the 
discretion of the British government, that there would be no increase in British 
armaments, and that there should be some periodic review. 
 
            Moreover, a closer examination of that Curzon Foreign Office document of December 
1921 shows a comparable distinction to Hankey’s, between a limited and a 
comprehensive commitment to France. Curzon had stated that a proposal:  
 
            to commit this country to go to war again – not for a narrowly defined and 
easily intelligible object, such as the eastern frontier of France, which is 
also the external frontier of Britain – but for objects which it will be difficult 
to define in words, and in contingencies which, though unlikely to arise, 
cannot be described as impossible, will I think, excite in many quarters the 
gravest disappointment and alarm and concern that this will be enhanced 
by the fear that a treaty of alliance with France may drag us into a war in 
which direct British interests are not involved, and which might have been 
avoided had not our ally been encouraged to take an unbending attitude in 
regard to a particular matter.41  
    
 
There was then a common distinction between narrow diplomatic agreements related to 
specific commitments, as opposed to an all-embracing Anglo-French treaty. However, in 
the cabinet discussions early March, when Chamberlain’s attitude was one of being 
relatively pro-French, and in favour of some form of agreement, he was challenged by a 
                                                 
40 Documents, Volume XXVII, No.191, 26 January 1925, p.286. 
41 Documents, Volume XVI, No.768, 28 December 1921, p.865. 
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number of cabinet members, including Churchill, who were not convinced of the need for 
any commitment to the French. Both before and during Chamberlain going to Paris to 
confirm Britain’s misgivings, and to Geneva to say that Britain would not sign the 
Protocol, Baldwin had considerable difficulty, including a resignation threat from 
Chamberlain, before obtaining a cabinet consensus to support Chamberlain. Once the 
decision was taken, and Baldwin had ensured backing for Chamberlain, the following 
months concentrated on intense diplomatic activity.42 
 
Locarno was then preceded by months of diplomatic activity, not only between Britain, 
France and Germany, but also with Italy, Belgium and Poland. All the key documents are 
recorded in Documents; there are many interesting examples of diplomatic 
correspondence to Chamberlain from British, for example from D’Abernon from Berlin 
on 15 March saying ‘the German Government have practically made up their minds that 
they must come into the League of Nations. The reserves (sic) that they made…appear to 
have been adequately taken into account in the reply of the League which is published in 
the German papers this morning. Provided Luther has the desire to come into the League, 
he can agree to the conditions formulated. I regard this question as nearly settled;’43 or 
Crewe from Paris on 29 May clarifying French foreign office reactions to particular 
wordings of the draft text44 or Graham from Rome on 19 June saying that he attached ‘the 
text of the reply of the Italian Government to the French communication of the French 
answer to the German note on the question of security.’45 There is also a letter from 
Drummond to Tyrrell on 6 May, offering the assistance of the League wherever it would 
be helpful.46  The point of these citations is to demonstrate both the complexity and the 
professionalism of the diplomatic processes. The detailed documents also show the ups 
and downs of the negotiations during these months; confidence in one part of the proposed 
agreements being agreed with one of the parties, was no guarantee of it being finally 
                                                 
42 Apart from such cabinet discussions, Baldwin left most foreign policy issues to Chamberlain. Jenkins 
wrote of Baldwin that, despite his regular relaxing visits to a hotel in Aix-Les-Baines, ‘he never made the 
seventy-mile journey from Aix to Geneva, which was then the centre of the international world.’ Roy 
Jenkins Baldwin (London : Collins, 1987) p.89. 
43 Documents Volume XXVII, No. 250, 15 March 1925, p.387. 
44 Ibid. No. 351, 29 May 1925, p.557. 
45 Ibid. No. 387, 19 June 1925, p.625. 
46 Ibid. No. 312, 6 May 1925, p.483. 
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agreed with all the parties, especially with the political complexities in France and 
Germany.47 
 
  
The debates within the cabinet in March appear to be often more vigorous than those 
between the parties in the Commons.48  Within the total time that the Commons spent on 
foreign and imperial matters, there were eight significant debates between the start of the 
session in December 1924 and the start of the recess on 7 August 1925. The first debate 
in the new parliament was on 15 December 1924, during the customary day allocated 
during the debate on the King’s Speech.49 Chamberlain was complimented on having 
attended the quarterly meeting of the Council of the League, and there was some 
discussion of the European security situation, but the debate was dominated by the 
position in the Sudan. That was top of the agenda because of the assassination of the 
governor general, Sir Lee Stack, and the immediate blame laid on the Egyptian 
government by the British government. The Labour Party, while very critical of the 
assassination, was also critical of the government’s response to Egypt. Therefore, because 
of Sudan, the European security situation did not play a major part in this debate.  
 
The first debate of 1925 on European security was on 5 March.50 The initial speaker was 
Herbert Fisher MP; his main concern was the situation in Germany and specifically the 
Allied decision, led by the French, not to evacuate Cologne on 10 January.  MPs 
appreciated that, as Chamberlain was about to set off for Paris and Geneva, he could not 
speak openly in advance of the diplomatic negotiations, and there was no vote. Concerns 
were expressed about Cologne, the Saar, Danzig and European security in general. A 
week later there was a private members motion on foreign policy but this was concerned 
                                                 
47  Kitching emphasised that in July, ‘Cecil raised questions of disarmament during discussions on the 
proposed pact, but Chamberlain refused to discuss any question of reduction, until security was achieved’ 
Carolyn J. Kitching Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament 1919-34 (London : 
Routledge, 1999). p.91. 
48
 The debates did become somewhat more partisan after the 1924 election, than at most times between 
1919 and 1924. This was partly due to the decisive result of the election, partly because, unusually, 
foreign policy matters had become an issue in the election with regard to Russia and the publication of the 
Zinoviev letter, and partly because of the development of the Labour Party as the main opposition party.  
49 Hansard, Volume 179, 15 December 1924, columns 647-754. 
50 Hansard, Volume 18, 5 March 1925, columns 690-804. 
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with the principles of parliamentary control of foreign policy, and not of substantive 
issues.51  
 
The final debate on European security in advance of Locarno took place on 24 June on 
the ‘Proposed Security Pact.’52 There was detailed discussion on the Pact including 
Chamberlain and Lloyd George and also MacDonald who was still extolling the virtues 
of the Protocol. Ponsonby, speaking for Labour, returned to the issue of Russia, and what 
he saw as the government’s refusal to draw Russia into the family of nations.53 Questions 
in the debate included whether the Pact was necessary, and whether any responsibilities 
that were involved were too great to assume. The importance of the debate was not 
reflected in members attending, as there had to be a roll-call to confirm that forty MPs 
were still present for the debate to continue.  Chamberlain knowing that there would be 
no vote, went out of his way to agree with MacDonald on the key issues that no one power 
should dominate Europe, that there should not be an alliance against other powers, that 
no great nation can be permanently held in subjection, and that British policy should have 
the objectives of security, arbitration and disarmament.   
 
The last two debates on foreign affairs  before Locarno, were devoted to imperial 
matters.54 The debate on 27 July was specifically on the proposed split of the Dominion 
and Colonial Offices.55 Amery’s comments on the different roles towards Dominions and 
the colonies have been quoted above, but he also used interesting wording about of the 
work of the department, when he said that forty telegrams had been sent to the Dominions 
in the last eight months regarding the European security situation, and that the department 
had made real efforts to keep the Dominions fully informed.56 An outline of possible 
future direction of Labour Party colonial policies can be seen in the discussions on India, 
                                                 
51
 Hansard, Volume 181, 11 March 1925, columns 1430-1474. China took priority in an adjournment 
debate on 18 June when Trevelyan argued that the lives of foreigners were in considerable danger. 
Hansard, Volume 185, 18 June 1925, columns 906-956. 
52 Hansard, Volume 185, 24 June 1925, columns 1555-1670. 
53 Ibid. column 1603. 
54 The tone of the debate on the India Supply Day on 9 July can be judged by Colonel Wedgwood who 
led for Labour and tried to balance the past and the future by emphasising that in urging self-government, 
he made ‘no judgement upon those great men who have built up our Indian Empire, and made its history 
something of which Englishmen could be proud.’ Hansard, Volume 18, 9 July 1925, columns 632. 
55 Hansard, Volume 187, 27 July 1925, columns 65ff. 
56 Ibid. column 72. 
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with the distinction between the honourable past with the need now for self-government, 
and on China, Egypt and the Sudan. 
 
 The Locarno Conference 
 
After the Commons rose for the recess on 7 August, the diplomatic processes continued 
and the Locarno Conference commenced on 5 October. It was attended by delegates from 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland and Italy.57 The 
priority in the discussions can be seen in Article 1, which started: 
 
           The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the 
manner provided in the following articles, the maintenance of the territorial 
status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and 
between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as 
fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 
28, 1919. 
 
The most important issues resolved were the confirmation of Germany’s western borders, 
the commitment of Britain to the security of France’s eastern borders, and the opportunity 
for Germany to become a full member of the League with an assumed seat on the Council. 
Steiner gave the best account of the achievements or satisfaction that the different 
countries obtained from the agreements at Locarno and these can be summarised as 
follows.58   
 
Germany made a major step towards international respectability by freely accepting the 
Versailles verdict on its western frontiers and the demilitarised Rhineland. They yielded 
nothing on their eastern frontiers and, with France’s eastern guarantees now linked to the 
League, Stresemann felt he had weakened the Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921. Germany 
had prevented a wider Anglo-French Alliance and the Allies had agreed to reconsider the 
Versailles provisions for German disarmament and to a review of the terms and length of 
the occupation of the Rhineland. 59 
                                                 
57 Italy’s delegation was led by Mussolini, who made a typically flamboyant, but unimportant, 
contribution.  
58 Steiner, The Lights that Failed, pp.397-410. 
59 Locarno confirmed the Versailles arrangements, but crucially with German agreement. The first 
withdrawal, deferred in January 1925, was implemented as part of the Locarno Agreements. The final 
withdrawal, due in 1935, was in fact implemented by 1930. The plebiscite on the separate area of the 
Saarland was held in 1935, with a large majority voting to return to Germany. 
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France was satisfied that she had ensured the ending of her fear of isolation, by associating 
Britain with the defence of France, and securing that formal British guarantee which had 
been absent since the collapse of the Franco-British-American Versailles commitments; 
the critical point about Locarno for Briand was his anxiety that British participation in the 
new security arrangements would prevent Germany looking to Russia for a German-
Russia Alliance. There was also satisfaction from the financial and commercial leaders in 
France who favoured an accommodation with Germany. 
 
Britain achieved, at little cost, a détente in western Europe after the six-year diplomatic 
struggle between the victors and the vanquished from the war; Britain’s new 
responsibilities were confined to the Rhine frontier; with the hope for peaceful change in 
Europe, Britain could concentrate on its domestic and imperial issues; by minimising the 
danger of war and restricting her military obligations should peace collapse, Britain 
distanced itself from commitments in Eastern Europe, and anchored Germany to the 
League, to the Western powers, and away from Russia.60 Although Italy and Belgium 
were participants in Locarno, they were not important players; the big losers of the 
participants were Czechoslovakia and particularly Poland. 61  
 
The Commons’ recess lasted until 16 November 1925, and therefore parliament was not 
sitting during the negotiations in Locarno. After parliament reconvened, Chamberlain led 
the debate  to approve the agreements, and there was some considerable debate on this 
occasion and a Labour amendment, while agreeing to the Locarno agreements, 
concentrated concern on both the need for ‘real disarmament’ and the need to ‘secure the 
adhesion of Russia to the League of Nations and its participation in European 
                                                 
60 Although Richardson pointed out that ‘the problem of disarmament was barely considered during the 
security negotiations of March – October 1925’ that was understandable, given the other major challenges 
of the process. Dick Richardson The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s (London : 
Winter, 1989) p.42. 
61
 The Round Table, as an independent contemporary commentator, pointed out the issues that Locarno 
had not solved such as that it did not shorten the occupation of the Rhineland, it did not alter the terms of 
Versailles in respect of the Saar, it did not deal with the issue of what was the realistic armaments policy 
for a country of the size and importance of Germany, and it had not been able to deal with the problems 
of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the writer in the December 1925 edition welcomed the agreements and 
concluded that Britain had not taken on any extra responsibilities. The Round Table, Number 61, 
December 1925, pp.1-28. 
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agreements.’62 The government defeated the amendment by 332 to 130, and won the main 
vote by 375 to 13, with the opposition coming from a few on the Labour benches, and not 
from any Diehard MPs in the Conservative Party.63  
 
Chamberlain was central to the Locarno process, and assessments of Chamberlain during 
the first twelve months of the second Baldwin government emphasize his pragmatism. 
Douglas Johnson said that ‘Chamberlain was careful to point out that he did not go to the 
Foreign Office with any ready-made policy’ and that he said he needed time ‘to form at 
any rate some first impressions of the many problems with which I have now to deal.’64 
The personal relationships that were built up between Chamberlain, Briand, and 
Stresemann appear to have been genuine, and clearly helped the diplomatic processes in 
1925. The obvious comparison is with the relationships at The Hague Conference in 1929, 
on the Young Plan on reparations, where according to Jacobson, the relationships were 
very difficult, when the new Labour government was represented by Snowden, rather 
than Henderson the foreign secretary.65  
 
The Locarno diplomacy can certainly be defended because it was both successful and it 
was suitable for its time. The more idealistic aspirations of the League and the Protocol 
had not been realised, and the League’s role was still strictly limited.66 The Locarno 
diplomacy did in some ways relate back to pre-war diplomacy, but was certainly more 
open and objective than the Versailles process with the carving up of problems and 
territories by Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. The Foreign Office, and the 
relevant ambassadors, were fully involved in the months leading up to Locarno; the post-
                                                 
62 Hansard, Volume 188, 18 November 1925, columns 419ff. These were the specific parts of the treaties 
that needed formal parliamentary approval. 
63 Marquand confirmed that MacDonald did welcome ‘the Locarno Pact on the grounds that it removed 
the remaining obstacles to the Protocol, and hence to disarmament.’  Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald, 
p.467. 
64
 Douglas Johnson, ‘Austen Chamberlain and the Locarno Agreements’, University of Birmingham 
Historical Society, Volume 8, 1961, p.64.   
65Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, Germany and the West 1925-1929 (Princeton NJ: University Press, 
1972), p.309. 
66
 Whether Locarno was consistent with the principles of the League has been a debated; Walters who 
had been deputy secretary general of the League wrote later that ‘Every line of the pacts was based upon 
the Protocol or the Covenant. Every provision for their application depended in the last resort on action 
by the Council. What had been planned at Locarno could be fulfilled nowhere else than at Geneva.’ 
Walters, A History of the League of Nations, p.291. However, Northedge, referring to this statement, 
argues that ‘there can be little doubt that, on the contrary, the general drift and purport of the Locarno 
accords were totally at variance with the League system, and went far to destroy it.’ F.S. Northedge, The 
League of Nations – Its Life and Times 1920-1946, (Leicester: University Press, 1986), p.96. 
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war diplomacy was no simple extension of pre-war diplomacy, but the politicians and 
diplomats had grown up and learnt their trades in the late Victorian and the Edwardian 
years. Goldstein, in reviewing the six years, wrote that: 
 
         for Britain, 1919 had marked the apogee of empire, the end of the age of 
expansion and the beginning of a period of consolidation…the years 1919-
25 saw a slow drift in the maintenance of a coherent diplomatic strategy…the 
move to develop a focussed and coherent foreign policy was driven by the 
combined forces of the new foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, and his 
dying permanent under-secretary, Sir Eyre Crowe.67  
 
 
Writing at the outbreak of the Second World War, E.H. Carr argued from a wider 
historical perspective that the reason that  international treaties might seem ‘disreputable’ 
and/or ‘morally invalid’ could be that treaties had been signed under duress, that they 
were inequitable treaties or that they were treaties that were instruments of power.68 
However, Carr also emphasised that while such accusations could be made about the 
Treaty of Versailles, the situation at Locarno was very different both on the process used 
and the agreements made. 
 
The twelve months between the discussion on the Protocol and the new Baldwin 
government in 1924, and the agreements in Locarno in October 1925, were marked by 
these important developments in both the diplomatic and the parliamentary areas. The 
diplomatic processes picked up from January 1925 and they carefully prepared for the 
formal conference in October; although there was still then work to be done, the 
groundwork had been well prepared. The analysis of the foreign affairs debates in the 
Commons shows the importance of both European and imperial affairs, the general 
consensus in the discussion on the ‘Pact’ and the first signs of a different agenda for 
Labour which was to be significant in the longer-term, but not in 1925. 
 
In looking back at Locarno in the context of the whole period from Versailles, it has been 
argued that there were far less differences between the political parties, than expected, 
                                                 
67 Erik Goldstein, ‘The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, 1924-1925’ in 
Michael Dockrill and B. J. C. McKercher (eds.), Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign 
Policy 1890-1950, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.115. 
68 E.H. Carr The Twenty Year Crisis, 1939-1939 (London : Macmillan, 2016 Edition) pp.172-174. 
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when in government.  This relative continuity of policies might suggest that the policies 
could have been driven by civil servants/foreign office officials, rather than politicians 
from different parties. There is no evidence of this; the analysis of foreign office 
documents above just indicated close and correct working between politicians, officials 
and ambassadors. Moreover, Sharp who has probably studied more foreign office 
documents of this period than most historians, does not identify this as one of his 
conclusions in his recent writing on ‘Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy 
in the 1920s.’69 
                                                 
69 Alan Sharp, ‘Adapting to a New World? British Foreign Policy in the 1920s’ in Gaynor Johnson (ed.), 
The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (London : Routledge, 2005). 
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Chapter Seven : Unfinished Business : 1926 and Beyond  
 
The events in Locarno in October 1925, and the formal signing of the agreements in what 
is still known as the Locarno Room at the Foreign Office in London in December, were 
significant dates in post-war diplomacy, but in concentrating on those dates, it is 
reasonable to explore the unfinished diplomatic business at the end of 1925.  Although 
the main problems for the British government in 1926 were to be domestic issues 
regarding the coal-mining industry and the General Strike in May, there were also 
important imperial and European foreign policy priorities and problems in 1926. 
 
As far as imperial matters are concerned, and particularly the Dominions, the more 
obvious closing date for the thesis could be argued to be the next Imperial Conference in 
October 1926. While the Dominions continued to acknowledge their historical links to 
Britain, their wish to keep their traditional markets in Britain, the investment by the City 
of London in their countries and, in the cases of Australia and New Zealand, the protection 
of the Royal Navy, the questions about their independence, in the broadest meaning of 
the word, were never far away. The subject had not been seen as a priority at the Imperial 
Conferences in 1921 and 1923, but the 1926 meeting was successful in reaching 
agreement, when the representatives of South Africa and the Irish Free State helped 
Balfour to produce a report on ‘Inter-Imperial Relations’ and propose a definition of a 
new relationship between the Dominions and the Britain.1 This stated that Britain and the 
Dominions were agreed to be ‘autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal 
in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external 
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as 
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’2 
 
                                                 
1 This has sometimes been known as the ‘Balfour Definition’; not to be confused with the 1917 ‘Balfour 
Declaration’ regarding the Allied Powers commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Balfour 
replaced Curzon as lord president of the council in April 1925, and was now seen as the elder statesman 
in the cabinet. 
2 Chamberlain, writing in 1930, said of the Dominions that ‘we are partners in a new experiment in 
government to which neither our own history, nor the example of other empires, ancient or modern, 
afford a parallel’ ‘Great Britain as a European Power’   Journal of the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs Volume 9 1930 p.182. 
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The implementation of legislation following the agreements at the 1926 conference varied 
considerably, with the Statute of Westminster being passed into British law in 1931, and, 
for example, the New Zealand national legislation not being finally passed until 1947.3 
The different delays in implementation do not detract from the significance of the 1926 
settlement, but the new relationship had already been established in practice, by default, 
in the Chanak crisis of 1922, in the negotiations at Lausanne without the Dominions in 
1923, and more specifically with the non-involvement of the Dominions in the process 
leading to, and agreements at, Locarno in 1925.4 This all tends to reinforce the 
significance of Locarno, and the year of 1925.  
 
The main European diplomatic issues in 1926 were the arguments on the implementation 
of one of the matters agreed at Locarno, that Germany would join the League and become 
a permanent member of its Council. The problems were with regard to the Council, 
because other major powers who did not have seats on that Council, such as Spain, Brazil 
and Poland, took advantage of the initiative regarding Germany to argue that they too 
should be permanent members. This was compounded by right-wing journalists in 
France, arguing provocatively that Poland should be treated the same as Germany, and 
the early arguments about Poland were not helped by Chamberlain’s initial ambivalent 
attitude. In the discussions leading to Locarno, the membership of the Council had not 
been identified as a major problem; for example, in a Foreign Office memo in March 
1925 there was reference both to Germany’s desire for a permanent seat on the Council 
and to a concern arising from article 16 of Versailles about the position of a state 
‘disarmed to the extent that Germany was disarmed,’ but all the subsequent discussion 
was about the latter.5 Moreover, in Sterndale Bennett’s Foreign Office summary of issues 
in January 1926 the membership of the Council is not referred to as a problem.6 
 
Walters, who might have been expected to argue from a League perspective that the 
Locarno negotiators should have anticipated the problem, did not do this and in 
commenting on this subject, openly admitted that ‘there suddenly arose formidable 
                                                 
3 The Statute of Westminster also replaced the ‘Colonial Laws Validation Act 1865’ which had explicitly 
licensed the British parliament to legislate for any part of the empire and forbade the Dominions from 
passing laws ‘repugnant’ to a British Imperial Act. 
4 Given the Australian and New Zealand casualties at Gallipoli, their absence at Lausanne was significant. 
5 Documents, Volume XXVII, No.219, 3 March 1925, p.334. 
6 Documents, Series 1A, Volume 1, No.1, 10 January, 1926. 
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political complications, unforeseen till then by either the German Government or the 
Secretariat.’7 The arguments led to delay in resolving the issue, from the March Assembly 
meeting till the September meeting.8 Germany did then became a permanent member of 
the Council, and Spain, Brazil and Poland were offered ‘semi-permanent’ seats on the 
Council; Brazil carried out her threat to resign in protest, and Spain also initiated a 
resignation process but was eventually persuaded not to leave. This unfortunate process 
was the result of inadequate diplomacy in 1926, rather than any fault in the Locarno 
agreements. There were no major new European diplomatic issues in 1926; the other 
matter outstanding from Locarno was the need for agreement on the reduction in 
occupying troops in the Coblenz and Mainz regions. After various figures were proposed 
by Germany and France, the issue was finally resolved by France offering a reduction of 
6,000, or about 10%, in August 1926.  
 
The diplomatic situation in 1926 does link with a further criticism of Locarno, for 
example by Bell, that Britain did not implement the military planning and follow-up in 
1926 and beyond, to ensure that the guarantees given at Locarno could be implemented;9 
and Bond pointed out that it was the chief of staff’s view that the Locarno Treaties: 
 
         greatly simplified the problems of Imperial defence because, with a friendly 
France, the Rhine becomes in fact…the strategic frontier of Great Britain on 
land. There was therefore less urgent need to prepare home defences against 
either a sea or air attack, and the Territorial Army could be reduced. More 
men, money and material could be devoted to the defence of the main line of 
communication from Britain through the Mediterranean to Singapore and the 
Far East.10  
 
                                                 
7 F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1952) p.317. 
8 The Assembly meeting on 14 September was the occasion when the national ratifications of the Locarno 
Treaties were exchanged, and with their registration with the League, came formally into effect. 
9
 P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), 
p.40. Bell did point out that there were wider attempts between France and Germany to encourage co-
operation after Locarno as he said that ‘The diplomatic relationship was accompanied by the activities of 
various private bodies, for example the Franco-German Committee, which originated with a small group 
of writers, politicians, and businessmen; and the Action Catholique de la Jeunesse Française, which 
threw itself into the work of reconciliation with German Catholics. In economic terms, French and 
German industrialists (with others from Belgium and Luxembourg) signed in September 1926 an 
agreement for an iron and steel cartel.’ Ibid, p.36.  
10 Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980), p.81. 
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The Foreign Office reminded the chiefs of staff in 1926 of Britain’s commitments after 
the Locarno Treaties, but the chiefs did not draw the same conclusions. Howard quoted 
them as being clear that the size of the British forces was:  
 
         governed by various conditions peculiar to each service, and is not arrived at 
by any calculations of the requirements of foreign policy, nor is it possible 
that they ever should be so calculated. Thus, though the Expeditionary Force, 
together with a limited number of Air Force Squadrons, constitute the only 
military instruments available for immediate use in Europe or elsewhere 
outside Imperial territory in support of foreign policy, they are so available 
only when the requirements of Imperial Defence so permit.11  
 
It appears that there was no direct Foreign Office reaction and Howard pointed to repeated 
reminders by the Chiefs that there were no plans for implementing Locarno guarantees 
and no instructions on this.12 This though is not a fair criticism of the content of the 
Locarno agreements themselves, and it has not been argued that the agreements provided 
commitments which could not have been implemented for political, military or financial 
reasons. 
 
Howard also was one of those historians who have argued in different ways that Britain’s 
imperial responsibilities had a negative effect on British policies towards Europe, or that 
the effects of the Great War accelerated imperial decline. Howard wrote that ‘in 1925, in 
fact, as in 1900, Britain’s imperial responsibilities rendered her impotent to bring serious 
influence to bear on those developments in Europe on which her security ultimately 
depended,’13 and Vinen commented on the imperial responsibilities that:  
 
for the British, the war had been essentially defensive. It had been designed 
to preserve the status quo. Since they had nothing to gain, even victory was 
bound in the long run to seem like the beginning of decline. This was 
particularly true in terms of overseas empire. Britain commanded even 
larger areas after 1919 than she had before 1914, but the war sapped her 
economic capacity to maintain such a position.14   
 
                                                 
11 Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of 
Two World Wars (London: Temple Smith, 1972), p.94. 
12 Ibid. p.95. 
13 Ibid. p.95.  
14 Richard Vinen, A History in Fragments: Europe in th Twentieth Century (London: Little Brown, 2002), 
p.71. 
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Some of these arguments depend on there being identified commitments in Europe which 
could not be undertaken because of those wide imperial responsibilities. In such 
arguments there would need to be a clear over-concentration on imperial issues, in costs 
or in time, to the detriment of a defined European commitment or thinking; for example, 
that priority for the Royal Navy within the total military budget had led to cutbacks in 
army numbers which affected commitments in Europe made, or wished for, by British 
governments. However, this was not the case during these years as direct commitments 
to Europe in general, and the Rhineland in particular, were already limited both by the 
terms of Versailles, and by the extreme caution of British politicians of getting further 
involved in European commitments. 
 
Writing in 1939, E. H. Carr argued with regard to Locarno that the British guarantees to 
France and Belgium, and to Germany were an ‘ingenious device’ to allay mutual fears, 
but that Locarno ‘also guaranteed a state of affairs that could not be maintained 
indefinitely once Germany became strong – the demilitarisation of the German 
Rhineland.’15   This viewpoint, written just at the start of the Second World War, again 
emphasises the questions of the work done, or not done, in the years after 1925, rather 
than deficiencies in the Treaties of Locarno themselves.  
 
In reviewing government thinking and priorities during and after 1926, it is appropriate 
to refer to three key Foreign Office documents which give the substance and the feel for 
British government views of the world after Locarno. Initially there was the ‘Foreign 
Office Memorandum respecting the Locarno Treaties’ by Sterndale Bennett in January;16 
then a ‘Memorandum on the Foreign Policy of His Majesty’s Government’ in April;17 
and most importantly the public ‘Statement made by Sir A. Chamberlain to the Imperial 
Conference’ in October.18 The January document was specific to Locarno and related 
matters; the April and October documents covered the whole world, and had much in 
common, and were no doubt originated in the same section of the Foreign Office.  
 
                                                 
15 E.H. Carr, Britain, A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War              
(London : Longmans Green, 1939) p.127 
16 Documents, Series 1A, Volume 1, 10 January 1926, pp.1-17. 
17 Documents, Series 1A, Volume 1, 10 April 1926, pp.846-881.  
18 Documents, Series 1A, Volume II, 20 October 1926, pp.919-958.  
186 
 
There was a common theme of looking back at the difficulties and increasing friction in 
Western Europe between January 1920 and the time in October 1923 which coincided 
with the last Imperial Conference, and emphasising the great progress made in the two 
years since October 1923. Bennett recorded the difficulties in the Locarno process of the 
British commitments to France, the German eastern borders, and the German reluctance 
to be fully involved in the League because of the links to the extremely unpopular terms 
of Versailles.  Bennett said that ‘Locarno is but a first step’ but believed that the new 
international spirit could help in troubled areas such as the Balkans, Russia, co-operation 
between the United States and Europe, and possibly general disarmament. 19 
 
The April document highlighted the differences between the aspirations of the various 
losers in the war, as opposed to Britain who had ‘no territorial ambitions, nor desire for 
aggrandisement.’20 However, the writer argued that the spread of British trade and finance 
meant that any threat to peace anywhere in the world was a threat to Britain. On Germany, 
he did highlight the unresolved Central European problems, when he said, significantly 
with regard to Danzig and Upper Silesia, that despite the arbitration treaty between 
Germany and Poland at Locarno, Germany would ‘never rest until her present wrongs, as 
she considers them, have been righted.’21 On Britain’s attitude he went on to say ‘it is 
hardly possible at the present time to suggest what line it will prove in our interest to take, 
but as a matter of history it may be recalled that this country has never in the past taken 
up arms to resist the dismemberment of Poland, even in days when we not so crippled by 
a colossal war debt.’22 
 
The wording of Chamberlain’s speech to the Imperial Conference in October 1926 
reflected many of the arguments, and some of the Foreign Office wording, of the April 
document, but was able to report that agreement with Turkey regarding Mosul had been 
reached in July through the good offices of the League.23 Chamberlain said that the ‘spirit 
                                                 
19 Documents, 10 January 1926, p.16. 
20 Documents, 10 April 1926, p.846. 
21 Ibid. p.857. 
22 Ibid. p.857. 
23
 The April paper had expressed concern about northern Iraq, where the writer felt that the Turks might 
attempt to recover Mosul by military means. Documents, 10 April 1926, p.860. Chamberlain was 
therefore announcing positive news on this; the April paper also identified the problems in the New 
Hebrides, where there was a tense situation in the territory involving a joint responsibility between France 
and Britain since 1914. 
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of Locarno as more important than the Treaties themselves,’ and explained why it had not 
been possible to make progress to resolve the issues of German’s eastern borders at 
Locarno, and indicated the ongoing political thinking in Germany by saying: 
 
         the severance of East Prussia from the main German body by means of 
the Polish Corridor, and the partition between Germany and Poland of 
the industrial and mining areas of Upper Silesia, are regarded as wrongs 
in which it is impossible permanently to acquiesce, and these practical 
grievances are aggravated by the hatred felt by the Poles for their 
former oppressors and by the contempt for the Poles as men of an 
inferior race and culture openly expressed by the Germans.24   
 
He said that he hoped that the example set by Locarno could be followed elsewhere in 
Europe to settle differences but he argued that ‘any attempt by the Western Powers to 
impose this policy would be doomed to certain failure – its whole value lying in its 
voluntary nature and spontaneous adoption.’25  
  
While recognising that the choice of dates for historical research is arbitrary, this analysis 
of the significant diplomatic events in 1926 reinforces the appropriateness of taking 
Locarno in 1925 as the key date after Versailles and the end of the era of the Great War. 
It is also clear that the British did understand the seriousness and difficulties of solving 
of the German-Polish border issues which were not included in the Locarno settlements. 
Chamberlain and the Foreign Office could, with good reason, repeat that it would have 
been impossible to make progress on solving these issues at Locarno, apart from the 
signing of the German Polish Arbitration Treaty, and that they did recognise in 1926 the 
dangers of the situation, but there was a strong feeling in public and in private that it was 
not Britain’s job or responsibility to get involved in Eastern Europe. It recalls 
Chamberlain’s famous quote in 1925, mentioned above, when he wrote that no British 
Government would risk the ‘bones of a British Grenadier’ for an objective in Poland.  
  
The inconsistency in the Chamberlain and the Foreign Office arguments was not in 
respect of the attitudes and conclusions in 1925; rather that while they emphasised the 
‘spirit of Locarno’ on an on-going basis, this implied further consistent and painstaking 
diplomacy after 1925. The references to Central Europe in 1926 indicated that it was up 
                                                 
24 Documents, 20 October 1926, pp.921and 923. 
25 Ibid. p.940. 
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to the nations concerned to take any initiative, which was highly unlikely given the 
German and Polish views listed, and that no British blood could be spilt in that area of 
Europe. The latter, however, was not being suggested, and a prospect of serious 
diplomacy does not assume military solutions. Goldstein wondered what might have been 
achieved after 1925, if Sir Eyre Crowe had not died in April 1925, and said of the 
Chamberlain approach to Locarno, and his rejection of advice from Headlam-Morley on 
Eastern Europe, that he adopted much of the advice he was given 
 
         but he rejected that on the significance of Eastern Europe as integral to 
the overall European balance. Strong arguments were made that to have 
included Eastern Europe in the Locarno arrangement would have 
prevented any meaningful result being achieved. Eastern Europe was 
therefore decoupled for later consideration. Chamberlain, however, 
during his remaining tenure of office never evinced any real interest in 
moving to the implicit second phase of negotiating an Eastern Locarno. 
Indeed, the remaining period of his foreign secretaryship is but a pallid 
reflection of those first energetic months. 26 
 
Looking in more detail at those remaining years of Chamberlain at the Foreign Office up 
to 1929, the traditional picture is that of his regular informal meetings in Geneva with 
Stresemann and Briand. In some senses, these reinforced the League, in that the three of 
them were in Geneva for League meetings, but they also emphasised their separateness, 
and raises the wider question of what was achieved in those years after Locarno, to build 
on the achievements of 1925. Doerr commented that Chamberlain’s ‘remaining years of 
office were marked by a curious lassitude or passivity’ but partly in his defence Dutton 
recorded his ill-health, especially during 1928.27 
 
A full assessment of Chamberlain’s total years at the Foreign Office would clearly be the 
subject of a separate thesis.28 After the events of 1926, Chamberlain or the wider British 
                                                 
26
 Erik Goldstein, The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, in Dockrill Michael 
L. and McKercher B.J.C. (eds.) Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy 1890-
1950 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996).  p.135. Dutton, as the prime biographer of 
Chamberlain wrote that ‘even in the greatest years of Pax Britannica Britain had not had the means 
effectively to intervene in the affairs of Central and Eastern Europe’ and ‘many had misunderstood 
Locarno to mark the start of active British participation in the affairs of Western Europe… it represented 
the limit and extremity of British involvement.’ David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain – Gentleman in 
Politics, (London: Ross Anderson, 1985), p.259.   
27 Paul W. Doerr British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (Manchester :  University Press, 1998) p.93. Dutton 
Austen Chamberlain p.281. 
28 This would take into account not only Doerr and Dutton but also Richard Grayson Austen Chamberlain 
and the Committment to Europe 1924-1929 (London : Routledge, 1997) who looking at his overall role as 
politician concludes that ‘his record as foreign secretary must go a long way to rescuing his reputation, 
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Government including the colonial secretary, certainly faced difficult problems in 1927, 
in different parts of the world. There was the diplomatic breach with Russia in May 1927, 
over the alleged spying from the Soviet Trade Delegation in London. There were anti-
colonial movements in China and Egypt; the British concession in Hankow was occupied 
in 1927 by Chinese nationalists; in Egypt although Britain had transferred internal affairs 
to an Egyptian Government in 1922, Chamberlain had to send naval forces and additional 
troops to Egypt also in 1927 to deal with nationalist pressures. The appointment by the 
government of the Simon Commission in November 1927, to review progress since the 
Government of India Act of 1919, insensitively did not include any Indian members, and 
the Indian National Congress quickly resolved to boycott the Commission. 
 
On the Chinese issues, Britain was not going to get sympathy from the United States for 
the results of Britain’s colonial history. Generally, British relationships with the United 
States had improved between the rejection of Versailles and the end of 1925; the 
agreement in Ireland, the settlement of the war debts issues, the success at Washington 
including both the naval agreement and the avoidance of the problem of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, and the co-operation on the Dawes Plan and the London Conference 
had all been positive developments.  
 
However, in 1927, relationships with the Unites States became more strained especially 
on the issue of naval disarmament. President Coolidge took the initiative for a conference 
in Geneva on possible limitations on cruisers involving United States, Britain and Japan, 
but with France and Italy declining to attend. However, the initiative was anyhow 
unsuccessful because the United States ideas of parity on cruisers would have led to 
limitations on British cruisers that the Admiralty saw as quite unacceptable in view of 
Britain’s worldwide commitments.  McKercher, wrote that ‘in the two years following the 
failure of the Coolidge Naval Conference in the summer of 1927, Anglo-American 
relations fell to the lowest point in this century.’29  
 
                                                 
despite his lack of success as a domestic politician’ p.283. McKercher in article ‘Austen Chamberlain and 
the Continental Balance of Power : Strategy, Stability and the League of Nations’ in Diplomacy and 
Statecraft Volume 14/22003 defended Chamberlain by writing that  ‘not once in that period was Europe 
subjected to the equivalent of the Ruhr Crisis that had the potential to undermine the new international 
order’ p.227 and his conclusion that Chamberlain was an ‘able practitioner of the balance of power’p.230.  
29 B.J.C. McKercher The Second Baldwin Government and the United States 1924-1929 : Attitudes and 
Diplomacy (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.1. 
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In Western Europe, in late 1926, Briand and Stresemann had made a wide-ranging 
cooperation agreement at the French village of Thoiry, but this fell apart during 1927. 
Also in 1927, Briand took an initiative with the United States, regarding a joint declaration 
renouncing the use of warfare; this led to the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, but this only 
amounted to a statement of intent, but with no clear enforcement mechanisms, and British 
reservations added to confusion. In mid-1928 Anglo-French negotiations on disarmament 
were not only unsuccessful but also involved Chamberlain offending not only Germany 
but also the United States. Johnson concluded that ‘the first tests of the unity of the 
Locarno powers revealed a still fragile relationship between Britain and France that had 
not entirely overcome or forgiven the tensions of the first years of peace.’30 
 
As far as the League was concerned, Chamberlain saw it as just one of the means of 
resolving diplomatic problems. Certainly, the diplomatic wrangling in 1926 about 
Germany’s appointment to the Council and those ‘tea parties’ in Geneva detracted from 
the main roles of the League. Britain’s relationships with the League were also not helped 
by Cecil’s separate cabinet responsibility for League’s matters up till his resignation in 
1927, which often led to discord with Chamberlain. Walters, as the former insider, saw 
these years as the ‘years of stability’ for the League but can only point to success in the 
Greco-Bulgarian crisis of October 1925 and the Mosul settlement in 1926, and Northedge 
later put this into perspective by pointing out that the League decision in December 1925 
to set up the ‘Preparatory Commission for the (world disarmament) 
Conference…remained the principal instrument of all the League’s work on disarmament 
until the conference met in Geneva in 1932,’ when it was to be unsuccessful.31 
 
 
These examples of foreign policy issues during Chamberlain’s later years at the Foreign 
Office, when Baldwin continued to leave most of these issues to Chamberlain, indicate a 
number of complicated problems, and no great progress on the main issues. On Franco-
German relationships, and those clearly known unsolved issues of Germany’s eastern 
borders, Jacobson made the point that whilst German affairs received close attention 
between 1924 and 1926 in London, that between December 1926 and September 1928 the 
                                                 
30 Gaynor Johnson ‘Austen Chamberlain and Britain’s Relations with France, 1924-1929’ Diplomacy and 
Statecraft Volume 17/4 2006 p.766. 
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British cabinet only once had matters referring to Germany on the agenda; Chamberlain 
left the German question to Briand, and in so doing, risked little political opposition at 
home.32  The Young Plan, and the Hague Conference later in 1929, were successful 
follow-ups to the Dawes Plan and the London Conference in 1924, but the process and 
the diplomatic relationships in 1929 did not give much hope for further diplomatic 
progress.  
 
 
The detailed look at 1926  has reinforced the significance of Locarno, and the choice of 
the period chosen for this thesis.  The brief look at the years from 1926 to 1929 has 
indicated a number of foreign policy failures, or at the very least a lack of planning or 
enthusiasm to build upon the foundations laid at Locarno. The death of Stresemann on 3 
October 1929, and the crash on the New York Stock Exchange on 29 October 1929 
highlighted in retrospect a new era in European and world problems. The following two 
years had significant dates in inter-war history; for example, the final evacuation of the 
Rhineland by Allied forces in June 1930, the National Socialists’ achievement of 107 
seats in the German Reichstag in September 1930 and Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 
September 1931.  
     
It is correct to say that the failure to get any agreement about Germany’s eastern border 
issues in the years after Locarno was a major reason for the events that led to the Second 
World War, and that the principles of the Versailles and Locarno Agreements collapsed 
with Hitler’s military occupation of the Rhineland in 1936.  However, Locarno did 
achieve what was possible in 1925 in two crucial respects; firstly, to confirm Germany’s 
western borders written down at Versailles, but now accepted by Germany, and secondly 
to establish a diplomatic rapport or understanding between the three big European 
powers, as equals, which could be built on, with further efforts. The reason that the causes 
of the Second World War could be linked back to Locarno and Versailles, is not that 
Locarno was a failure, but that Locarno was not built on after 1925. 
 
No-one can know what might have thwarted German nationalism after say 1929, but it 
was not the fault of the negotiators when they were at Locarno. Chamberlain, Briand and 
                                                 
32 Jon Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy, Germany and the West1925-1929 (Princeton : University Press, 
1972), p.127.  
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Stresemann did resolve the issues of Germany’s western borders, and Britain and France 
did accept that Germany must be accepted as a full member of the international 
community. There was no possible solution in 1925 of the long-term issues regarding 
Germany’s eastern borders, so it is quite wrong for criticism of Locarno in that respect; 
the two major successes were correctly achieved, and those successes would not have 
prevented greater efforts after 1925 to address the outstanding problems for Germany and 
her neighbours about those eastern borders.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
193 
 
 
Chapter Eight :  Conclusions  
 
In the introduction to this thesis it was made clear that this was an attempt to reassess the 
conduct and success of British foreign policy between 1919 and 1925. It was emphasised 
that it was necessary to justify why this period has been chosen, to give a definition of 
success as the criterion against which to assess the conduct of policy, and to provide a 
methodological discussion about the ability of individuals, in this case, of politicians, 
diplomats or civil servants to affect the policy decisions. These issues were addressed in 
turn, followed by a discussion of the sources for this thesis, both primary and secondary, 
involving a review of the relevant literature and an assessment of the strengths, 
weaknesses and suitability of these sources in relation to the objectives of the thesis. 
 
Within the main chapters of the thesis, the various areas of British foreign policy during 
these years have been described and analysed. The questions regarding the 
appropriateness of the choice of those years, the achievements within those policies and 
the roles of the key individuals have been covered. The ‘recurrent patterned 
arrangements’ in both European and imperial matters have been clearly identified, but the 
influence of individuals such as Lloyd George, Churchill, Balfour or Chamberlain, and 
also Briand and Stresemann, have been clear in the different events leading up to 
December 1925. Within this concluding chapter an assessment will be made, in summary, 
of the different areas of policy to reach an overall conclusion. 
 
The Great War and the Treaty of Versailles provided examples of ‘discontinuities’, most 
obviously in the demise of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and the Ottoman 
empires, but ‘continuities’ in respect of the continuity and reinforcement of the British 
and French Empires. In retrospect, the clearest diplomatic continuity was the growth of 
the power of the United States during and after the war. This was demonstrated in the 
military contribution in 1917 and 1918, the role of Woodrow Wilson in Paris, and despite 
the growth of ‘isolationism’, the positive United States role it played at the Washington 
Conference and its involvement in 1924 in the Dawes Report and the London Conference. 
 
The American Governments were prepared to be involved in international diplomacy 
when they felt it was in American interests. Britain’s views on relationships with the 
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United States were ambivalent, as to whether the United States should be viewed as a 
friend, or as a rival global power.  The United States was not directly involved in the 
Locarno process, or the Locarno Conference.   
 
A positive assessment of the British foreign policies during these six years is dependent 
not just on Locarno, but on a wider assessment of the achievements and stability achieved 
by the end of 1925. Versailles had provided imperfect solutions to many of the problems 
that faced the Allied leaders in Paris; it inevitably left some mistaken decisions and many 
unresolved issues for the European statesmen to tackle in the post-war years. Locarno 
was also not a perfect solution to outstanding European problems, especially as it only 
dealt with Germany’s western borders, but, taken together with the Lausanne Agreements 
in 1923 and the London Conference in 1924, the British political establishment could 
look back with a considerable sense of achievement and stability in Europe at the end of 
1925.  
 
Versailles set the agenda for most of the diplomatic activities during these years, and the 
Locarno agreements did provide a conclusion to the years of apparently unsuccessful or 
inconclusive diplomatic initiatives to settle the outstanding issues of reparations and the 
acceptance of Germany’s western borders. After four years of total war, and seven years 
of uneasy peace, both former enemies and former allies eventually found a constructive 
way of managing the peace after the terms agreed or imposed at Versailles. Britain 
invested a large amount of diplomatic effort in 1925 to achieve a more permanent 
settlement in Western Europe and, despite all the suspicions towards France, the British 
came round to the view that it was in everyone’s interest and especially that of Britain to 
find a mutual accord with both France and Germany.  
 
At the same time, the increase in the size of the British Empire at Versailles, primarily by 
the acquisition of new territories in the Middle East, brought a new dimension to the 
empire, and to Britain’s overall foreign commitments. Before the war the different 
territories in the empire fitted comfortably into the definition of either the Dominions or 
the colonies, except for the unique situation of India and the position in Egypt which was 
still formally part of the Ottoman Empire. The acquisitions of Mesopotamia, Palestine 
and formally of Egypt were very different, not because of any League of Nations 
mandates, but rather because they, unlike the Dominions, had no history of links to Britain 
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and no British settlers, and unlike the colonies, had an established and increasing political 
class with an understanding of the goal of independence. Palestine had a particular mix 
of problems, but Egypt and Mesopotamia had some similarities with India, in respect of 
the aspirations for independence. The British also found it difficult to come to terms with 
the challenges of the Middle East, whether this was due to an ignorance of Islamic 
countries, the lack of a paternalistic or other cause as in Africa, or that the territories just 
did not fit into those traditional imperial definitions. 
 
In the traditional Dominions, these years marked a pause before their independence was 
clarified at the successful 1926 Imperial Conference. The growing evidence after Chanak 
that there could be no assumptions about the attitudes of the Dominions to foreign policy 
issues, especially with regard to commitments in Europe, came to a head in 1925 when 
the British government studiously avoided getting the views of the Dominions about a 
European Security Pact during the nine months of diplomacy. Chamberlain’s policy 
towards the Dominions in these matters was most unusual, but diplomatically successful. 
It contributed to the likelihood of success at Locarno because there was no way that all 
the traditional Dominions, let alone the new Irish Free State, would have been able to 
commit themselves to the Locarno Treaties.  
 
India always has to be discussed separately from the traditional Dominions. The political, 
military and economic position in India was very difficult from 1919 to 1922, with the 
Amritsar massacre, the subsequent political consequences in London, and then the growth 
and the decline in 1922 of Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaigns. The relative calm in 
India from the end of 1922 until after 1925 must have left the governments in London 
with an understandable feeling of satisfaction with regard to their policies. As far as the 
colonies were concerned there were no significant issues during this period, except for 
the racial issues in Kenya which resonated in India, and again the governments in London 
could not have seen any reasons why their colonial policies were not appropriate.  
Although it is arguable whether Ireland is domestic or imperial history, the 1922 
settlement and the creation of the Irish Free State, did provide a pragmatic solution to the 
centuries-old problem.  The settlement in Ireland, the acceptable compromise with the 
United States at the Washington Conference, and the evolvement of the Dominion status 
to real independence, were all successful in the short to medium-term, but in the long-
term were all examples of Britain’s decline as a global imperial power.  
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Britain’s responsibilities as a major imperial power did not compromise Chamberlain’s 
commitment to a diplomatic solution in Western Europe.  There is no convincing 
evidence that there was an over-concentration on imperial issues, to the detriment of a 
defined European commitment. During these years, direct commitments to Europe in 
general, and to the Rhineland in particular, were already limited both by the terms of 
Versailles, and by the extreme caution of British politicians of getting further involved in 
European commitments. 
 
Within Western Europe, it was the relationships with, and between, France and Germany 
that were central to most of the diplomatic problems in these years, whether in respect of 
Europe itself, or in the competition between Britain and France as imperial powers. The 
analysis of Britain’s relations with France was perhaps best summed up by the D’Abernon 
quotation that there was ‘no real hatred even when enemies - no real comradeship even 
when Allies.’ The anti-German attitudes in France, and the continuing attempts by French 
governments to impose different solutions to what they saw as threats to their national 
security, provided major problems for British diplomacy. However, closer examination 
of some of the primary sources, especially those of Curzon and Chamberlain, has shown 
greater consistency in British foreign policy towards France than often described. 
Analysis must distinguish between British reluctance to be involved in a comprehensive 
treaty with France, which could involve Britain in supporting unreasonable French 
demands in Europe or aspirations outside Europe, as opposed to a limited commitment to 
Franco-German issues, as was agreed at Locarno. 
 
Britain’s relationship with Germany was also complicated; many of the international 
conferences were between the Allies on how to deal with Germany, and did not involve 
Germany itself, and the British policies were partly affected by the obvious remembrances 
of the war, partly by the complicated details of reparations, security and relations with 
France, and partly by concern whether the German political fabric might collapse like that 
in Russia. What was crucial at Locarno was that France and Britain accepted Germany as 
a fellow major European power, and Germany accepted the western borders imposed at 
Versailles and Germany’s place in international diplomacy, including membership of the 
League.   
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The concentration of historiography on the totality of the inter-war years has affected the 
ability of historians to give appropriate consideration to the difficulties and the 
achievements during the years of 1919 to 1925. This historiography is appropriate when 
taking a wider look at issues leading to the Second World War; however, it does not 
recognise the significance of Locarno, and the reasons to look separately at the years from 
1919 to 1925. It is not reasonable to look back from after 1945, and simply see the 
inevitability of the Second World War being rooted in Versailles and the ‘illusion’ of 
Locarno.  Choices of dates for assessments are arbitrary, but the London and Locarno 
conferences did bring to a conclusion a succession of different conferences. Britain’s 
imperial policies do not point to a different date, and the look forward into 1926 and 
beyond has reinforced the significance of Locarno and 1925, both in respect of subsequent 
events and in the policy thinking of the Foreign Office.  
 
The attention of many historians to the whole of the inter-wars years has also contributed 
to the apparent reluctance to appreciate the difficulties facing the governments after the 
Great War. Although the different governments did have certain advantages in dealing 
with these problems, most obviously that Britain had emerged on the winning side in the 
war, these advantages were clearly outweighed by the difficulties faced. These included 
the personal and national feelings of exhaustion after four years of total war, that the 
responsibilities of empire had increased as a result of Versailles at the same time as the 
economic costs and the total debts of the war hit the peacetime economy, that there were 
immediate problems in 1919 with the demobilisation of up to four million military 
personnel, that the complexity and difficulties of the Irish negotiations would have been 
a burden for any government, and finally that, while a comprehensive Peace Treaty had 
been signed in Versailles, many foreign policy problems remained unsettled, especially 
the ongoing antagonism between France and Germany.  
 
Historians also sometimes forget the relative stability in Britain’s domestic situation, 
excluding Ireland, compared with many of the major powers in Europe. The revolution 
in Russia, the near-revolution in Germany immediately after the armistice, the communist 
and fascist movements in Hungary, and the fascist success in Italy in 1922 are just some 
examples of developments on the continent of Europe which were far from the continuing 
liberal democracy in Britain, including the acceptance of the first Labour government in 
1924. Despite some radical trade union activity after the war during the Lloyd George 
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government, the political and industrial scene in Britain then remained relatively stable 
until the General Strike in May 1926, and the politicians must have contributed to this 
domestic stability. Although it could be argued that this relative domestic stability made 
foreign policy decisions easier, it would be fairer to give the governments and politicians 
some credit for this domestic stability. 
 
In contrast to the eight years of continuous Liberal government before the war, and the 
solid Conservative majority through to 1929, the six years from 1919 saw five different 
governments, and a mixture of a coalition, minority governments and an absolute majority 
in the Commons. Despite all these variations, there were fewer major differences than 
might have been expected between the political parties with regard to both imperial and 
European policies. The general acceptance of the benefits of the British Empire, and the 
suspicion and caution in relation to Europe, could be applied in different degrees to all 
the parties and to all the governments, including the Labour Party in government for the 
first time. The other possible domestic constraints on foreign policy were also less than 
might have been expected. Financial constraints affect all governments to some extent; in 
this post-war period, there were considerable financial and economic problems, especially 
in the light of conventional economic thinking that applied to all parties. However, 
although all governments put restrictions on military spending, there is no evidence that 
there was any direct effect on military capability or on foreign policies except in the case 
of Mesopotamia. 
  
Therefore, it can be concluded that after June 1919  Britain faced a variety of foreign 
policy issues, including the need to reduce Franco-German animosity and to prevent any 
new conflict in Western Europe without further British military commitment; in imperial 
matters to absorb the new territories, especially in the Middle East, without putting 
unreasonable financial demands on the Treasury, to clarify a new status for the Dominions 
and to move to some form of resolution of the Irish problem; on wider diplomatic issues, 
that the United States, Germany and possibly Russia should either join the League, or be 
associated with the League in a positive way; and finally to resolve the problems between 
Greece and Turkey, without any threat to old and new British territories in the Middle 
East. On the basis of such a list of problems Britain had made considerable progress by 
the end of 1925; if Versailles had included some or all of those achievements, historical 
views of that treaty would surely have been far more positive.  
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The three Foreign Office policy documents in 1926, while not providing a specific foreign 
policy strategy after Locarno, do clearly show such priorities as the need to reinforce the 
newly established relationship between France and Germany, the need to aim to 
consolidate the functioning of and contribution to the League without restricting British 
rights of independent action, and the need to make progress about Germany’s eastern 
borders, or at least go some way to defusing them as obvious flashpoints where such 
moves would not be contrary to the principles and spirit of Versailles. Finally, with 
Ireland accepted into a clearer definition of Dominion status, there was the need to 
consolidate the imperial role, and deal with the unresolved nationalist pressures 
particularly in India, Egypt and Mesopotamia. There were no new obvious hostages to 
fortune, such as could be seen in the Versailles settlement of Germany’s eastern borders, 
or in the subsequent Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey. 
 
Therefore, although Locarno had provided the possibility of a new period of greater 
stability, there was much diplomatic work to be progressed after 1925. The assumption 
that not enough was achieved in the following years, except for the 1926 Imperial 
Conference, is not a criticism of Locarno, but raises serious questions about the 
diplomatic efforts after 1925. Any assessment of success in foreign policies must take 
into account the complexity of the existing diplomatic problems, the other difficulties 
faced by the governments, the achievements made during the period and that no new 
hostages to fortune were left for succeeding governments. In retrospect, Britain and the 
British Empire can be seen as being in long-term decline, but given the range of problems 
that faced the British governments during these six years, that long-term decline does not 
detract from the success, and the relative stability, that had been achieved by the end of 
1925.   
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